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Europe
6. In 2007 there was a public debate in the print and televised media in Iceland on whether the regulations pertaining to strip clubs should be made stricter or whether such clubs should be banned. In June 2007 a magazine named Ísafold published an article discussing the links between such clubs and prostitution. It maintained that the conditions of strip club dancers originating from eastern
Valerik
11. At the material time the only applicant in this case and her common-law partner Magomed Edilov, born in 1979, lived at Sheripova Street, 11 (in the submitted documents the address is also referred to as Lenina Street, 89) in
Urus-Martan
59. On 5 June 2006 the district prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation under Article 105 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated murder) in connection with the discovery of Murad Khachukayev’s remains. The decision stated that “in the course of the investigation of criminal case no. 34023 opened on 12 February 2003 in connection with the abduction of Murad Khachukayev on 5 February 2003 from the village of Goyty in the
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15. The judgment also referred to the pre-trial statements of co-defendants Mi., Mu. and Gu., which were inconsistent with their evidence at trial, one of them indicating the applicant as a person who had been on the
Europe
459. He had obtained books and articles praising the PKK in order to learn more about the organisation, and took them into prison for training people there. He used to write reports on incidents in the region which he faxed to Human Rights associations in
the Northern Caucasus
18. The Government submitted in their memorial of 28 April 2004 that it had been established that on 2 March 2000 in the village of Podgornoye fighting had taken place involving servicemen of the federal forces, which had resulted in the deaths of servicemen of the OMON detachments from Sergiyev Posad. Immediately after the fighting a special operation had been conducted in Podgornoye aimed at identifying members of the illegal armed groups who had participated in the ambush. The detainees had been taken to the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD, but Shakhid Baysayev was not listed among them. Nor was his name on the list of persons who had been detained by other detachments of the Ministry of the Interior in
Lachin
12. At the time of the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was an autonomous region (oblast) of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Azerbaijan SSR”). Situated within the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, it covered 4,388 sq. km. There was at the time no common border between Nagorno-Karabakh (known as Artsakh by its Armenian name) and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (“the Armenian SSR”), which were separated by Azerbaijani territory, the district of
South
23. On 20 November 2012 the applicant submitted the documents requested by the Attorney General’s representative on 1 June 2010 (see paragraph 18 above). In particular, the applicant submitted certificates issued by the head of the local community (mukhtar) explaining that there were inconsistencies in the spelling of the applicant’s aunt’s name in different documents. The mukhtar explained that the latter had held Cypriot identity document no. 327090 and had been variously known as: Christallou Nikola Stavrinou, Chriystallou Nicola Stavrinon, Christallou Nicola Stavrinou, Christalla Nikola and Chrystallou Nicola, but these were one and the same person. The mukhtar further certified that she had never married and that before her death she had gifted her immovable property to her sister’s daughter, the applicant (Andriani Ioannou, holder of a Cypriot identity card). In support of the mukhtar’s certificates, the applicant submitted her aunt’s identity documents (including a Cypriot identity document). The applicant also submitted documents showing the transfer of title from her aunt to her in respect of the plots of land in question. She also submitted documents showing that she had been allocated a Turkish Cypriot house in the
premises
18. The Government submitted that the Kumkapı Removal Centre where the applicant was detained had a capacity of 300 persons. The detainees were accommodated on three floors: the first two floors were reserved for male detainees, and the third floor for females. There were five dormitory rooms on each floor, measuring 50, 58, 69, 76 and 84 sq. m respectively. There were fifteen to twenty beds in each of the ten rooms reserved for male detainees and all rooms were sufficiently ventilated. There were also five showers and six toilets per floor, as well as a cafeteria measuring 69 sq. m, where breakfast, lunch and dinner were served daily on each floor. The detainees had the right to outdoor exercise in suitable weather conditions. A doctor was present on the
Oktyabrskiy
19. On 20 September 2000 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic received the applicant’s application concerning the disappearance of her husband after he had allegedly been apprehended in the
territories
23. On 19 May 2003 another anonymous witness was interviewed by the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office. He said that at the beginning of 1991 he joined the Croatian Army, namely the Office for the Defence of Sisak. He had been assigned to the reserve units of the Sisak County Police, headed by Đ.B., whose Deputy was V.M. The unit the witness had joined had been headed by Ma.M. The witness named several of his colleagues. Đ.B., V.M. and the late J.B. had made a list of persons to be arrested and brought to the First Police Station, and given orders to that effect. A.H. had almost always been present when the orders for arrests were given. The members of the reserve units had been given Serbian flags with four C-s, badges and cards allegedly issued by the Serbian Democratic Party, and certificates issued by that Party recognising contributions to its spread in the occupied
Portadown
12. The Government stated that despite the efforts of the police it was not possible to identify any particular suspect. No one had witnessed the arrival of the gunmen on the night of the attack. While a Ford Cortina car had been seen moving away from the location after the attack no one was able to identify this vehicle as belonging to the gunmen or as being used by them as a getaway vehicle. Although conversations with customers in the bar had led to a photofit picture being compiled this did not lead to anyone being connected with the incident. The view of the investigating officer at the time was that extreme loyalist elements from the
Kavaja
6. During the communist regime several plots of land and two shops owned by the applicants’ father were confiscated by the authorities without payment of compensation. The property, measuring in total 46,000 sq. m (the land) and 150 sq. m (the shops) (“the relevant property”), was situated in the
Urus-Martan
72. On 26 March 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment further wrote to Mr Khamzayev that the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings in connection with the attack of 19 October 1999 had been lawful and well-founded, as it had been established during the investigation that the federal aircraft had bombed fortified command points, bases and ammunition depots of the illegal armed groups rather than any residential areas of
Northern Iraq
18. According to the applicants’ submissions, on 28 June 2008 the national authorities once again attempted to deport them, this time to Iran. The applicants prevented their deportation by speaking Arabic and pretending not to understand Farsi. Consequently, the Iranian authorities refused to admit them to Iran. In their submissions to the Court, the Government made no mention of the purported deportation of the applicants to Iran. Instead, they noted that the applicants would be required to be deported to
Shali district
13. On an unspecified date in March 2006 several persons who did not identify themselves broke into the flat occupied by the first applicant and Khamzat Tushayev and took him away. Eight days later his relatives found out that he was being held at the
the Shumen plateau
24. In a judgment of 3 December 1999 the Varna Military Court convicted chief sergeants B.I. and H.T. of having negligently caused the death of Mr Nikolov by wilfully inflicting grievous bodily harm on him, contrary to Article 124 § 1 of the CC. It sentenced each of them to three years' imprisonment, suspended for five years. It also awarded the first applicant BGN 4,000, the second applicant BGN 3,000, and Mr Nikolov's son BGN 3,000, payable jointly and severally by the two officers. The court described in detail the events of 27 September 1994 and held, as relevant: “... the act was committed negligently ... The case at hand concerns a complex offence, where the intention in respect of the lesser outcome is combined with negligence in respect of the more serious outcome, in other words, the offence was committed with both forms of mens rea ... The court is of the opinion that both of the defendants wilfully inflicted grievous bodily harm on [Mr Nikolov], which later brought about his death. The intentions must be judged through their actions. Taking into account the subjective attitude of the defendants towards their act, the court deems that their intention did not go beyond inflicting bodily harm. They merely behaved negligently in respect of the ensuing death. The objective analysis of the defendants' conduct shows that they did not foresee the imminent death of [Mr Nikolov] and neither wished nor envisaged a fatal outcome, their intention being solely to inflict bodily harm... ...The evidence in the case suggests that no persons other than the defendants were in physical contact with [Mr Nikolov]... All the traumatic injuries which were established were inflicted at the same time, in quick succession. The evidence shows that between 2 and 2.15 p.m. on 27 September 1994 in the area of
