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Abhidharma

6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process

abhidharma

First published Mon Aug 16, 2010; substantive revision Wed Jun 1, 2022

The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika proposes a similar account of sensory perception, but argues that the sensory object exists as a real entity. The Sautrāntika theory of perception, however, is rather different. It rests on the Sautrāntika radical view of momentariness, according to which there is no real duration but only a succession of infinitesimal moments, and on its view of causation, according to which causes cease to exist when their effects come into existence. The application of these principles to sensory perception makes it difficult to explain how perception directly apprehends sense objects, for it implies that objects have ceased when their apprehending consciousness arises. The Sautrāntika reply is that consciousness does not have direct access to its sense objects. By contrast to phenomenalist realism, the Sautrāntika view of perceptual consciousness may be characterized as representationalism: it sees perception as apprehending its objects indirectly, through the mediation of aspects (ākāra) representative of their objects (Dreyfus 1997, 335 & 380–381).

Abhidharma

6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process

abhidharma

First published Mon Aug 16, 2010; substantive revision Wed Jun 1, 2022

What is common to all the three main Abhidharma traditions—Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Sautrāntika—is that they manifest a somewhat similar paradigm shift towards reducing the phenomenal, causally conditioned world into the activity of cognition and consciousness. This shift was part of a broader movement in Indian philosophy in which Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist thinkers turned away from traditional metaphysical questions about the nature of the external world and the self, and focused instead on the study of epistemology, logic, and language. Their purpose was to provide systematic accounts of the nature and means of valid cognition. Within Buddhist circles, this epistemological turn saw the rise of thinkers such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the founders of the Yogācāra (400–480 CE), and, most notably, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (around 500 CE) who developed sophisticated logical and philosophical systems (ibid, 15–19). The Abhidharma, then, sets the stage for this epistemological turn. The new emphasis becomes dominant from the period of the vibhāṣā compendia onward and is evident in a shift in the terminology used by the Abhidharma to describe the nature of dharmas. This terminological shift is indicated by the terms “particular inherent characteristic” (Skt., svalakṣaṇa, Pali, salakkhaṇa) and “general characteristic” (Skt., sāmānyalakṣaṇa, Pali, sāmānyalakkhaṇa).

Abhidharma

6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process

abhidharma

First published Mon Aug 16, 2010; substantive revision Wed Jun 1, 2022

The term lakṣaṇa/lakkhaṇa means a mark, or a specific characteristic that distinguishes an indicated object from others. The Logicians use this term in the sense of “definition” of a concept or logical category. The Abhidharma applies it to the practice of the discernment of dharmas, distinguishing between multiple generic characteristics a dharma shares with other dharmas and (at least) one particular inherent characteristic that defines a dharma as that very individual occurrence distinct from any other instances of its type. The post-canonical Abhidharma thus assimilates the concept of the particular inherent characteristic with that of intrinsic nature. “Dhammas,” the Theravādin commentarial literature states, “are so called because they bear their particular inherent characteristics” (Vibh-a 45; Vibh-mṭ 35; Paṭis-a I 79; Vism XV 3), and a particular characteristic “is the intrinsic nature that is not held in common by other dhammas” (Vism-mhṭ II 137). Used in conjunction or interchangeably with intrinsic nature, the particular inherent characteristic constitutes a dhamma’s unique definition (Vism VI 19, 35). It is an epistemological and linguistic determinant of a dhamma as a knowable instance that is defined by a distinct verbal description.

Abhidharma

6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process

abhidharma

First published Mon Aug 16, 2010; substantive revision Wed Jun 1, 2022

The Mahāvibhāṣā of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika similarly distinguishes between a dharma’s particular inherent and generic characteristics and identifies the former with intrinsic nature, thus discriminating “levels in the apprehension or discernment of dharmas that serve to clarify the ambiguity encountered in the application of the term svabhāva to both individual dharmas and to categorial groups” (Cox 2004A, 575). The difference between the analytical description of dharmas in terms of their intrinsic nature or their characteristics, notes Cox (ibid, 576), is that “whereas intrinsic nature acquires its special significance in the context of exegetical categorization, the starting point for the characteristics lies in perspectivistic cognition. Ontology is a concern for both systems, but the shift in terminology from intrinsic nature to the characteristics reflects a concurrent shift from a category-based abstract ontology to an epistemological ontology that is experientially or cognitively determined.” This new epistemological emphasis looms in through a modified definition of existence proposed by the mature Sarvāstivāda exegesis that sees the causal efficacy underlying all existence as cognitive. Representing this development in the history of Sarvāstivāda thought is Saṅghabhadra (fifth century CE), who states in his Nyāyānusāra: “to be an object-field that produces cognition (buddhi) is the true characteristic of existence” (ibid). This means that dharmas as the constituents of our experiential world are objectively identifiable through cognition.

