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[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think there's substance to the idea that thoughts and ideas are themselves alive. As I've become older, I wonder, was I as conscious when I was a child as I am now? This is a valid question because my child self did not have vocabulary for many of the thoughts and ideas that are now common in my head. If myself as a child was unable to express the same ability to make choices, to imagine complex scenarios, or to communicate within my own inner space as my adult self does, then does that mean there is a spectrum of consciousness evident in just my own single existence?\n\n\nLet's assume that consciousness is not an in-born quality, but rather a quality that is learned. The learning itself, then, must in some way encode the conscious experience itself. I have learned to communicate, and so my consciousness has learned to express itself through communication, and my communication is an extension of my consciousness that affects the world around me. Within my communication must be embedded some form or pattern that literally represents my consciousness because without that, where did my communication come from? Taking this to the extreme, is any single human actually cable of consciousness when there is no one to learn it from? Are we only conscious as a species because consciousness has developed within the linguistic/informational expressions we make with each other?\n\n\nWe know from cases of isolation that a human removed from Humanity can lose their sense of identity, of self and can quickly devolve into apparent madness. We know that feral children raised by animals past a certain age will never be capable of learning to act and behave as we expect them to. I posit, then, that consciousness is not at all a feature of material or spirit, rather it is an evolved trait of communication and information. It is a self re-inforcing pattern that builds, evolves, devolves and never stops changing. Perhaps our brain is merely a medium that is optimized for the sharing and storing of information, making it an excellent host of consciousness, but not actually the conscious actor at all?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Just wondering, how are you defining consciousness here?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think there's substance to the idea that thoughts and ideas are themselves alive. As I've become older, I wonder, was I as conscious when I was a child as I am now? This is a valid question because my child self did not have vocabulary for many of the thoughts and ideas that are now common in my head. If myself as a child was unable to express the same ability to make choices, to imagine complex scenarios, or to communicate within my own inner space as my adult self does, then does that mean there is a spectrum of consciousness evident in just my own single existence?\n\n\nLet's assume that consciousness is not an in-born quality, but rather a quality that is learned. The learning itself, then, must in some way encode the conscious experience itself. I have learned to communicate, and so my consciousness has learned to express itself through communication, and my communication is an extension of my consciousness that affects the world around me. Within my communication must be embedded some form or pattern that literally represents my consciousness because without that, where did my communication come from? Taking this to the extreme, is any single human actually cable of consciousness when there is no one to learn it from? Are we only conscious as a species because consciousness has developed within the linguistic/informational expressions we make with each other?\n\n\nWe know from cases of isolation that a human removed from Humanity can lose their sense of identity, of self and can quickly devolve into apparent madness. We know that feral children raised by animals past a certain age will never be capable of learning to act and behave as we expect them to. I posit, then, that consciousness is not at all a feature of material or spirit, rather it is an evolved trait of communication and information. It is a self re-inforcing pattern that builds, evolves, devolves and never stops changing. Perhaps our brain is merely a medium that is optimized for the sharing and storing of information, making it an excellent host of consciousness, but not actually the conscious actor at all?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Maybe for individuals, consciousness is a threshold we have to pass/achieve (and learn), in addition to a state we can be in.\n\nI don't know if my 4-year-old self was conscious, but I doubt my 2-year-old self was.\n\nDifferent species might have different thresholds, some perhaps being incapable of crossing that threshold. Some species might be capable of group but not individual consciousness.\n\nOr maybe consciousness is just a complex feedback loop between DNA and the environment that \"thinks\" it's conscious.\n\nI don't have a firm definition of consciousness, so I might be speaking gibberish. :D\n\nETA: I recently realized I have aphantasia, so I'm quite sure my consciousness is different from people who have photo/audio/video memories and feedback. I've been thinking about the differences between minds recently... and come to no useful insights. :(" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It seems that the author was inspired by *Dragon’s Egg* by Robert L. Forward — a sci-fi story where humans met natives of a neutron star whose lifespan was around 50 minutes. \n\nStill, I didn’t read anything new in the article — what it describes is basic functionalism, or the idea that the right substrate will create beings with consciousness and, if you are willing to entertain the idea, freedom of the will. \n\nThough the question of whether there is a thinker separate from thoughts in philosophy might be more about personal identity in general, rather than consciousness, but the article partially addresses the idea. For example, who is “I” in the uncontroversial phrase: “I can consciously and voluntarily control my mind”? There doesn’t seem to be a little Ariti (my nickname) in my head sitting in the library of thoughts. \n\nAs a mind functionalist, my answer is that we are talking about one huge self-sustaining feedback loop that supports itself and includes conscious control as one of its crucial stages, along with many non-conscious processes. Or, to say it in other way, we don’t literally choose next thought in small picture, but we surely exert volition over our own cognition in larger picture. In such self-referential patterns, I believe, magnificent and beautiful phenomena of subjectivity and volition are born." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Michael Levin is a real scientist, with a penchant for science communication through YouTube and some rather radical ideas about agential intelligences within living bodies, in particular bio-electric intelligences living in cells other than neurons, and operating in morphodynamic space, eg driving the position of different tissues in space to create parts of our bodies practically independently of genetics. It's pretty interesting stuff - I think the scifi story inspired his choice of example, but there is a lot of heft to his ideas." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It seems that the author was inspired by *Dragon’s Egg* by Robert L. Forward — a sci-fi story where humans met natives of a neutron star whose lifespan was around 50 minutes. \n\nStill, I didn’t read anything new in the article — what it describes is basic functionalism, or the idea that the right substrate will create beings with consciousness and, if you are willing to entertain the idea, freedom of the will. \n\nThough the question of whether there is a thinker separate from thoughts in philosophy might be more about personal identity in general, rather than consciousness, but the article partially addresses the idea. For example, who is “I” in the uncontroversial phrase: “I can consciously and voluntarily control my mind”? There doesn’t seem to be a little Ariti (my nickname) in my head sitting in the library of thoughts. \n\nAs a mind functionalist, my answer is that we are talking about one huge self-sustaining feedback loop that supports itself and includes conscious control as one of its crucial stages, along with many non-conscious processes. Or, to say it in other way, we don’t literally choose next thought in small picture, but we surely exert volition over our own cognition in larger picture. In such self-referential patterns, I believe, magnificent and beautiful phenomena of subjectivity and volition are born." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">...one huge self-sustaining feedback loop...\n\nA Strange Loop perhaps?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It seems that the author was inspired by *Dragon’s Egg* by Robert L. Forward — a sci-fi story where humans met natives of a neutron star whose lifespan was around 50 minutes. \n\nStill, I didn’t read anything new in the article — what it describes is basic functionalism, or the idea that the right substrate will create beings with consciousness and, if you are willing to entertain the idea, freedom of the will. \n\nThough the question of whether there is a thinker separate from thoughts in philosophy might be more about personal identity in general, rather than consciousness, but the article partially addresses the idea. For example, who is “I” in the uncontroversial phrase: “I can consciously and voluntarily control my mind”? There doesn’t seem to be a little Ariti (my nickname) in my head sitting in the library of thoughts. \n\nAs a mind functionalist, my answer is that we are talking about one huge self-sustaining feedback loop that supports itself and includes conscious control as one of its crucial stages, along with many non-conscious processes. Or, to say it in other way, we don’t literally choose next thought in small picture, but we surely exert volition over our own cognition in larger picture. In such self-referential patterns, I believe, magnificent and beautiful phenomena of subjectivity and volition are born." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "So a dead substrate is able to create consciousness and awareness while also denying its own power of will." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It's one of the principles of organization. But you're not just a pattern, you're a pattern of something. \n\nA painting is a pattern, but it doesn't exist unless you paint it. \n\nA song is a pattern but it doesn't exist until you play it. \n\nThere is no distinction between the thought and The thinker. The thinker facilitates the thought." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Or does the thought facilitate the thinker?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It's one of the principles of organization. But you're not just a pattern, you're a pattern of something. \n\nA painting is a pattern, but it doesn't exist unless you paint it. \n\nA song is a pattern but it doesn't exist until you play it. \n\nThere is no distinction between the thought and The thinker. The thinker facilitates the thought." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "So a propositional thought, being carried by brain waves, and then sound waves, is alive?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "True….for one to understand one’s own existence he has to lose the idea that he is one." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Banal platitude." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Just wondering, how are you defining consciousness here?