Aegean
11. The Yatağan, Yeniköy and Gökova thermal power plants have been operated for many years by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the public utility company Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu (“TEAŞ”) in Muğla, in the
Mars-20
37. On 15 August 2005 the investigators questioned V.M., the police officer, who stated that he had assisted the applicants in their search for Amirkhan Alikhanov. According to the witness, he had accompanied Mr A. on 24 December 2004 when the latter had gone to various law-enforcement agencies looking for his brother. A few days after the abduction, they had received information that A.A. had participated in the abduction. Then, the witness had spoken with A.A.; the latter, having confirmed that he had been at the “
the Kelmehmet
133. In a certified document, dated 25 February 1996 and signed by the Mardin gendarmerie commando battalion commander Major Hurşit İmren, it is stated that Harun Aça, who had been serving as a village guard under the orders of the Derik gendarmerie district command since 27 May 1994, had participated in operations carried out from 19 July to 6 September 1994 by the Mardin gendarmerie commando battalion command in the Şırnak province and
the Brčko Area 1
39. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court notes that the Court of Appeal awarded non-pecuniary damages to M.S. because her reputation was affected by the untrue statements made in the impugned letter ... The Constitutional Court has already stated in its previous case-law that a person’s reputation forms part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity ... ... 43. The appellants ... failed to verify the impugned statements beforehand as was their duty. The Court of Appeal established that the appellants had damaged M.S.’s reputation by making untrue allegations which caused her mental distress ...When deciding on the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage and its amount, the Court of Appeal took into account the purpose of those damages and the rule that it should not favour aspirations that were incompatible with its nature and social purpose. 44. [T]he Constitutional Court considers that the measure imposed on the appellants in the present case was proportionate to the aim pursued ...The court further considers that the Court of Appeal did not go beyond its discretionary power in deciding on the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage ... [T]he Constitutional Court finds that the reasons the Court of Appeal gave were ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’ within the meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention. 45. In view of the above, the Constitutional Court considers that the interference with the appellants’ right to freedom of expression was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and that, therefore, there has been no violation of Article II/3.h) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Article 10 of the European Convention.” 35. According to the minutes of a meeting of the Management Board of the BD’s radio station dated 9 May 2003, there were two candidates for the post of the radio’s director, one of whom was M.S. The Management Board decided to extend the mandate of the acting director of the radio given that “due to political pressure and repeated voting” no decision could be made in respect of either of the candidates. II. 1995 GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (“THE DAYTON AGREEMENT”) 36. The Dayton Agreement, initialled at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton (the United States of America) on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris (France) on 14 December 1995, was the culmination of some forty-four months of intermittent negotiations under the auspices of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and the Contact Group. It entered into force on the latter date and contains twelve annexes. 37. Annex 2 of the Agreement concerns the Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues. The relevant part of this Annex reads as follows: “The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (the ‘Parties’) have agreed as follows: ... Article V: Arbitration for
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58. Accordingly, for the first six months after the date when the Utena District Court decision came into effect, the applicant was to communicate with his son for no more than two hours per working day for ten days per month, in an environment to which the child was accustomed – at the child’s home or the child care authority’s
Eastern Georgia
33. This part of the application concerns the applicant G. Makharoblishvili (listed in the appendix as no. 16). On 29 January 2001, while walking along the road between the villages of Okami and Lamiskana (
Urus-Martan
167. In a letter of 22 July 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic requested the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic to investigate the alleged involvement of officers of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD in the theft of the applicant's property, including three foreign-made cars, as during the investigation in case no. 12088 one of the cars had been found in
Staropromislovskiy district
78. On 16 and 27 March 2010 the investigators questioned Mr A.D. His statements were similar to the account of the events given by the applicant in his submissions to the Court. Among other details he noted that some of the abductors had spoken unaccented Russian and that from his neighbors, who had witnessed the abduction, he had learned that the abductors had arrived in UAZ minivans. Mr A.D. alleged that the culprits had belonged to the federal forces and had apprehended him together with Mr Anzor Tangiyev on suspicion of membership in illegal armed groups. Mr A.D. stated that after his release he had been questioned about the circumstances of the abduction by police officers from the
District
17. On 19 April 2000 the Tymovsk District Court inquired the Novoaltaysk Town and Tymovsk District police departments about the registered place of the applicant's residence. In May 2000 the Tymovsk District police department replied that the applicant had moved to Novoaltaysk in 1997. The
the Val d’Oise
10. Pursuant to the above-mentioned Law of 5 July 2000, and after the annulment of the first travellers’ reception and accommodation programme by the administrative courts, a new programme was adopted in November 2004 for
Vlora
6. During the communist regime several plots of land owned by the applicants’ parents had been confiscated by the authorities without compensation. The property measuring in total 132 hectares was situated in the
Icaria
26. Subsequently, in March 2005, the Spanish authorities authorised the applicant’s return to his country of origin, where he is now living, on condition that the Greek authorities ensured his compliance with the periodic supervision to which he had been subject in Spain. The applicant is therefore required to report every two weeks to a police station on the island of
the Samara Region
18. On 29 September 2008 the applicant was convicted of another drug‑related offence and sentenced to six years and six months’ imprisonment in a high-security colony. He was sent to serve a prison sentence in correctional colony no. IK-13 in
Oryol Region
14. On an unspecified date the staff lawyer of the applicant’s newspaper commissioned a linguistic examination of the publication, which was carried out by a professor from Oryol State University who had a degree in language studies. His report pointed out that the publication had not referred to any police officer by name or otherwise and the blame had been placed on the state authorities as a whole and the
the Vedenskiy District
35. On 30 January 2007 the acting prosecutor of the District Prosecutor’s Office approached the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 for assistance in obtaining information from the UGA as to whether the mortar batteries used on 7 June 2003 had belonged to the military units and divisions deployed in
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57. On 14 February 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant's sister-in-law, Ms E.B. She stated that on 4 February 2003 the first applicant had come to her house and told her that at about 11 a.m. on that day the head of the Khattuni OVD and police officers had arrived at their house and asked Ramzan Babushev to repair their car. Then a group of military servicemen had arrived at their house in an APC and taken Ramzan Babushev away without providing any explanation; they had also searched the first applicant's house. After that the witness and the first applicant had gone to the checkpoint in Khattuni and asked the duty officer for news of Ramzan Babushev. They were told that he had been arrested on the order of the Vedeno military commander and that he would be transferred to Vedeno. The next day, 5 February 2003, the witness and the first applicant went to Vedeno and met the deputy military commander, who told them that Ramzan Babushev had not been delivered to their office. The Vedeno VOVD also denied that Ramzan Babushev was detained on their
Ayios Yiannis