Abhidharma

6. Epistemology: Perception and the theory of the consciousness process

abhidharma

First published Mon Aug 16, 2010; substantive revision Wed Jun 1, 2022

In sum, the Abhidharma project, as evident by the dharma theory and its supporting doctrines, is, at bottom, epistemologically oriented. Yet the project also intends to ascertain that every constituent of the experiential world is knowable and nameable, and that the words and concepts used in the discourse that develops around the discernment of these constituents uniquely define their corresponding referents. The dharma analysis therefore paves the way for conceptual realism: a worldview that is based on the notion of truth as consisting in a correspondence between our concepts and statements, on the one hand, and the features of an independent, determinate reality, on the other hand. Conceptual realism does not necessarily have implications for the ontological status of this reality as externally existing. But to espouse such a position is to make a significant move away from the earliest Buddhist teaching that presents the Buddha’s view of language as conventional.[17]

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

What is an ability? On one reading, this question is a demand for a theory of ability of the sort described above. On another reading, however, this question simply asks for a rough guide to what sort of things we are speaking of when we speak of ‘abilities’. So understood, this question is not asking for a theory of ability, but for an explanation of what exactly a theory of ability would be a theory of. This section will offer an answer to this question on this second, more modest, reading.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.1 Dispositions and other powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

It will be helpful to begin by considering a topic that is related to, but nominally distinct from, abilities: dispositions.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.1 Dispositions and other powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Dispositions are, at first pass, those properties picked out by predicates like ‘is fragile’ or ‘is soluble’, or alternatively by sentences of the form ‘x is disposed to break when struck’ or ‘x is disposed to dissolve when placed in water.’ Dispositions so understood have figured centrally in the metaphysics and philosophy of science of the last century (Carnap 1936 & 1937, Goodman 1954), and also in influential accounts of the mind (Ryle 1949). They are like abilities in many significant respects, in particular in the fact that they are properties of things that can exist even when not manifested: as a glass may be fragile even when it is not broken, so may a person have the ability to raise her arm even when she is not raising her arm.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.1 Dispositions and other powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

While dispositions have been central to contemporary philosophical discussions, they do not exhaust the range of the possibilities inherent in things. Especially notable, for present purposes, are those that are intimately connected to agency. These include the susceptibility of things to be acted on in certain ways — such as the edibility of an apple, or the walkability of a trail — that the psychologist J.J. Gibson called affordances (Gibson, 1979). These include also the powers of action that we ascribe to things, of the kind observed by Thomas Reid: ‘Thus we say, the wind blows, the sea rages, the sun rises and sets, bodies gravitate and move’ (Reid 1788/2010, 16; Reid himself regarded these locutions as "misapplications" of active verbs, based on erroneous views of the grounds of powers). Finally, and crucially, these include the powers of agents themselves.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.1 Dispositions and other powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

In light of this ontological diversity, it will be useful to have a term that encompasses all the possibilities inherent in things and in agents. Let us reserve the word ‘power’ for that general class. Dispositions, as defined above, are a proper subset of powers more generally. Affordances, as sketched above, are another one. And abilities, in a sense still to be defined, are yet another.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.1 Dispositions and other powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

It may yet be that dispositions are especially privileged among the powers. For instance, they might be more fundamental than the other powers, in the sense that other powers may be reduced to them. It has been proposed, for instance, that affordances may be reduced to dispositions (Scarantino 2003). And we will consider in some detail, in Section 5.1, the proposal that abilities themselves may be reduced to dispositions. But our initial hypothesis is that dispositions are simply one member of the broader family of powers, albeit one that has received a great measure of attention in the philosophical literature.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.2 Demarcating abilities

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Abilities, then, are a kind of power. What kind of power, precisely, is an ability? As the term will be understood here, there are two additional conditions that a power must meet in order for it to be an ability. First, abilities are distinguished by their subjects. Abilities are properties of agents, rather than of things that are not agents. Objects have dispositions and affordances — as a glass is disposed to break when struck, or affords the drinking of liquid — but they do not have abilities. Being a power of an agent is not, however, a sufficient condition for being an ability. This is because agents have powers that are not abilities. Therefore, second, abilities need to be distinguished by their objects: abilities relate agents to actions.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.2 Demarcating abilities

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Some examples may make the need for this second condition clear. Some powers, though properties of agents, do not intuitively involve any relation to action. Consider the power of understanding language. Understanding a sentence, while it is not wholly passive or arational, is not typically an action. In contrast, speaking a sentence is. Thus the power to understand French will not be an ability, on the present taxonomy. In contrast the power to speak French will be an ability, since it involves a relation to action. (See van Inwagen 1983, 8–13.)

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.2 Demarcating abilities

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

So, as the term will be understood here, an ability is a power that relates an agent to an action. This way of demarcating abilities, while serviceable for our purposes, is not unproblematic. For it inherits the problems involved in drawing the distinction between actions and non-actions. First, there is the problem that the domain of action is itself a contentious matter. Second, there is the problem that, even if we have settled on an account of action, it is plausible that the domain of action will be vague, so that there are some events that are not definitely actions, but that are not definitely not actions either. Arguably both of these points about action apply, also, to the property of being an agent. If this is right, then the present account of ability, which is cashed out in terms of agency and action, will be correspondingly contentious and vague. Borderline cases may, in the end, generate problems for the theory of ability. But such problems will not be central here. For giving such a theory will be difficult enough even when we focus on paradigm cases of agency and action, and so on paradigm cases of ability.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.2 Demarcating abilities