13. On 10 July 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court considered that the applicants had locus standi because they owned property in the area concerned. The court held that it could not review the prefect’s decision no. 9468/1985 directly because the application had not been lodged within the time-limit prescribed by law. However, it could review the two building permits issued on the basis of that decision and, in the context of this review, the court was obliged to examine the constitutionality of the prefect’s decision. The decision was found to have violated Article 24 of the Constitution, which protects the environment, because the redrawing of the boundaries of the settlements put in jeopardy the swamp in
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8. As soon as the applicant had left the office, Judge M.J. drew up a regulatory offence report (administratīvā pārkāpuma protokols). This document, which was written entirely by hand, read as follows: “Liepāja, 20 July 2000 11.30 a.m. Regulatory offence report prepared by Judge [M.J.] of Liepāja District Court concerning Mr Vasilijs Zaicevs ..., of ..., Liepāja. Mr Zaicevs burst into my office without permission, disturbing me at my work, and rudely demanded information to which he was not entitled, thus acting in flagrant breach of the rules [of conduct] within the precincts of a court and displaying a lack of respect. Vasilijs Zaicevs thereby infringed Article 201-39 of the Regulatory Offences Code. The offending party is unable to offer an explanation, having left the
Kalı
55. The Government's witnesses maintained, however, that no houses were set alight on 23 October but that houses had burned down the previous day as a result of fighting between the PKK and security forces. Yet those inhabitants of the
Europe
121. The indictment mentioned that Mrs Şahin had drawn up documents which had been faxed to human rights associations in European countries. Mrs Şahin acknowledged having prepared documents which colleagues in
the Urus-Martan District
46. By a decision of 12 June 2004 D.Ch. discontinued criminal proceedings against Zelimkhan Isayev in view of his death. The decision stated that on 8 May 2004 a criminal investigation had been opened in respect of A.M., who was suspected of terrorist activities and participation in illegal armed groups. The case was assigned the number 94/22. The investigation established that in October 2000 A.M., together with several persons, including Zelimkhan Isayev, had blown up several vehicles of the Russian military. On 10 May 2004 Zelimkhan Isayev was arrested and placed in the temporary detention facility of the department of the interior of
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8. On 15 May 1998 the court asked the applicant to submit further information as regards her enforcement request and to pay a court fee. The applicant replied on 25 May 1998. In particular, she proposed that the sum in issue should be obtained by selling movable property from the
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71. According to the Government, the investigators also requested information from various State authorities about the disappearance. On various dates these authorities, including the district offices of the FSB and the military prosecutors' office, stated that they had not detained Ruslan Magomadov or carried out a criminal investigation into his activities. Also on unspecified dates a number of the district departments of the interior in Chechnya informed the investigation that they had never detained or delivered Ruslan Magomadov to a temporary detention facility. On unspecified dates the remand centres in Chechnya and the neighbouring regions informed the investigation that the missing man had never been detained on their
the Canary Islands
9. The applicants were crew members on a merchant ship named the Winner, registered in Cambodia. The ship had attracted the attention of the American, Spanish and Greek anti-drug services when the Central Office Against Illegal Drug Trafficking (l’Office Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite des Stupéfiants – “the OCRTIS”), a ministerial body attached to the Central Police Directorate of the French Ministry of the Interior, requested authorisation to intercept it. The OCRTIS suspected the ship of carrying large quantities of drugs, with the intention of transferring them to speedboats off
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12. The Perm OMON unit was stationed on the premises of an orphanage in the vicinity of the applicant’s house. At the material time, two brothers of the Kuznetsov family were in charge of the OMON unit. It appears that they were involved in the abduction as they were not wearing masks and could therefore be identified by the applicant. The following day the military commander’s office accepted a food package for Mr Nazyrov, but the next day the servicemen denied that he had ever been detained on their
West
5. On 27 November 1995 The Guardian newspaper published an article written by Jonathan Rugman entitled “Turkish Islamists aim for power”, based on an interview held with Mr Abdullah Gül, a Member of Parliament (“MP”) for Refah Partisi (“the Welfare Party”) at the material time. The relevant part of the article read as follows: “Abdullah Gül is dressed in a well-cut suit and tie. The MP may be the deputy leader of Turkey’s Islamic revivalist Welfare Party, Refah, but he speaks good English and seems to have been schooled within the political traditions of the
Охридското езеро
8. On 1 September 2003 the Ohrid Restitution Commission, operating within the Ministry of Finance (Министерство за финансии на Република Македонија - Комисија за Денационализација со седиште во Охрид – “the Restitution Commission”), accepted the applicant’s request and ordered the restitution of the land (“the restitution decision”). On the basis of documentary evidence of 30 May 2002 obtained from the Ministry of Transport and Communications (Министерство за Транспорт и Врски), the Restitution Commission found that no structures of public interest, but rather “beach service facilities and a leisure centre” (сервис објекти за плажа и центар за забава), were planned to be constructed on the plot in question. An expert had carried out an on-site inspection and had established that the land in question had been undeveloped building land and was part of the Ohrid lakeshore strip (крајбрежен појас на
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42. On 1 December 2000 the Ombudsman sent a letter to Mr Ustinov, the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The Ombudsman strongly condemned the use of derogatory terms such as “sect” and “totalitarian sect” in the documents issued by State officials. In its relevant part the letter read as follows: “...In particular, the letter from the deputy Prosecutor General, Ye.G.Chuganov, to the Chairwoman of the Governor's Commission for Human Rights in the Chelyabinsk Region, Ye.V.Gorina, was widely distributed... It recommended using as reference material on the activity of the Jehovah's Witnesses the book An Introduction to Sectarianism by A. Dworkin, and the handbook New Destructive and Occult-Related Religious Organisations in Russia, prepared by the Missionary Department of the Moscow Patriarchate [of the Russian Orthodox Church]... The publication referred to in the letter is highly condemnatory in respect of certain faiths. It reflects the judgment of one religious organisation about others and its contents serve to prove the 'authenticity' of one religion and the 'falseness' of the other(s)... The situation is further aggravated by the fact that Chuganov's letter was used in trials where it was portrayed as reflecting the official stance taken by the Prosecutor General's Office of Russia. For example, in Chelyabinsk, in the course of examination of a complaint by the local community of Jehovah's Witnesses against the Chairwoman of the regional Commission for Human Rights Ms Gorina, the latter constantly referred to Dworkin's book as a handbook recommended by the Prosecutor General's Office that contained reliable information on the activity of so-called destructive sects, including the community of Jehovah's Witnesses. This was used to justify the extremely heavy-handed conduct of the municipal authorities towards the Jehovah's Witnesses, in particular their breaking-up, with the aid of the police, of the believers' prayer meeting being held on the
the Urus-Martan District
18. In the morning of 7 November 2002 the first applicant visited the local military commander’s office, the department of the interior of the Urus-Martan District (“the ROVD”), the prosecutor’s office of
Straits
14. The Turkish coastguard and other Turkish authorities boarded and seized the vessel. Since the waters were rough at the point where the vessel was stopped, it was towed by a military boat to the Turkish port of Büyükdere. All parties to the case subsequently proceeded on the basis that the seizure of the vessel had taken place in the
Europe
37. On 13 December 2005 the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asked the Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to investigate allegations of “extraordinary renditions” in
the Straits of Hormuz
10. The indictment against the first applicant was returned by a Federal Grand Jury sitting in Connecticut on 6 October 2004. It alleges the commission of four felonies between 1997 and August 2004: conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; providing material support to terrorists; conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country; and money laundering. On 28 June 2006, a similar indictment was returned against the third applicant, save that the charge of money laundering was not included. For both indictments, the material support is alleged to have been provided through a series of websites, one of whose servers was based in Connecticut. The charge of conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country is based on two allegations: first, that the websites exhorted Muslims to travel to Chechnya and Afghanistan to defend those places; and second, that classified US Navy plans relating to a US naval battle group operating in
the North Caucasus
37. On 29 November 2002 Colonel S.I., the commander of military unit no. 74814, reported, in particular, that Mr Sultan Saynaroyev had been detained on 22 October 2002 by servicemen of the Regional Operative Headquarters of the FSB in
South Dobrudja
27. Indeed, on 10 November 1998 judgement was delivered. The Tervel District Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that 492.3 decares of the applicant’s ancestor’s land had been confiscated in 1923 by the Romanian State after the Romanian occupation of the northern part of Bulgaria (the so‑called
premises
14. On 17 April 1998, the applicant lodged a petition with the Malazgirt District Governor's office and asked for permission to return to his village. He explained that he was unable to sustain the living of his family in the city and that he wanted to cultivate his lands in the village. The District Governor transmitted the applicant's request to the District gendarmerie Command and also advised him to apply to the Konakkuran Gendarmerie Station. The applicant went to see the commander of the aforementioned station and told him that he had been advised to address him by the District Commander. The latter refused the applicant's request to re-settle in the village and ordered a gendarme to remove the applicant from the
Leninskiy
39. On 4 February 2011 the first applicant complained to the head of the Chechnya investigating department that the investigation of her brother’s abduction was ineffective, stating, amongst other things, the following: “... I familiarised myself with the contents of the criminal case file as a result of which the following has been established: 1. My brother had been detained at about 7.20 p.m. on 31 October 2009. The case file contains the list of his mobile phone connections for that day. According to that list, after the abduction, my brother’s mobile telephone had received a text message while being in Argun. At that time a checkpoint had been functioning on the roads leading from Grozny to Argun. Therefore, the persons who had detained my brother had taken him or his telephone to Argun; they had passed through two checkpoints of the law enforcement agencies. However, there is nothing in the case file showing that the investigators had taken any steps in respect of the staff who had manned those checkpoints on 31 October 2009. 2. On 31 October 2009 the persons who had detained my brother had carried out a special operation in Staraya Sunzha. From the information obtained from the local residents, they had condoned off several streets and had not allowed anyone into the sealed off area.... In addition, these persons had used at least ten vehicles ... from the case file it does not follow that the investigation took steps to verify this information. 3. The investigators, when questioning the local residents, could have asked them not only of the vehicles used by the abductors, but also of the direction in which they had left. However, no such steps have been taken. 4. Mr Rizvan Aziyev had been abducted by a large group of armed persons who had arrived in at least ten vehicles and cordoned off significant area in Staraya Sunzha. Every time if a member or several members of illegal armed groups resurface in Chechnya, the authorities take urgent steps to eliminate them. In my brother’s case, the law-enforcement agencies had failed to take any steps to search for his abductors. They had arrived at the crime scene to inspect it several days later after the crime had been reported to them, in spite of the fact that already in about an hour after the abduction my cousin Mr A.-M.A. had informed the Leninskiy ROVD of the abduction. From this it is possible to conclude that the authorities had known that the persons who had detained my brother, had belonged to law-enforcement agencies. It also follows that the investigation in the criminal case should have questioned law‑enforcement officials responsible for the
Yaylatepe
8. The area in question was situated to the south of an asphalt road which ran between the city of Şırnak and the town of Uludere. The two village guards and a team of soldiers from the nearby Milli gendarmerie station would take up positions on
premises
68. On 21 and 22 April 2011 the investigators checked the detainee registration log of the Leninskiy ROVD temporary detention ward. There was no indication that Ms Zarema Gaysanova had been detained on the
the Kuvinskiy District
32. First, the case file contained two separate decisions dated 27 April 2010 by the same investigator of the Fergana Regional Department of the Interior of Uzbekistan containing contradictory information on the charges against the applicant. According to the first decision the applicant had been accused of setting up and active participation from 2000 to 2009 in a local branch of the religious extremist organisation “Warriors of Islam” in
the Urus-Martan District
10. Seven days later the applicants were approached by Z., an officer of the Military Commander’s Office. He told them that Mr Ali Khadayev could be released against the payment of 2,000 United States dollars (USD). By 1 May 2002 they gathered the money and handed it over, following which Mr Ali Khadayev was dropped off outside their house. He was very weak since during his 11 days’ detention at the Federal Security Service (FSB) of
Hvasser island
15. The article stated: “The Tjøme Municipality is now in the process of tightening up the obligation to comply with the residence requirement in the municipality. A zero concession limit has long since been introduced. This means that year-round properties must be lived in all year. Confrontation In the near future the technical services department of the Tjøme Municipality will approach the County Governor in order to report its suspicion that the residence requirement is not being fulfilled for a number of properties. It is then up to the County Governor to confront the owners of these properties. The director of the Planning and Building Department, Mr Dag Dreyer Sæter, does not wish to comment to Tønsbergs Blad as to which properties are on the list they are sending to the County Governor. But from what Tønsbergs Blad has been given to understand, the property of Tom Vidar Rygh at Sandøsund on
West
32. On 19 April 2010, the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the applicants' case. It found that the most recent general background information would not lead to a revised assessment of the case. More specifically in its letter to the applicant's representative it stated as follows: The Refugee Appeals Board finds that the applicants have provided new and/or extended information during the reopened proceedings, and that this gives rise to critical doubt about the credibility of the applicants' information, as there appears to be no reasonable explanation for the late appearance of the information, even in view of the information regarding the applicant husband's mental difficulties, see counsel's pleading of 19 April 2010 with exhibits. The applicant wife has thus stated that the reason why she did not inform the Refugee Appeals Board of her LTTE theatre performances in the previous asylum proceedings was that at the time she was not in possession of the photograph now submitted ... The Refugee Appeals Board finds that this is not a reasonable explanation why she did not, at the beginning of her asylum case, inform the Refugee Appeals Board of the high profile that she now invokes. The applicant wife further stated that, in connection with the arrest where her father paid a bribe for her release, she was the only one arrested and that she was to be questioned again at a different location, and that this arrest was the reason for her departure four or five days later. The Refugee Appeals Board finds that this statement contradicts her statement at the interview of 3 July 2006 as reported by the Danish Immigration Service according to which she was arrested with the sister who now lives in Denmark and that her father paid for the release without any conditions. It appears from her asylum application form that the arrest for which her father paid a bribe took place in 1998. Her departure was in March 1999. The Refugee Appeals Board finds that the applicant wife's statement appears to have been extended on essential points and it only considers it a fact that her father did social or humanitarian work in the local community in his home town ... without being a member of the LTTE, that as a member of the LTTE between 1995 and 1997, the applicant wife also did social work for the LTTE, including distribution of food and medicine, that she lived in various places after 1997, at which time she was exposed to general, brief periods of detention, and that one year prior to her departure she lived in Colombo, from where she departed using her genuine national passport. Moreover, the Refugee Appeals Board noted that the information provided by the applicant wife, that the last time she had contact with her father was in 2005, does not correspond with the information provided by the Danish Refugee Council in its letter of 11 June 2009. The Board further notes that the applicant wife's brief arrests were in the nature of general detention in which several other Tamils were detained by the authorities in connection with situations where the LTTE was considered responsible for specific actions. The applicant wife was released unconditionally every time. She stayed in Colombo for about one year with part of her family before her departure. They were registered with the authorities in Colombo. She departed using her own, genuine nationality passport. At the above interview, the applicant wife stated about her sister in the LTTE that she had been a member of the LTTE for four to five years and that she assumed that her sister was a rank-and-file member, but