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Note there is a similarity between the present category of ability, as distinct from other powers, and the traditional category of active powers, where active powers are those that essentially involve the will (Reid 1788/2000). But it is not clear that these distinctions overlap exactly. For example, the power to will itself will clearly be an active power. It is less clear whether it will count as an ability, for the answer to that question will turn on the contentious question of whether willing is itself an action.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.3 ‘Know how’ and the intelligent powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Some will expect that an account of ability would also be an account of what it is to know how to perform an action, on the supposition that one knows how to perform a certain action just in case one has the ability to perform that action. This supposition, which we may call the Rylean account of know how (since it is most explicitly defended in Ryle 1949, 25–61), has been called into question by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (Stanley and Williamson 2001). Let us briefly consider Stanley and Williamson’s argument and how it bears on the theory of ability.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.3 ‘Know how’ and the intelligent powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Stanley and Williamson argue, on broadly linguistic grounds, that our default view of know how ought to be rather different from Ryle’s. Part of the argument for this is that standard treatments of embedded questions (‘know who’, ‘know where’, and so forth; see Karttunen 1977) suggest a rather different treatment. On this treatment, to know how to A is to know a certain proposition. At first pass, in Stanley and Williamson’s presentation, for S to know how to A is for S to know, of some contextually relevant way of acting w, that w is a way for S to A. Stanley and Williamson develop and defend such a treatment, and offer independent considerations for rejecting Ryle’s own arguments for the Rylean view. On their view, then, to know how to A is not to have an ability.

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.3 ‘Know how’ and the intelligent powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Stanley and Williamson’s arguments are far from widely accepted (see Noë 2005), but they tell at the very least against simply assuming that an account of ability will also be an account of know how. So we will leave questions of know how to one side in what follows. It is also reasonable to hope that an account of ability, while it may not simply be an account of know how, will at least shed light on disputes about know how. For so long as we lack a theory of what an ability is, the precise content of the Rylean view (and of its denial) remains unclear. So it may be that getting clear on abilities may help us, perhaps indirectly, to get clear on know how as well. (Additional discussion of these questions may be found in Stanley’s book-length development of his and Williamson’s initial position (Stanley 2011), as well as the papers collected in (Bengson and Moffett 2011).

Abilities

1. A taxonomy

1.3 ‘Know how’ and the intelligent powers

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Whatever our view of ability and know how, there is a further question at the intersection of these topics that bears consideration. This is how to accommodate those powers of agents that appear to be especially closely connected to practical intelligence, such as skills and talents — which we might collectively call the intelligent powers. Are the intelligent powers simply a species of ability, or do they demand an independent treatment? There are a number of recent proposals to be considered here. (Robb forthcoming) proposes a dispositionalist theory of talent, on which a talent is a disposition to maintain and develop a skill. (McGeer 2018) emphasizes the significance of a distinctive kind of intelligent power, which she (following Ryle) calls an ‘intelligent capacity,’ and of which she too offers a broadly dispositionalist account. These proposals suggest a more general program of dispositionalism about the intelligent powers, which has suggestive parallels to the dispositionalism about ability that we will consider in Section 5.1. Still more generally, accurately accounting for the nature of the intelligent powers, and the relationship of these to abilities and to the powers more generally, remains an open and intriguing problem.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

If one wants to give a theory of ability of the sort described at the outset, it is helpful for that theory to observe some formal distinctions that have been marked in the literature. This section canvasses two of the most important formal distinctions.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.1 General and specific ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The previous section was primarily concerned with distinguishing abilities from other powers. But there is also a distinction to be made within the class of abilities itself. This is the distinction between general and specific abilities (Honoré 1964, Mele 2002).

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.1 General and specific ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The distinction between general and specific abilities may be brought out by way of example. Consider a well-trained tennis player equipped with ball and racquet, standing at the service line. There is, as it were, nothing standing between her and a serve: every prerequisite for her serving has been met. Such an agent is in a position to serve, or has serving as an option. Let us say that such an agent has the specific ability to serve.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.1 General and specific ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

In contrast, consider an otherwise similar tennis player who lacks a racquet and ball, and is miles away from a tennis court. There is clearly a good sense in which such an agent has the ability to hit a serve: she has been trained to do so, and has done so many times in the past. Yet such an agent lacks the specific ability to serve, as that term was just defined. Let us say that such an agent has the general ability to serve.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.1 General and specific ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The concern of this article will be general abilities in this sense, and unqualified references to ‘ability’ should be read in that way. But specific abilities will also be at issue. This is for at least two reasons.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.1 General and specific ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The first is one of coverage: many of the proposals that are relevant to the understanding of ability, especially the classical ‘conditional analysis’ (discussed in Section 3.1 below), are naturally read as proposals about specific ability in the present sense, and a suitably broad conception of ability lets us keep these proposals within our domain of discussion.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.1 General and specific ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The second reason is more properly philosophical. If we accept the distinction between general and specific abilities, then we want for our account of ability to accommodate both of them, and ultimately to explain how they are related to each other. For this distinction is not plausibly diagnosed as mere ambiguity; it rather marks off something like two modes of a single kind of power. There are at least two kinds of proposals one may make here. One, arguably implicit in many of the ‘new dispositionalist’ approaches to ability, is that general ability is in some sense prior to specific ability: to have a specific ability is simply to have a general ability and to meet some further constraint, such as having an opportunity. Another proposal (suggested in Maier 2015) is that specific ability is in some sense prior to general ability: to have a general ability is simply to have a specific ability under a certain range of circumstances.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.1 General and specific ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The idea that there is some sort of bipartite distinction to be made between abilities has been a prominent theme in contemporary work on ability. It has been endorsed and developed, in different contexts, by Glick (2012), Vihvelin (2013), and Whittle (2010). It is an open question whether the bipartite distinctions in ability introduced by these authors are the same as one another, or the same as the one introduced here. It could be that there are several bipartite distinctions to be made in this area, or that we simply have one distinction under several names.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Much philosophical discussion of ability has taken place in the formal, as opposed to the material, mode. Thus we are often asked to distinguish senses of ‘ability’, or to think about what ‘can’ means. This subtle shift between discussing ability and discussing the ascription of ability is often harmless. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between these questions, and to mark this distinction explicitly at the outset.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

On the one hand, there are questions about ability itself. The central question here to give an account of what an ability is, in the sense foregrounded at the outset. Subsidiary questions here include, for example, whether abilities may exist when they are unexercised, whether abilities are intrinsic or extrinsic features of their bearers, and whether agents have abilities in deterministic worlds. These are, broadly speaking, questions about the metaphysics of ability.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

On the other hand, there are questions about ability-ascriptions. Abilities are characteristically ascribed (in English) with sentences involving the modal auxiliaries ‘can’ and ‘is able to.’ Accordingly, the central question here is to give a semantics for sentences involving those expressions. Subsidiary tasks include resolving certain open problems in the semantics of these expressions, such as the ‘actuality entailment’ observed in (Bhatt 1999), and integrating a semantics for agentive modals with a semantics for modal expressions more generally. These are, broadly speaking, questions about the semantics of agentive modality.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

On certain conceptions of the philosophical enterprise, the project of giving a theory of ability and that of giving a semantics for ability-ascriptions are closely connected, and even collapse into each other. Nonetheless, there is at least a methodological distinction to be marked here. Having marked that distinction, this discussion will primarily be concerned with the first of these projects, the project of giving a theory of ability. Nonetheless, the project of giving a semantics for ability-ascriptions will also frequently be relevant. As with the distinction between general and specific abilities, this is for two reasons, one of coverage and one more properly philosophical.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The first reason, that of coverage, is the following. Many of the most prominent theories of ability defended in the philosophical literature have in fact been, in the first place, theories of ability-ascriptions. Indeed, the central thought in much work on ability in the analytic tradition has been a kind of semantic deflationism, on which we may give a semantics for ability-ascriptions that does not quantify over abilities themselves. This is arguably the main theme of the hypothetical theories to be considered in Section 3, and the modal theories to be considered in Section 4. Given this tendency in thinking about ability, an overview of philosophical work on ability that neglected the role of ability-ascriptions would be seriously incomplete.

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

There is also the second, more philosophical, reason. Any account of abilities owes us, among other things, an account of ability-ascriptions. This is perhaps true of philosophical topics generally, but it is true of ability in particular. Even philosophers who are explicit in their ‘refusal to take language as a starting point in the analysis of thought and modality’ (Lewis 1986, xi) are prone to make explicit appeal to language when the topic turns to ability, as occurs in (Lewis 1976) or (Taylor 1960). This is for any number of reasons, but perhaps especially because it is difficult to even identify the topic under consideration without using or mentioning certain phrases, notably ‘can’ and ‘is able to.’

Abilities

2. Two fundamental distinctions

2.2 Abilities and ability-ascriptions

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Happily, the topic of ability-ascriptions is one on which linguists and philosophers have made significant progress. While there has long been considerable philosophical interest expressions such as ‘can’ and ‘is able to,’ there is nothing recognizable as a rigorous semantic theory of such terms prior to the foundational work of Angelika Kratzer, recently revised and collected in (Kratzer 2012). Kratzer’s work has been central to natural language semantics, and its significance for philosophical work is still being appreciated. The question of whether it is correct as an account of the semantics of agentive modality is an open one: important challenges include (Hackl 1998) and, more recently, (Mandelkern, Schultheis, and Boylan, 2017), (Schwarz 2020), and (Willer forthcoming). The Kratzer semantics, and a view of ability on which that semantics plays a foundational role, will be considered in some detail in Section 4. The more methodological point being made here is that any adequate account of ability ought to provide an account of ability-ascriptions, and as such may want to reckon with this ongoing debate in the semantics of modal expressions.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The bulk of theories of ability that have been defended in the historical and contemporary literature have been what we might call hypothetical theories. On such views, to have an ability is for it to be the case that one would act in certain ways if one were to have certain volitions. One arrives at different theories depending on how one understands the volitions in question and how exactly these actions would hypothetically depend on them, but nonetheless these views constitute something like a unified family. Given their prominence and unity, it is natural to begin our survey of theories of ability with them.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The most prominent hypothetical theory of ability is what has come to be called the ‘conditional analysis’. In this section, we will survey that form of analysis, the problems for it, and alternatives to it that are supposed to overcome those problems.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The conditional analysis of ability has at least two aspects. First, S has an ability to A just in case a certain conditional is true of her. Second, that conditional has the following form: S would A if S were to have a certain volition. The precise form such an analysis will take will depend on, first, how we interpret this conditional and, second, which volition figures in the antecedent.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