that she had no contact with her. This statement contradicts the information about the sister provided by the Danish Refugee Council in its letter of 11 June 2009. The applicant husband stated to the Refugee Appeals Board that, contrary to what he stated in 2007, he did in fact own the garage until 1998. He further stated that LTTE left a bomb in his garage, that he hid the bomb there and that that was the reason why he chose to sell the garage ... in May 1998 for 300,000 Sri Lankan rupees. Thereafter, he stayed in various locations until October 1998 when he took up residence in or near Colombo. He did not use his own name and was not registered with the authorities, and in April 1999 he left using a false passport with his picture inserted. The Refugee Appeals Board finds that this statement contradicts the applicant husband's previous statements, including the interview report of 3 July 2006 according to which he stated that he refused to help the LTTE plant the bomb, that the LTTE had eventually left, and that the LTTE as well as people from the Sri Lankan army continued to force him to work for them, that he needed the money but that they did not pay very often, and that he eventually could not stand it and therefore sold his garage in April or May 1998, that he stayed for six months in Colombo before his departure, and that he departed lawfully using his genuine passport in which a study visa had been inserted. In its decision of 4 October 2007, the Refugee Appeals Board rejected the idea that the applicant husband was the subject of a specific search at his mother's house, and on the basis of an assessment of the applicant's statement at the current Refugee Appeals Board hearing, the Refugee Appeals Board does not find that the current statement and the letter from the mother, which dates from 2007, ... [can] lead to a revised assessment. Therefore, concerning the applicant husband, the Refugee Appeals Board only considers it a fact that he sustained an injury to his hand in 1983 in connection with the assault where his father was killed, that he trained with the LTTE for three months in 1985 and subsequently left without problems to continue his education, that he probably inherited the garage from his mother's family in 1996, that he ran the garage, that he sold the garage in 1998 because both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan authorities were pressuring him to work for them, and that thereafter he stayed in various locations, most recently for six months in Colombo before departing from the airport in Colombo in April 1999 using his own name and his own genuine passport. ... As the applicants' statements are assessed, the Refugee Appeals Board thus deems it a conclusive fact that neither applicant stood out at all in March and April 1999. Neither of them was wanted by the Sri Lankan authorities nor did they have any specific conflicts with the authorities. Both departed lawfully. In the assessment of whether, if they were to return to Sri Lanka, including via Colombo, the applicants, who are ethnic Tamils from northern Sri Lanka, would risk persecution or assault as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act, including treatment as covered by Article 3 of the ECHR, particularly because a video clip exists on YouTube of the applicant wife's younger sister who allegedly was a high-ranking so-called training master in LTTE according to the information received, the Refugee Appeals Board notes that in the sequence shown the person pointed out in the video clip - in part together with others and in part alone - is seen wearing a uniform and carrying weapons and ammunition and agitating for the LTTE's fight. The person in question speaks directly to the camera. The Board notes that there is no other information available about the applicant's younger sister apart from that provided for the case by the applicant wife herself. In this connection, it gives rise to some uncertainty with the Refugee Appeals Board that the applicant wife stated at the hearing that the last times she had contact with her parents was in 2005, but that a cousin told her in a brief telephone conversation in 2009 that the family was staying in M. According to the information from the Danish Refugee Council ...on 11 June 2009, the applicant wife stated that in April 2009 she was contacted by her father who informed her that he was with her sister, but that they would move to M as soon as possible. Even if it is considered a fact that the sister in question is the person pointed out in the video clip on YouTube, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that, in view of the applicants' insignificant profile as described above, their return would not put them at risk of persecution or assault as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act. This assessment takes into consideration that the applicants departed lawfully from Sri Lanka in 1999 and are now thirty-one and forty years old, respectively. Although the applicants are ethnic Tamils from northern Sri Lanka, neither of them has had specific conflicts with the Sri Lankan authorities and cannot be considered to be wanted or having been wanted previously. In this respect, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that the circumstance that as ethnic Tamils from northern Sri Lanka the applicants may risk being questioned by authorities when entering the country does not lead to a revised assessment of the case in terms of asylum law. In this assessment, consideration has been had to the background information available to the Refugee Appeals Board, from which it appears that the individuals at particular risk of being detained and investigated upon entry in Colombo are young Tamils, men in particular, from northern and eastern Sri Lanka: those without ID; those not resident or employed in Colombo; and those recently returned from the
Asia Minor
7. In 1925 the Greek State occupied an olive grove of a total area of 3,877,000 sq. m in Chalkidiki (northern Greece) and assigned it to the Refugees’ Relief Committee (Επιτροπή Περιθάλψεως Προσφύγων) with a view to settling refugees from
the Martanka
159. Ms Malika Ts. gave her statement to the investigators the same day. According to her, on 13 February 2001 her father had already been abducted and detained in a military unit stationed by the main road between Urus‑Martan and Tangi-Chu. Her father could not tell exactly where he had been detained since a bag had been put over his head, but he had known roughly where he was from the noise of helicopters landing nearby. On 17 February 2001 he had been thrown out of a vehicle next to
West
32. On 16 March 2010 the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the applicants' case as it found that the most recent general background information would not lead to a revised assessment of the case. More specifically in its letter to the applicant's representative it stated as follows: “... The Refugee Appeals Board still finds that, if returned to Sri Lanka, your clients will not risk persecution or outrages as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act by the Sri Lankan authorities, including in connection with arrival at Colombo Airport. In this connection, the Refugee Appeals Board emphasises that your male client stated during the asylum proceedings that he has not been politically active or otherwise been involved in conflicts with the Sri Lankan authorities or the LTTE. The Board thus emphasises that your male client appears not to stand out in any way at all as he has exclusively been the subject of money demands from the LTTE like other fishermen in Batticaloa. In that connection, the Board refers to the fact that your clients left Sri Lanka lawfully using their own Sri Lankan national passports. The Refugee Appeals Board also refers to the fact that it appears from the background material available to the Board that, in general, individuals who have previously supported the LTTE on a lower level are not of interest to the authorities. Thus, generally, only high-profile members of the LTTE who are still active and wanted, or individuals wanted for serious criminal offences are of interest to the authorities, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009, and Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23‑ 29 August 2009. Also against that background, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that your clients will not be at a real risk of persecution or outrages as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act on the part of the Karuna Group or the TMVP, which are in the factual control of Batticaloa according to United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009. In that connection, the Refugee Appeals Board observes that your clients' incidents with the group took place in 2005. Likewise, on the background of the above, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that the fact that your male client's cousin has been a member of the LTTE for fifteen years cannot warrant a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act according to the background material now available. It should be noted that your male client stated at the Board hearing on 14 August 2006 about his cousin, V, that he last saw V in 2001 at his mother's sister's house and did not otherwise have any contact with him. The fact that as ethnic Tamils from eastern Sri Lanka your clients may risk being questioned and investigated by the authorities upon entry into the country does not lead to a revised assessment of the case under asylum law. In this assessment, consideration has been given to the background information available to the Board, from which it appears that the individuals at particular risk of being detained and investigated upon entry in Colombo are young Tamils, men in particular, from northern and eastern Sri Lanka: those without ID; those not resident or employed in Colombo; and those recently returned from the