It has been standard in the literature, when this first question has been raised, to understand the conditional as a subjunctive conditional (Ginet 1980), and we will assume in what follows that this is the best form of the conditional analysis. There has been some disagreement about whether it is a might or a would conditional that is relevant (for an account of this distinction, see Lewis 1973, 21–24), as well as about which volition is relevant. In the following, we will take the relevant conditional to be a would conditional, and the relevant volition to be trying, though nothing will hang on these selections, and the points to be raised would apply also to other forms of conditional analysis, mutatis mutandis.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

We thus arrive at the following form of the conditional analysis:

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

(CA) S has the ability to A iff S would A if S tried to A.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

If (CA) were true, it would constitute a theory of ability in that it would say under exactly what conditions some agent has the ability to perform some action without making reference to the idea of ability itself. (Note that a variant on (CA) that is sometimes discussed, according to which S has the ability to A iff S could A if S tried to A, would not meet this standard, since the ‘could’ seems to make a claim about S’s abilities. So such a view is not really a conditional analysis. Indeed, it is not even clear that it involves a genuine conditional, for reasons discussed in Austin 1970 (211–213).

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The conditional analysis so understood has been subject to a fair amount of criticism, which will be reviewed in the following section. It bears noting, however, just how apt an account of ability it seems at first pass. It satisfies, at least at first approximation, the extensional constraints: there are many actions with respect to which a typical agent satisfies the relevant conditional, and also many actions with respect to which she does not, and these roughly correspond to her abilities. This imposes a demand even on those who wish to reject (CA), namely to explain why, if (CA) is simply false, it so closely approximates to the truth about abilities.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Its approximate satisfaction of the extensional constraints is also plausibly a reason why something like (CA) has found so many thoughtful advocates. It is at least strongly suggested, for example, by the following remarks from Hume’s Enquiry:

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. (8.1; Hume 1748, 72)

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.1 The conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Of course, Hume and many of those who have followed him have been attempting to do something rather more than to offer a theory of ability. Hume’s intent was to show that disputes over ‘question of liberty and necessity, the most contentious question of metaphysics’ have been ‘merely verbal’ (8.1; Hume 1748, 72). Whatever we may think of this striking claim, however, there is a dialectical gap between it and the alleged truth of (CA). To anticipate a theme that will be central in what follows, we must be careful to distinguish between, on the one hand, the adequacy of various views of ability and, on the other, the more contentious metaphysical questions about freedom to which they are doubtlessly related. It is the former that will be our concern in this section.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

(CA) says that satisfying a certain conditional is both sufficient and necessary for having a certain ability. There are two kinds of counterexamples that may be brought against (CA): counterexamples to its sufficiency, and to its necessity. Let us take these in turn.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Counterexamples to the sufficiency of (CA) have been most prominent in the literature. Informally, they are suggested by the question: ‘but could S try to A?’ There are a variety of ways of translating this rhetorical question into a counterexample. We may distinguish two: global counterexamples, according to which (CA) might always get the facts about ability wrong, and local counterexamples, according to which (CA) might sometimes get the facts about ability wrong.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Begin with global counterexamples. Let us say that determinism is true at our world. Familiar arguments purport to show that, if this is the case, then no one has the ability to do anything, except perhaps for what she actually does (for several developments of such an argument, see van Inwagen 1983, 55–105). But if (CA) is true, then agents would have the ability to perform various actions that they do not actually perform. For it is plausible that the conditionals in terms of which (CA) analyzes ability would still be true in a deterministic world. But then, since it makes false predictions about such a world, which for all we know may be our own, (CA) is false.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

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The difficulties involved in this sort of counterexample are clear. The proponent of (CA) will reject the arguments for the incompatibility of ability and determinism as unsound. Indeed, it is precisely her thought that such arguments are unsound that has typically led her to take ability to be analyzed in terms like those of (CA). So global counterexamples, while they may be successful, are dialectically ineffective relative to the range of questions that are at issue in the debates over ability.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

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It seems, however, that we can show that (CA) is false even relative to premises that are shared between various disputants in the free will debates. This is what is shown by local counterexamples to (CA). One such example is given by Keith Lehrer:

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3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

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Suppose that I am offered a bowl of candy and in the bowl are small round red sugar balls. I do not choose to take one of the red sugar balls because I have a pathological aversion to such candy. (Perhaps they remind me of drops of blood and … ) It is logically consistent to suppose that if I had chosen to take the red sugar ball, I would have taken one, but, not so choosing, I am utterly unable to touch one. (Lehrer 1968, 32)

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Such an example shows that (CA) is false without assuming anything contentious in debates over freedom. It turns rather on a simple point: that psychological shortcomings, just as much as external impediments, may undermine abilities. (CA), which does not recognize this point, is therefore subject to counterexamples where such psychological shortcomings become relevant. We may, if we like, distinguish ‘psychological’ from ‘non-psychological’ ability, and claim that (CA) correctly accounts for the latter (this sort of strategy is suggested, for example, by Albritton 1985). But our ordinary notion of ability, that of which we are attempting to give a theory, seems to involve both psychological and non-psychological requirements. And if that is correct, then Lehrer’s example succeeds as a counterexample to (CA) as a theory of our ordinary notion of ability.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Counterexamples to the necessity of (CA) have been less frequently discussed (though see Wolf 1990), but they also raise important issues about ability. Consider a case where a good golfer misses an easy putt. Given that this golfer tried to make the putt and failed to, it is false that she would have made the putt if she had tried to; after all, she did try it and did not make it. (This thought is vindicated by standard views of subjunctive conditionals; see Bennett 2003, 239). But, as a good golfer, she presumably had the ability to make the putt. So this seems to be a case where one can have an ability without satisfying the relevant conditional, and hence a counterexample to the necessity of (CA).

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Here the defender of (CA) might avail herself of the distinction between specific and general abilities. (CA), she might say, is an account of what it is to have a specific ability: that is, to actually be in a position to perform an action. The golfer does lack this ability in this case, as (CA) correctly predicts. It is nonetheless true that the golfer has the general ability to sink putts like this. But (CA) does not purport to be an analysis of general ability, and as such is compatible with the golfer having that sort of ability. Again, the plausibility of this response will hang on the viability of the distinction between specific and general abilities.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.2 Problems for the conditional analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

We have seen that (CA) faces serious problems, especially as a sufficient condition for ability, even once we set to one side contentious claims about freedom and determinism. If this is correct, then (CA) must either be modified or rejected outright. Let us first consider the prospects for modification.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The guiding idea of hypothetical accounts is that abilities are to be defined in terms of what someone would do were he in certain psychological conditions. There are a number of ways of developing this idea that do not fit into the form of (CA). At least two such proposals deserve attention here.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Donald Davidson takes concerns about the sufficiency of (CA), especially as developed in Chisholm 1964, to tell decisively against it. More specifically, he takes the lesson of this problem to be is that:

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The antecedent of a causal conditional that attempts to analyze ‘can’ or ‘could’ or ‘free to’ must not contain, as its dominant verb, a verb of action, or any verb which makes sense of the question, Can someone do it? (Davidson 1980, 68)

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3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

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Davidson suggests that we may overcome this difficulty at least by endorsing:

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3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

A can do x intentionally (under the description d) means that if A has desires and beliefs that rationalize x (under d), then A does x. (Davidson 1980, 68)

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3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Davidson proceeds to consider a number of further problems for this proposal and for the causal theory of action generally, but he takes it to suffice at least to overcome standard objections to the sufficiency of (CA).

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

The trouble is that it is not at all clear it does so. For these objections did not essentially depend on a verb of action figuring in the antecedent of the analyzing conditional. Consider Lehrer’s case again. It seems true that if Lehrer’s imagined agent has desires and beliefs that rationalized that action under the description ‘eating a red candy’—namely, adopting the analysis of Davidson 1963, a desire for a red candy and a belief that this action is a way of eating a red candy—she would eat a red candy. But the trouble is precisely that, in virtue of her psychological disability, she is incapable of having this desire, and so cannot perform this action intentionally. For this reason it does not seem that Davidson’s proposal successfully overcomes the sufficiency problem, at least not on Lehrer’s way of developing that problem.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

A second and rather different approach to modifying (CA) has been taken in recent work by Christopher Peacocke. Peacocke accepts that (CA) is insufficient in light of counterexamples like Lehrer’s. But he argues that we might supplement (CA) in order to overcome these difficulties. In the terms of the present discussion, Peacocke’s proposal is: S has the ability to A just in case: (i) (CA) is true of S and (ii) the possibility in which S tries to A is a ‘close’ one. The closeness of a possibility as it figures in (ii) is to be understood, at first pass, in terms of what we can reasonably rely on: a possibility is a distant one just in case we can reasonably rely on it not obtaining; otherwise it is a close one (Peacocke 1999, 310). To modify one of Peacocke’s examples, the possibility of toxic fumes being released into a train car that is safely insulated is a distant one; on the other hand, the possibility of toxic fumes being released into a train car where they just happen to be blocked by a fortuitous arrangement of luggage is a close one.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Peacocke’s thought is that this suffices to overcome the sufficiency objection: though Lehrer’s agent satisfies (i), she does not satisfy (ii): given the facts about his psychology, the possibility that he tries to A is not a close one. The trouble, however, is that Peacocke’s proposal is subject to modified versions of Lehrer’s counterexample. Consider an agent whose aversion to red candies is not a permanent feature of her psychology, but an unpredictable and temporary ‘mood’. Consider the agent at some time when she is in her aversive mood. This agent satisfies (i), for the same reason as above, and she also satisfies (ii): given the fragility of her mood, the possibility of her trying is a close one in the relevant sense. Yet such an agent lacks the ability to eat a red candy, in precisely the same way as she does in Lehrer’s original example.

Abilities

3. Hypothetical theories of ability

3.3 The conditional analysis: some variations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

It is an interesting question how we might develop other ‘supplementation’ strategies for (CA) (such strategies are also suggested by Ginet 1980), though the track record of this method of analysis in other domains (for instance, the project of ‘supplementing’ the analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief, in response to (Gettier 1963)) does not inspire confidence.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

There is a surprising disconnect between the way abilities have been discussed in the philosophical literature in the tradition of Hume and the way that they have been approached in more recent work in logic and linguistics. Here, ability claims are understood as categorical possibility claims: claims about what some agent does in some non-actual state of affairs (or ‘possible world’). Let a modal theory of ability be any theory on which claims about an agent’s abilities are understood in terms of claims about what that agent in fact does at some possible world (or set of worlds). The idea that some such modal theory of ability must be true is a presumption of much formal work on ability and ability-ascriptions. Yet there are serious challenges to the idea that ability is in this sense a modality.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