Corke Abbey
22. Packaging from a Rayovac torch and a receipt dated 10 October 2002 were later found in the Nissan Micra when it was searched. The SCC was satisfied beyond any doubt that this packaging and receipt matched the torch found in the Transit van. It was further satisfied that the dark green Nissan Micra observed by the police at
Malyy Kamennyy
63. On 24 July 2014 the Moscow City Court found Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev guilty of organising mass disorder on 6 May 2012. The judgment contained the following findings: “The witness Mr Deynichenko testified that on 4 May 2012 he had taken part in a working meeting at the Moscow Department of Regional Security... as a follow-up to the meeting a draft security plan was prepared, and all necessary agreements were reached with the organisers concerning the order of the march and meeting, the movement of the column, the stage set-up, access to the meeting venue, barriers and the exit from the stage; the [organisers] had agreed on that. The question of using the park at Bolotnaya Square was not raised because the declared number of participants was 5,000, whereas over 20,000 people could be accommodated in the open area of the square and the embankment, and [the organisers] had known that in advance. It had been discussed with them how the cordon would be placed from Malyy Kamennyy bridge to the park of Bolotnaya Square, so the organisers knew about the cordon in advance. The placement of the cordon was indicated in the [security plan]. This document was for internal use and access to it was only given to the police; the location of the forces could be changed in an emergency by the operational headquarters. The organisers did not insist on an on-the-spot visit; such visits are held at the initiative of the organisers, which had not been requested because they had known the route ... and the meeting venue ... [The witness Mr Deynichenko] had known that at the beginning of the march the event organisers, including Mr Udaltsov, had discussed between them that they were not going to turn towards the meeting venue but would stop and try to break the cordon to proceed to Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge. ... The witness N. Sharapov testified that Mr Udaltsov had known the route of the march and had not raised a question about opening up the park at Bolotnaya Square. Moreover, the park was a nature reserve with narrow lanes ... the park had been opened up previously [for a public event], as an exception, on only one occasion, on 4 February 2012, but then it was winter, it was snowing and the declared number of participants had significantly exceeded 5,000. No such exception was made for 6 May 2012. ... according to the statement of the Moscow City Security Department, ...the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment could accommodate 26,660 people ... The fact that no map of the assembly route or the placement of the police had been produced at the working meeting of 4 May 2012, that these questions had not been expressly discussed, ... that the event organisers present at the working meeting had not been shown any maps, was confirmed by them. ... the court concludes that no official map had been adopted with the organisers and, in the court’s opinion, [the published map] had been based on Mr Udaltsov’s own interview with journalists ... Therefore the map presented by the defence has no official character, its provenance is unknown and therefore unreliable and it does not reflect the true route of the demonstration and the placement of the police forces. ... the witness Mr Makhonin ... testified that on 5 May 2012 he received the [security plan] ... Before the start of the march he personally met the event organisers Ms Mityushkina, Mr Udaltsov [and] Mr Davidis and in the presence of the press and with the use of video recordings explained to them the order of the meeting and the march, warned against the breach of public order during the conduct of the event; and stressed the need to inform him personally about any possible provocations by calling the telephone number known to the organisers. He asked Mr Udaltsov about the intention to proceed towards the Kremlin and to cause mass disorder because the police had received information about it from undercover sources; Mr Udaltsov had assured him that there would be no breaches of order at the event and that they had no intention to move towards the Kremlin ... He (Mr Makhonin) arrived at Bolotnaya Square after the mass disorder had already begun ... After the mass disorder began he tried calling Mr Udaltsov on the phone but there was no reply. Mr Udaltsov did not call him ... Other event organisers had not asked him to move the cordon. Given the circumstances, Ms Mityushkina, at his request, announced the end of the meeting, and the police opened additional exits for those willing to leave. In addition to that, the police repeated through a loudspeaker the announcement about the end of the meeting ... ... the witness Mr Zdorenko ...testified that ... following information received [from undercover sources] about the possible setting up of a camp site, at about 9 p.m. on 5 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square and organised a search of the area including the park. The park was cordoned off and guarded ... if necessary, at the decision of the operational headquarters, the venue allocated for the meeting could be significantly extended at the expense of the park [at Bolotnaya Square]. However, there was no need for that given that there were no more than 2,500-3,000 persons on Bolotnaya Square ... [others being stopped at] Malyy Kamennyy bridge. ... The witness A. Zharkov testified that ...while the stage was being set up he had seen an unknown man smuggling four camping tents in rubbish bins. ... The witness M. Volondina testified that ... before the beginning of the march, police information came through from undercover sources that the event organisers intended to encircle the Kremlin holding hands to prevent the inauguration of the Russian President. The witness M. Zubarev testified that ... he had been [officially] filming ... while Police Officer Makhonin ... explained the order ... and warned the organisers ... and asked Mr Udaltsov to inform him of any possible provocations. Mr Udaltsov stated that they would act lawfully and that he had requested the police to stop any unwanted persons from joining the public event ... The witness Y. Vanyukhin testified that on 6 May 2012 ... at about 6 p.m. Mr Udaltsov, while on the way to the stage, told people around him that they were going to set up a campsite ... ... the witness Ms Mirza testified that ... Police Officer Biryukov had asked her and [the Ombudsman] to come to
Vedeno
49. On 16 December 2008 the Shali FSB replied to the investigators’ information request of November 2008, stating that there was information concerning Mr Artur Ibragimov’s involvement in illegal armed groups between 2003 and 2006. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows: “... According to the information [we have gathered], from approximately the middle of 2003 [Mr Artur Ibragimov] was a member of an armed group in the
the Veïkou Estate
15. In various judgments delivered during the past years the Greek courts have had the occasion to decide the property status of part of the Veïkou Estate (judgments nos. 8864/1995 of the Athens First Instance Court, 8314/1996, 9632/2000 of the Athens Court of Appeal and 1359/2002 of the Court of Cassation). The courts have recognised that a number of plots which were situated in the greater area of
premises
40. On 14 September 2010 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected Draupner’s appeal, but granted that of the Tax Agency. Draupner’s procedural requests for an oral hearing and an inspection were rejected, but the court held a preparatory meeting with the parties to determine the continued proceedings in the case, notably the method for examining the disputed material. The court found that, due to the extremely extensive data material – more than 300,000 files and entries –, it was impossible to examine each and every data file, and the Tax Agency was therefore instructed to list the documents and files it considered as part of its examination after which Draupner would have an opportunity to lodge a new request for exemption. The appellate court agreed with the County Administrative Court’s assessments that the material, including the hard disk drive and the USB memory stick, had been seized on Draupner’s business
premises
7. On 10 March 2010 the Oslo City Court (tingrett), finding that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion (skjellig grunn til mistanke) in respect of the charges, decided at the request of the prosecuting authority to authorise that a search be carried out at the applicant’s
the Samashki forest
71. On 6 September 2001 the investigators questioned a woman, whose name was not submitted to the Court, identified as “Raisa”. She testified that on 29 October 1999, together with three other persons, she tried to leave in their car for Ingushetia through the “humanitarian corridor”. After they were refused permission to cross at the checkpoint, they turned back at about noon and reached Grozny safely. Later she learned that the refugees had been attacked from the air, and that many people were killed and wounded. She submitted that on the road back she had seen a group of four or five men on the edge of
premises
7. On 8 October 1997 the applicants distributed four-page folded pamphlets to passers-by in front of a Nuremberg medical centre. The front page contained the following text: “'Killing specialist' for unborn children Dr. F. [is] on the
premises