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Intuitively, claims about ability are claims about possibility. It is in some sense a truism that someone is able to perform some act just in case it is possible for her to perform it.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

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To develop this purported truism, begin with the thought that for S to have an ability to A it is necessary, but not sufficient, that it be possible that S does A. This claim will be contentious for various more specialized sorts of possibility, such as nomic possibility. But if we may help ourselves to the idea of possibility simpliciter (‘metaphysical possibility,’ on at least one reading of that phrase), then this claim appears plausible. (We will survey some historical and contemporary challenges to it below in Section 4.2.) On the other hand it seems implausible that this sort of possibility is a sufficient condition: there are any number of acts that that are metaphysically possible to perform that an agent might nonetheless not be able to perform.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

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This suggests a natural hypothesis. To have an ability is for it to be possible to A in some restricted sense of possibility. As nomic possibility is possibility relative to the laws of nature, and epistemic possibility is possibility relative to what an agent knows, so may ability be possibility relative to some independently specifiable set of conditions.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

To render this hypothesis precisely, we may help ourselves to the formal framework of ‘possible worlds,’ which offers an elegant and powerful semantics for modal language. On this framework, a proposition is possible just in case it is true at some possible world. We can then say an agent is able to A just in case she performs that act at some world (or set of worlds) that satisfy some independently specifiable set of conditions.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

We thus arrive at the modal analysis of ability:

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

(MA) S has the ability to A iff S does A at some world (or set of worlds) satisfying condition C.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

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(MA) is actually not itself an analysis but rather a template for a general family of analyses. Different members of this family will be distinguished by the different candidates they might propose for C, as well as whether they quantify over individual worlds or sets of worlds. Nonetheless, these analyses demonstrate sufficient theoretical unity that they may be viewed, at an appropriate level of abstraction, as a single approach to the analysis of ability.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

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Two points about (MA) bear noting. First, ‘modal’ here is being used in a relatively strict and narrow way. Sometimes ‘modal’ is used loosely to describe phenomena that are connected to possibility (and necessity) in some way or other. As noted above, it is a truism that there is some connection between ability and necessity, and so that ability is in this loose sense ‘modal.’ The proponent of (MA) is concerned with modality in a stricter sense: she proposes that ability may be analyzed in terms of the precise framework of propositions and possible worlds just adumbrated. The opponent of (MA), in turn, grants that ability has something to do with possibility but denies that any such analysis succeeds.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Second, while (MA) has been presented as an alternative to (CA), (CA) is arguably just one particular version of (MA). For, as noted above, (CA) appeals to a subjunctive conditional, and the standard semantics for the subjunctive conditional (developed in slightly different ways in Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973) is told in terms of quantification over possible worlds. Specifically (on Stalnaker’s version) a subjunctive conditional is true just in case its consequent is true at the world where its antecedent is true that is otherwise maximally similar to the actual world. In these terms, (CA) is roughly equivalent to the following:

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

(CAmodal) S has the ability to A iff S does A at a world at which S tries to A that is otherwise maximally similar to the actual world.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

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This is patently a version of (MA), with ‘S tries to A and is otherwise maximally similar to the actual world’ serving as condition C.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.1 The modal analysis

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

If this is correct, then most discussions of the analysis on ability in the twentieth century have focused on a special and somewhat idiosyncratic case of a much broader program of analysis, namely the program of giving a modal analysis of ability. The considerations brought forth in the remainder of this section, in contrast, are concerned with the general case.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

There are two questions that might be raised for this proposal about ability. First, does ability indeed admit of some kind of modal analysis? Second, if it does, how exactly are we to spell out the details of that analysis — in particular, how are we to articulate condition C? Let us begin with the first, more basic, question.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

According to (MA), performing an act at some possible world (or set of worlds) is both necessary and sufficient for having the ability to perform that act. One way of challenging this claim is to deny the necessity claim: that is, to argue that it is sometimes the case that an agent is able to perform an act that she does not perform at any possible world.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

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This is an argument that has in fact been made by several authors. Descartes, for one, appears to have argued that God is such an agent (Curley 1984). A genuinely omnipotent being, one might argue, should be able to perform any act whatsoever, even the impossible ones. This view of omnipotence is contentious, but it is not clear that it should be ruled out formally, by the very analysis of ability, as (MA) does. Spencer (2017) argues that even non-omnipotent agents may sometimes have the ability to perform acts that they do not perform at any possible world.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

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Let us grant, however, that the possibility of performing an act is a necessary condition for performing that act, and that in this sense an attribution of ability entails a possibility claim. One might nonetheless resist the view that ability admits of a modal analysis in the manner suggested by (MA).

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

That is the kind of argument developed in a prescient discussion by Anthony Kenny (Kenny 1975; the presentation of Kenny here is indebted to the discussion in Brown 1988). Kenny argues that, if something like (MA) is indeed true, then ability should obey the principles that govern the possibility operator in standard modal logics. Kenny claims that ability fails to satisfy the following two principles:

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

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(1) \(A \to \Diamond A.\)

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

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Informally, (1) expresses the principle that if an agent performs an action, then she has the ability to perform this action. This is, Kenny argues, false of ability.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

(2) \(\Diamond(A \lor B) \to (\Diamond A \lor \Diamond B).\)

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Informally, (2) expresses the principle that if an agent has the ability to perform one of two actions, then she has the ability to perform either the first action or the second action. This is, Kenny argues, false of ability.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

Let us begin with (1). Kenny claims that this principle is false in light of cases like the following: ‘A hopeless darts player may, once in a lifetime, hit the bull, but be unable to repeat the performance because he does not have the ability to hit the bull’ (Kenny 1975, 136). This kind of ‘fluky success’ has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature — perhaps most famously in Austin (1956) — in order to make a variety of points. Kenny’s insight is to observe that these simple cases tell against the modal analysis of ability, as they violate an axiom of many modal logics, namely any system as strong as the system T.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

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A simple response to this point is to deny that T (or any stronger logic) is the correct logic for ability. To deny this is still to allow for a treatment of ability within the framework of possible worlds. Notably, the modal logic K is one that fails to validate (1). A natural response to Kenny’s first point, then, is to say that K, rather than T or some stronger system, is the correct modal logic of ability.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

This response is not available, however, in response to Kenny’s second objection. Recall that objection was that (2) is true of possibility but not of ability. Here the retreat to weaker modal logics will not work, since (2) is provable on the weakest standard modal logic, namely K. Yet the parallel claim does not seem true of ability. Kenny gives the following example:

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

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Given a pack of cards, I have the ability to pick out on request a card which is either black or red; but I don’t have the ability to pick out a red card on request nor the ability to pick out a black card on request. (Kenny 1975, 137)

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

abilities

First published Tue Jan 26, 2010; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020

This then appears to be a case where S has the ability to A or B but lacks the ability to A and lacks the ability to B. So it appears that (2) is false of ability. In light of this Kenny concludes that ‘if we regard possible worlds semantics as making explicit what is involved in being a possibility, we must say that ability is not any kind of possibility’ (Kenny 1975, 140).

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

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To appreciate Kenny’s conclusion, it is instructive to work through why precisely this is a counterexample to (MA). Consider an agent S who has the ability to pick a red card or a black card, but does not have the ability to pick a red card or the ability to pick a black card. According to (MA), S has the ability to A iff S does A at some world (or set of worlds) satisfying condition C. Consider the case where (MA) appeals to a single world, not a set of worlds. If S has the ability to pick a red card or pick a black card, then by (MA) there is a world w satisfying condition C where S picks a red card or black card. Then either S picks a red card at w or S picks a black card at w. Then, applying (MA) now in the other direction, S has the ability to pick a red card or S has the ability to pick a black card. But that, by assumption, is not the case. Since (MA) is the only substantive premise appealed to that argument, (MA) must be rejected.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.2 The modal analysis: logical considerations

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Note that this argument turned essentially on adopting the version of (MA) which appealed to a single world, rather than a set of worlds. So one way of responding to this objection is by appealing to sets of worlds in the modal analysis of ability. This is precisely the proposal of Mark Brown, who argues that, if we take accessibility relations to hold between a world and a set of worlds, then we may capture talk of ability within a possible worlds framework that is broadly in the spirit of standard views (Brown 1988; see also Cross 1986). Alternatively, we may take this sort of point to militate in favor of a return to hypothetical theories of ability, since, at least on Lewis’s view of subjunctive conditionals, it may be that a disjunction follows from a counterfactual claim without either of its disjuncts following from that claim (Lewis 1973, 79–80). Modal accounts that appeal to sets of worlds are ‘non-normal’ in the sense that they do not satisfy the axiom K, but they remain true to the letter of (MA) as well as the spirit of modal analyses generally, insofar as they avail themselves only of possible worlds and quantification thereover.

Abilities

4. Modal theories of ability

4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations

abilities

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In the material mode, the modal analysis gives an account of what it is to have an ability in terms of quantification over possible worlds. In the formal mode, it gives a semantics for the ascription of ability — paradigmatically, sentences involving ‘can’ or ‘is able to’ — in terms of quantification over possible worlds.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations

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This formal aspect of the modal analysis has been prominent in the philosophical and linguistic literature because the standard semantics for ability ascriptions is an explicitly modal one. This is the view developed in a series of papers by Angelika Kratzer (Kratzer 2012). Kratzer treats expressions such as ‘S can A’ and ‘S is able to A’ as possibility claims. That is, ‘S is able to A’ is true just in case there is a possible world w meeting certain conditions at which S does A. The conditions are that (i) w be accessible given some contextually-specified set of facts (the modal base) and (ii) that w be at least as good, according to a contextually-specified ranking of worlds (the ordering source), as any other accessible world. The Kratzer semantics is thus an instance of the modal analysis on its semantic formulation:

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4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations

abilities

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(MAsemantic) ‘S is able to A’ is true iff S does A at some world (or set of worlds) satisfying condition C.

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4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations

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A number of objection have been brought against the modal analysis in this latter, formal, aspect.

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4. Modal theories of ability

4.3 The modal analysis: linguistic considerations

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One objection prominent in the recent literature (Mandelkern et al. 2017; Schwarz 2020) is that Kratzer’s semantics, or any analysis of the form of (MAsemantic), appears to have trouble marking an intuitive distinction between what someone is able to do and what it is possible for her to do. Let us say that an unskilled darts-player is about to throw a dart. She utters:

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(3) I am able to hit the bullseye