37. On 11 August 2005 the district prosecutor’s office replied to the first applicant’s query of 2 August 2005. The letter stated that the investigation in criminal case no. 20123 in connection with her son’s abduction had been opened on 17 June 2003, and that although all possible measures had been taken, Isa Zaurbekov’s whereabouts and the identity of the alleged perpetrators could not be established. It went on to say that a number of witnesses residing in the same block of flats where Isa Zaurbekov and the second applicant had lived had been questioned and that relevant enquiries had been sent to various State bodies in Chechnya and neighbouring regions; however, those steps had brought no positive results. The letter assured the first applicant that the search for her son was in progress and stated that she could access the file of criminal case no. 20123 at any time during working hours on the
the Urus-Martan District
12. Having learned of their relatives’ disappearance, the applicants started searching for Isa and Shamil Khalidov. In an attempt to establish the whereabouts and the fate of those missing, they applied both in person and in writing to various official bodies, such as the Prosecutor General’s Office, the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment, the Administration of the Chechen Republic, the Russian Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Interior of the Chechen Republic, the Ministry of Interior of Ingushetia, the military commander’s office of
Khankala
43. On 24 September 2004 the district prosecutor’s office granted the first applicant victim status and questioned her. During the interview the first applicant did not allege that her husband had been kept at the
the North Caucasus
238. On 2 May 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s relative Mr A.E., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one given by the first applicant and her husband. In addition, he stated that when he had arrived at the police station with the relatives and the head of the administration, Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev had not been there. On 26 April 2002 he had spoken with the local journalist Mr R.T., who had given him a copy of a report by the regional headquarters of the counter-terrorist operation in
premises
50. On an unspecified date A.K. was questioned. He stated that at about 5.30 a.m. on 21 December 2004 police officers had entered his house and asked him to go with them to the ROVD. At first he had been put in an APC and then in an UAZ vehicle in which he had travelled with the policemen. Upon arrival to the ROVD he had been questioned and then released. Having returned home he had learned of Alis Zubirayev’s kidnapping. He had been transferred to the ROVD on his own and had not seen Alis Zubirayev on its
Humanisten
19. On 4 September 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court, unanimously, found that the Government’s decision was not unlawful and confirmed it. The court held: “According to section 1 of the [1988 Act] the Supreme Administrative Court must examine if the Government’s decision in the case is contrary to any legal rule in the manner claimed by the applicant or as otherwise clearly appears from the circumstances of the case. .... According to Chapter 1, section 6, of the [1987 Act] land may only be used for development if it is, from a public interest point of view, suitable for its purpose. The conditions on which an examination of suitability should be carried out through the adoption of a detailed development plan - and not solely in a matter concerning a building permit or a tentative approval - are specified in Chapter 5, section 1, paragraph 1, of the [1987 Act]. Thus, according to point 2 of the aforementioned provision, a detailed development plan becomes relevant when a new single building is to be constructed, the use of which will have significant influence on its surroundings. The Government’s assessment that the suitability of the intended change of the property and the development conditions within the block
the Urus-Martan District
30. On 5 September 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the first applicant that further to her request a number of enquiries concerning the security raids of 23 to 24 January 2003 had been sent to the official “power structures” (силовые структуры) of
Hyde Park
7. On 23 July 2007 Hyde Park applied to the Municipal Council of Chişinău for authorisation to stage a protest on 30 August 2007 in front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General's Office against alleged acts of harassment of
Proletarskoye
68. On 4 February 2005 the district prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that “... as a result of the examination of the criminal case file it has been established that the case was initiated on 14 January 2003 under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code in connection with the abduction at about 3 a.m. on 11 January 2003 in
West
9. The applicant’s article on Ms Kandić appeared in Politika on 7 September 2003. The integral translation of the impugned article, titled “The Hague Investigator”, reads as follows: “‘Even my son blames me for protecting everybody but the Serbs’, says the director of the Fund for Humanitarian Law. Ms Nataša Kandić, founder and Executive Director of the Humanitarian Law Centre for Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo and Metohija, a non-governmental organisation aimed at promoting human rights for minorities, last week, again, defended herself ‘from the Serbian patriotism surge’. On the occasion of the International Day of the Disappeared commemoration, at the gathering of the Association of Families of Missing and Kidnapped Persons in Kosovo and Metohija organised in the centre of Belgrade, following a short argument she slapped one of the participants. After this incident the Belgrade police submitted a request for the initiation of prosecution proceedings against her, and the Association of Families of the Missing lodged a lawsuit, demanding that she pay 30,000,000 Serbian dinars (RSD) for the insult to the families of those kidnapped and killed. Recently our media have also reported that this ‘prominent advocate of human rights and democratic reform in Serbia’ was awarded the annual Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative Award (CEELI) from the American Bar Association on 9 August during the ABA Annual Meeting luncheon in San Francisco. Former winners of this award were Petar Stoyanov from Bulgaria, Emil Constantinescu from Romania, Vaclav Havel from the Czech Republic, Stjepan Mesić from Croatia ... It was also reported that at the beginning of May the American magazine Time published a list of thirty-six individuals dubbed the European heroes, among which was Nataša Kandić, too. The Serbian campaigner for the truth on war crimes, a lonely voice of reason in Serbia or the Soros[5] mercenary, the one who was named by all the banished FRY[6] spies, has won many awards, including the Human Rights Watch Award, but none of them were awarded to her in Serbia. Nataša Kandić provokes stormy reactions wherever she appears. While the
premises
32. On 6 March 2002 the Zavodskoy and the Oktyabrskiy ROVD in Grozny and the Grozny ROVD informed the investigators that they did not have information concerning either Khamzat Umarov’s whereabouts or his detention on their
Khankala
53. While being interviewed on 29 April 2006, the applicant confirmed her account of the events concerning the abduction of her husband and stated that at the end of the year 2005 a certain M.Z. had told the mother of Ruslanbek Alikhadzhiyev that the latter was in
Urus-Martan District
80. At 6 a.m. on 2 April 2005 a group of seven or eight armed men in camouflage uniforms and black bulletproof vests broke into the applicant’s house at 26 Gvardeyskaya Street in Gekhi. They were of Slavic and Chechen appearance and spoke Russian and Chechen. The men were equipped with portable radio sets. One of them grabbed the applicant by the throat and threatened to kill her if she moved. The others forced Mr Vakha Dadakhayev outside, saying that they were taking him for interrogation to the
Sovetskiy district
8. According to the applicant, police officer Sh. took him to an experts’ room where he was photographed and fingerprinted. Then, shortly after 3 p.m., Sh. led him out of the police station from a back door in the experts’ room and took him to Orsk police department no. 2 in a police car for questioning. According to the police station logbook, the applicant left the
Gozo
10. However, the applicants were unable to find an apartment to rent in Malta given that, at the time, owners were reluctant to lease property to Maltese residents because of the rent laws in force. In consequence the applicants had to reside in their smaller apartment on the island of
Solyenaya Balka
18. In the morning of 11 January 2003 the applicants started their search for Arbi Karimov. They spoke to a number of local residents who lived close to the route to the Staropromyslovskiy district. The residents confirmed that on the night of 11 January 2003 they had seen that some of the military vehicles had driven in the direction of Grozny while others had left in the direction of the area called
the Kursk Region
44. On 11 August 2005 Ms Liptser visited the applicant in the remand prison. During her visit the applicant made the following statement: “In remand prison IZ-32/1 I am also subjected to pressure by officials of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences from the Kursk and Bryansk regions and their colleague from Moscow [...] They skilfully beat me without leaving any traces: they beat me on the head with books, on the face with their open palms... They are about to become residents here – they have been dealing with me for a week now from dusk till dawn. They say that I am the only one remaining. They let me make phone calls to remand prisons in Orel and Kursk, where other convicts tell me to withdraw [my complaints] and that they have already withdrawn theirs. [The officials] brought letters from others saying that I should withdraw [the complaints], refuse assistance from counsel, that “this must be done”. Then they began to beat me again and to burn me with a boiler forcing me to write [the withdrawal letters]... I read [Sh.’s] withdrawal of his application [before the Court] and his rejection of your services ... and a similar withdrawal written by M.” “I was forced [under torture] to write dictated statements addressed to Mr Laptev, representative of the Russian Government before the Court, Mr Lukin, Russian Ombudsman, the Prosecutor of
premises
31. By a final decision of 23 May 2005, the Bârlad prosecutor’s office, in particular the head prosecutor R.F., dismissed M.A.’s challenge as ill‑founded. It held that it had not been possible to take a statement from the applicant because she had been in a situation and state which prevented her from engaging in conversation as a result of psychotropic medication she had been administered, which had a negative psychopathological effect. Moreover, it would have been immoral to find that the applicant’s parents had unlawfully deprived her of her freedom given that she had been unable to express her own will because she was constantly accompanied by MISA members and was not allowed to attend meetings alone. M.A. was sixteen years older than the applicant and he had not been able to prove that he was her fiancé. He had initially informed an employee at the mayor’s office that he was the applicant’s boyfriend, and had stated that he was her fiancé only after a telephone conversation with a third party, and only in order to justify his own interests in respect of the applicant. It had been natural for the applicant’s parents to attempt to bring their daughter back home by any means necessary and to try to ensure her physical and emotional recovery, given that they had seen the press campaign concerning what happened to young women at the MISA
Transylvania
11. The Principality of Moldavia first emerged as an independent State in 1359. Its territory covered the area between the Eastern Carpathian Mountains, the Dniester River and the Black Sea; today, this area encompasses Moldova, part of Romania and part of Ukraine. Its population spoke the same language and was of the same descent as the populations of Wallachia and
premises
20. The applicant and his counsel appealed against that decision to the Regional Court and referred to the same arguments as in their appeals against the previous detention orders. In addition, they pointed out that a number of expert reports, which were initiated after the seizure of documents on the construction company’s
Land’s End
6. The applicant adheres to a firmly held belief in the inoffensiveness of the human body. This has in turn given rise to a belief in social nudity, which he expresses by being naked in public. In 2003 he decided to walk naked from
Mølleparken
17. The following comment was then made: “Commentator: So in December 1981, shortly after X’s wife disappeared and X was in prison, the Frederikshavn police were in possession of the taxi driver’s statement, in which she reported that shortly after noon that Saturday she had driven behind X and his son for about a kilometre ... So X and his son were in
Kiasma-Postitalo
37. On 17 December 2007 the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) found the applicant guilty of contumacy towards the police under Chapter 16, section 4(1), of the Penal Code but did not impose any penalty on him. The applicant stated before the District Court that he had heard the orders to disperse at around 8.30 p.m. but had understood them as applying only to the demonstrators. The court found it established that the police actions had been legal and that the applicant had been aware of the orders of the police to leave the scene but had decided to ignore them. It appeared from the witness statements given before the court that the applicant had not said or indicated to a police officer standing nearby at the time of the apprehension that he was a journalist. According to this police officer, this fact only became known to him when the magazine relating the events at the demonstration came out. It appeared also from the witness statement of another journalist that he and a third photographer, who had been in the sealed-off area, had been able to leave the scene without consequences just before the applicant was apprehended. This last remaining journalist stated that he had taken his last photograph at 9.15 p.m. and left the area just two to three minutes before the applicant’s apprehension took place. The District Court found it further established that the police orders had been clear and that they had manifestly applied to everyone in the crowd, which consisted of demonstrators as well as bystanders and other members of the public. Moreover, the District Court examined the justification of the interference of the applicant’s right under Article 10 of the Convention in the following manner. “... It is disputed whether Mr Pentikäinen had, as a journalist and on the basis of his freedom of expression, the right not to obey the orders given to him by the police. He had intended to use his freedom of expression as a photographer. The police orders to disperse therefore restricted his freedom of expression. The question is whether there was a justification for this restriction. Pursuant to Article 12 of the Constitution and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, everyone has the right to freedom of expression. It includes a right to publish and distribute information without interference by the authorities. Pursuant to the Constitution, more detailed provisions on the exercise of freedom of expression are laid down by an Act. In accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the exercise of freedom of expression may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties which are prescribed by law. Pursuant to the said Article and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, three requirements must be taken into account when assessing the restrictions: (1) the restriction must be prescribed by law; (2) it must have an acceptable reason; and (3) it must be necessary in a democratic society. First of all, the District Court notes that the police have the power, in accordance with sections 18 and 19 of the Police Act, to cordon off an area and to disperse a crowd. On the strength of this power, the police gave an order to disperse to the persons remaining in the
Veikou Estate
17. In various judgments over the past few years the Greek courts have been called upon to decide the property status of parts of the Veikou Estate (judgments no. 8864/1995 of the Athens Court of First Instance, no. 8314/1996 of the Athens Court of Appeal, and no. 9632/2000 of the Athens Court of Appeal). The courts have recognised that a number of plots which were situated in the greater
Ingushetia
20. On 25 March 2004 the first applicant sent letters to prosecutors’ offices at several levels, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of the Interior, and other federal and regional authorities, complaining about the detention of his son by persons who had used special passes to do so, and about the absence of any news from him. He submitted that several dozen people had been kidnapped in
North Caucasus Circuit
40. The investigators requested information on the portable remote-control detonator from the UGA. On 7 June 2004 the head of engineer troops of the North Caucasus Circuit replied that portable remote-control detonators PM-4 No. 3144 issued in 1999 had not been supplied to the
Urus-Martan District
20. Immediately after the abduction the applicants complained to the head of the Federal Migration Service’s Office in Kulary, Mr I., about the abduction of their relatives. Mr I. informed them that Mr Suliman Isayev and Mr Ramzan Isayev were detained in the building of the
the Bronze Soldier
24. On 27 April 2007 from 9 p.m. to 9.15 p.m. the third applicant was interviewed by a prosecutor as a suspect of a serious breach of public order. The record of the interview states that the applicant explained that he and his girlfriend had gone to see what was going on around
Europe
7. On 5 September 2003 the Utrecht Regional Court (rechtbank) found the applicant guilty of being a co-perpetrator of the offence of transporting a shipment of tablets containing a psychotropic substance the trade of which is illegal in all countries concerned, namely 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine (“MDMA” for short, known in its street pill form as “ecstasy” or “XTC” – the latter designation will be used in this judgment hereafter) from the Netherlands to Germany with the intention of ultimately shipping it to Australia. According to the judgment, the XTC was to be hidden in the cylinders and crankcases of motor car engines that would then be shipped to a business, H. Autosport, in Sydney, New South Wales, which company had been set up by the applicant with a view to importing engine parts from
River Khul‑Khulau
8. On 7 June 2003 at about 5 p.m. an operational investigative group composed of officers of the Vedenskiy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the District Prosecutor’s Office”), the Vedenskiy District Department of the Interior (“ROVD”), the Criminal Police of the Provisional Task Force of the Russian Ministry of the Interior and the Directorate of the Federal Security Bureau for the Vedenskiy District (“UFSB”), were driving several vehicles along the Dyshne-Vedeno-Kharachoy road, returning from Kharachoy to the village of Vedeno. One of the vehicles of the convoy was blown up and thrown down a steep slope by the explosion into the nearby