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Yea, it’s a complicated issue just to nail that down. I am thinking of it in terms of qualia as in “what does it feel like to taste fruit”. In the absence of experience, do we have qualia at all? Does a baby have qualia, but cannot express it? Does an octopus have qualia but cannot express it? If qualia are inexpressible do they really exist? It’s kinda the “if a tree falls and no one hears it” situation. I can have greater qualia because I can express greater qualia. And I dont just mean I express it to others, I have learned with experience to express my own qualia to myself in greater detail and understanding. Did you know that people who learn sign language as their first language actually think in sign language? Can you even imagine what it is to have qualia in sign?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Michael Levin is a real scientist, with a penchant for science communication through YouTube and some rather radical ideas about agential intelligences within living bodies, in particular bio-electric intelligences living in cells other than neurons, and operating in morphodynamic space, eg driving the position of different tissues in space to create parts of our bodies practically independently of genetics. It's pretty interesting stuff - I think the scifi story inspired his choice of example, but there is a lot of heft to his ideas." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Thank you! I will check him in the near future." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">...one huge self-sustaining feedback loop...\n\nA Strange Loop perhaps?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "This makes sense!" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "So a dead substrate is able to create consciousness and awareness while also denying its own power of will." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "What do you mean by “denying power of will”?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "So a propositional thought, being carried by brain waves, and then sound waves, is alive?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I don't think I understand what you're saying, it sounds like you're saying if you have an idea and you say it out loud it's alive. \n\nI'm saying that your thoughts don't exist outside of you thinking them" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yea, it’s a complicated issue just to nail that down. I am thinking of it in terms of qualia as in “what does it feel like to taste fruit”. In the absence of experience, do we have qualia at all? Does a baby have qualia, but cannot express it? Does an octopus have qualia but cannot express it? If qualia are inexpressible do they really exist? It’s kinda the “if a tree falls and no one hears it” situation. I can have greater qualia because I can express greater qualia. And I dont just mean I express it to others, I have learned with experience to express my own qualia to myself in greater detail and understanding. Did you know that people who learn sign language as their first language actually think in sign language? Can you even imagine what it is to have qualia in sign?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I see what you’re saying. Though, one can definitely have rich conscious experience without language, expression or communication ever being involved. I know I’ve experienced it through meditation and psychadelics. A state of pure analog awareness." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yea, it’s a complicated issue just to nail that down. I am thinking of it in terms of qualia as in “what does it feel like to taste fruit”. In the absence of experience, do we have qualia at all? Does a baby have qualia, but cannot express it? Does an octopus have qualia but cannot express it? If qualia are inexpressible do they really exist? It’s kinda the “if a tree falls and no one hears it” situation. I can have greater qualia because I can express greater qualia. And I dont just mean I express it to others, I have learned with experience to express my own qualia to myself in greater detail and understanding. Did you know that people who learn sign language as their first language actually think in sign language? Can you even imagine what it is to have qualia in sign?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Imagine the qualia you have on a mushroom 🍄 trip.\n\n\nThen the question are you conscious or are you high?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Thank you! I will check him in the near future." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I'm a huge fan of Levin and would recommend this (rather short) video as an intro [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0a3xg4M9Oa8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0a3xg4M9Oa8) and this as a followup [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lzf0HOfC86c](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lzf0HOfC86c)" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "What do you mean by “denying power of will”?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "As you pointed out, you deny the power/ability of free will.\n\n\nTherefore it makes no sense to postulate a organism/patternism, that is not self aware yet able to create self awareness to ultimately deny its own ability of choice and distinction/recognition." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I see what you’re saying. Though, one can definitely have rich conscious experience without language, expression or communication ever being involved. I know I’ve experienced it through meditation and psychadelics. A state of pure analog awareness." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "You know, I can imagine such a state and have in meditation approached something of this nature, yet I don't think I've ever really been totally disconnected from contextual understanding of my reality. Like, in a deep meditation I can detach from active thought and \"just exist\" or \"just observe\" but even then I'm aware that I have a thing called a body, that this body is situated on a thing called a floor, that I must be breathing, and so on. My awareness may have stopped processing active thoughts, but clearly some part of my mind is aware of *what* things are. How could I have that context in my existence if I had never learned what a floor was, or what my body was? Clearly this *information* and *context* is stored somewhere in my mind that is deeper than active thought processes, indicating to me that information and context themselves are somehow part of building/creating the conscious experience." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Imagine the qualia you have on a mushroom 🍄 trip.\n\n\nThen the question are you conscious or are you high?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Altered state of consciousness maybe?\n\n\nLet's say the brain is a host for consciousness, but that consciousness itself is a pattern that is reinforced through expression of ideas and language (even internally to the brain itself). Then a modified host of consciousness would naturally modify consciousness to be other than what the unaltered host experiences." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "As you pointed out, you deny the power/ability of free will.\n\n\nTherefore it makes no sense to postulate a organism/patternism, that is not self aware yet able to create self awareness to ultimately deny its own ability of choice and distinction/recognition." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Where did I deny power/ability of will? \n\nI literally talked about emergence of volition.\n\nThat’s a different question from free will, though." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Altered state of consciousness maybe?\n\n\nLet's say the brain is a host for consciousness, but that consciousness itself is a pattern that is reinforced through expression of ideas and language (even internally to the brain itself). Then a modified host of consciousness would naturally modify consciousness to be other than what the unaltered host experiences." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Interesting thought.\nWhat I think is that consciousness is void, and merely a reflection of what gets in. The brain 🧠 is the filter of what gets recognized as patterns and what not.\n\n\nBecause when u are on a mushroom 🍄 trip, your filters get disabled and your qualia becomes that of a child again. Unfiltered and extreme senses of colour, depth, smell, etc.\n\n\nOnly after a few hours the brain reorganized itself to understand to the surroundings better.\n\n\nTherefore I think consciousness is a omnipotent void capable of reflecting and understanding the patterns given by the informator ( the brain)." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Where did I deny power/ability of will? \n\nI literally talked about emergence of volition.\n\nThat’s a different question from free will, though." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "\" entertaining the idea of free will\" - suggests the opposite." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "\" entertaining the idea of free will\" - suggests the opposite." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I wrote the comment to be agnostic on the issue of freedom of the will because it’s a very different topic from agency and volition, but it’s also intimately tied to consciousness." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I’m confused by your suggestion. Different reflective surfaces with different light-scattering properties may exist independently of perception. And different wavelengths of light may exist independently of perception. But the color blue IS the phenomenal experience of those wavelength, and as such does not exist independently of perception. Am I missing something?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "This sticking point always loses me somewhat. Is Alex's contention similar to the Is–ought problem people have brought up with Sam's view on morality?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">while the color blue exists independently of perception,\n\nThe colour blue only exists in perception and cannot exist without conscious minds.\n\nPhotons that cause a chain of events that ends up in us perceiving blue exist independently of the mind, but blue itself only exists in perception." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "If 100% of people don't like getting stabbed in the eye, then it is objectively true that people prefer to not get stabbed in the eye. \n\nHowever, biological preference, 100% or not, is not an objective fact like gravity or time, because outside of biology, you cannot find independent facts that say we must follow our biological preference, as the universe and reality are not conscious and have no default preferences. \n\nIs it possible that some people have very different or even opposing biological preferences, sure, I bet you could find someone who likes getting stabbed in the eye, but that's not the point, because we are trying to put things in the right categories, objective Vs subjective, NOT find exceptions to the rule. \n\nProblem is, people define objectivity and subjectivity differently and cannot agree on the same definition and nuances. \n\nThe way I see it, when it comes to morality, objectivity/subjectivity doesn't matter, because morality is about what you can live with, your strongest feelings for/against various behaviors, which is what Alex is trying to argue for; emotivism. \n\nIf 99% of people feel strongly about something, they will claim it's moral/immoral, but as long as the 1% feel strongly in the opposite direction, then their claims are also valid, as we have no objective benchmark to prove them wrong/right. The 99% cannot change the minds of the 1% and vice versa, so we will always end up with majority rule, like it or not, as this is how morality works, through statistical domination/consensus, not how \"right/wrong\" we are. \n\nSo, if 99% of people prefer to not physically suffer and define that as \"well being\", then it will be the objectively true preference of the 99% and subjectively true moral consensus of the majority. BUT, it is still a feeling, not an independent fact of the universe." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "If morality isn't rooted in the well-being of conscious minds, then we're discussing something entirely different. It's nothing to do with the morality." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. \n\nAlex is right. Just because you can more-or-less measure \"well-being\" objectively (e.g. a living thing is more \"well\" than a dead thing), that doesn't mean the value you place on \"well-being\" isn't subjective. For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not. By the way, this example also illustrates the flaw of Harris's answer, when he referred to the happiness gained by a certain preference. A sadist is really happy when hurting someone – that doesn't make it objectively good." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "> Sam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nYes we can make objective statements about subjective preferences, but Sam Harris is trying to get us to believe the subjective preferences themselves are objective.\n\n> Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning.\n\nThat's beside the point, but it's also not true. In \"Tim is a good baseballs player,\" \"good\" doesn't derive its meaning from any connection to well-being. Or \"oxygen is good for sustaining fire.\"\n\nBut it's beside the point because good and bad and well-being are still subjective value judgements. And maybe more importantly, there's no objective measure of morality even using well-being as the standard.\n\nSome people consider their own well-being are that of their families to weigh more heavily than the well-being of others. Some people (like myself) consider it more important to reduce the suffering of those suffering than to enhance the well-being of the already well-off (however that should be defined). Some people would think it's morally preferable to sacrifice the well-being of the few to increase the well-being of the many, while others do not. And even that's a reductive way of stating the nuance and complexity of moral questions related to well-being.\n\nSam Harris is using some profoundly simple and flawed logic with this.\n\n> Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter.\n\nYeah, well that's a bigger point of subjective contention: whether in this life we know or the likely nonexistent and surely uncertain 'next.'\n\nNone of this makes morality objectively measurable. It is, by definition, subjective." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Sam should have stuck to neuroscience. He's terrible at this stuff." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Clearly well-being exists independently of conscious minds, if “well-being” simply means “being well,” “existing in a fine way.” A flower can do this, or a barnacle.\n\nWhat a conscious mind adds is simply awareness of well-being. Unlike a flower or a barnacle, I can value my well-being and the well-being of others. I can even value the well-being of a flower or a barnacle, even though I understand that they do not have minds like mine.\n\nMoreover, the capability of subjectivity is restricted to conscious beings—it is not a flaw but a feature, and is the grounds for objective knowledge.\n\nSam’s argument is a bit strange. Someone like Aristotle would lose his mind. Recall that Sam is an atheist, so presumably there is no deity directing the “laws of nature,” and therefore unless Sam can define the laws of the mind then I’m afraid his argument is nonsense.\n\nIf the mind is a natural thing, then it need not obey some general laws of nature—it need only obey the laws of the mind. Frankly the mind is not well understood, so why not suppose that we do not yet understand the nature of the mind?\n\nFor example, if it just is the case that the mind is a non-deterministic sort of phenomena, then it will be natural for it to be so. There may well be invariances that we can call laws. But Sam seems to think, like Enlightnment thinkers, that the mind is governed by the deterministic laws of atomic physics.\n\nWhat is the reason for such confidence in reductionism, given how unsuccessful it has been as a program for understanding the mind?\n\nThis is the rather anti-scientific risk of approaching arguments as if nature is able to be described by the propositional content of simple logical arguments. You risk falling into word games.\n\nWe might simply ask Sam if he thinks that love, or art, should also turn out to be governed by the “laws of nature,” such that we can find objective answers to them. And why not, as they are produced by the mind just as morality is. Why should we not also be able to determine the best film, the best husband, or the perfect cake?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning.\n\nExcept Alex believes \"good\" is an expression of value, not an expression of well-being. If something is merely called \"good\", without further specification, it can mean it's desirable to one person, without necessarily resulting in more well-being overall. That's why he disagrees with the first premise, the first premise is making the argument practically circular. If we narrow down the definition of good, it gains clarity but becomes less representative of its real life uses. If we then use that definition consistently, we will encounter an issue where there are better words to describe well-being than just \"good\" and there are still people who use \"good\" to mean something else entirely." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "All states of mind are subjective so long as we have no means of measurement besides self-reporting. We are relying on the participant's subjective interpretation of the internal mental state to report to us the \"facts\" or \"truth\" within the mind of the participant. Even the simple example of \"picking a number\" mentally has no objective basis. We rely on the person to tell us what the number is, assume they are honest, assume their memory of the number is correct, and we even assume that the human mind CAN \"pick a number\" in some meaningful sense. All of these are assumptions which are extremely convenient for us all to accept because to do otherwise would blow up many of the assumptions of free will and personal choice and common ground that are fundamental to our worldview and way of life, but these assumptions cannot be confirmed empirically. \n \nHarris's argument assumes that we can accept shared assumptions as fact or objective truth, which is precisely the assumption we *don't* agree on, therefore his argument does nothing to advance his claims logically. Objective truth is convenient to accept when everyone agrees on it, sure, *but what do we do when they don't agree*? Any assumption of objective truth based on internal mental states requires only one person to say they believe differently, and this argument is of no further use. Which, in reality, is *always* the case since there is almost no fact that everyone agrees with. \n \nHis argument seems to be a disguised argument for objective reality based on majority rule, wherein the majority define objective reality and the minority are simply labeled as false or insane or whatever." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. \n\nI don't know if grounded is the right word.\n\nHow about \"defined as\"\n\nIt has to have some kind of definition\n\nAnd unless that definition of the word morality is to be completely vacuous, well being is the smallest common denominator of people that use the word (differences being that some want to pursue it directly, some indirectly etc.)" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam Harris’ argument rests on two premises: first, that morality can be grounded in the well-being of conscious minds, and second, that minds and their states are natural phenomena governed by the laws of nature. Therefore, there must be objective answers to moral questions that science can address.\n\nAlex O’Connor disagrees with the first premise, arguing that morality cannot be based on well-being alone. He uses an analogy involving the color blue, but Sam Harris responds by downplaying the importance of color to morality, missing the deeper point. Alex counters that even universal agreement on well-being doesn’t make it objectively true that we ought to maximize it, as consensus is not the same as truth.\n\nSam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nAlex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning. Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Sam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nSam has said that on several occasions and he does so in this interview as well. But Sam makes the larger point that every domain of human inquiry has some sort of subjective, axiomatic assumption at the core that isn't self-justifying. He often makes the analogy to health. The underlying assumption to the science of health is that we should care about improving health. But that is subjective assumption that can't be justified from the science of health itself. Nevertheless, health is still a domain of objectivity. Sam's argument has always been that morality is no different. Its assumption is to maximize wellbeing.\n\nTo bring it back to Alex's analogy with color; Sam's response was that if you turn the \"wellbeing dial\" up enough with experiencing color, to the point that experiencing the color blue truly improved your wellbeing and to deprive someone of experiencing it would make you some sort of monster, then we are talking about morality at the point." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I don't have much to say on their dialogue about the blue analogy, and I will mention that I think you accurately address that mind-dependent propositions can still yield objective truth values. So I don't disagree that it's possible to have an objective account of morality. In fact, I've argued for moral objectivism, that is up until very recently when I came to the opinion that objectivity isn't necessary for morality to be real and useful.\n\nRegardless of my view on the objectivity of morality however, I do object to the common tendency nowadays to root morality in well-being, such that promoting well-being is \"good\" and causing suffering is \"bad\". Even more, the utilitarian idea that the purpose of morality is to maximize well-being for everyone. It seems that this video doesn't really argue why this ought to be the case, except for incredulity and the assertion that people like me, even though disagreeing, actually do agree.\n\nI would say two things with regards to the purpose of morality and its supposed objectivity: \n\n1) Even if I were to agree that well-being is good, I see no way to extend this statement from myself to others. Yes, *my* well-being is good, but you'd need an elaborate and theoretical argument about why promoting well-being in others \"objectively\" improves my well-being (I know because I've tried). And, depending on definitions, I'm not even sure if I agree that promoting my own \"well-being\" is necessarily good, but that's too much for this comment.\n\n2) With regards to objectivity, I think you're making a mistake when you say \"words like 'love', 'jealousy', and 'anger' refer to **objectively** real emotions.\" I agree with your reasoning that the things you mention must be real, but I would say there is extra unwarranted baggage involved when you add \"objectively\" to that. For example, consider a chessboard. I might say there is \"objectively\" a particularly fashioned wooden piece on one of the black squares, and I'd be right to do so because I am referring to physical objects that exist regardless of our perspective. However, if I were to claim that the opposing king is smother-mated on H8, this seems to be a different situation. That's because outside of our POV as chess playing agents, there is no such thing as a \"king\" or \"checkmate\" or \"H8\", we can only impose that meaning on the physical arrangement. So this would not be an \"objectively\" true statement, but I would also say that the objects described are still \"real\"; if they weren't, how could we communicate their description with words?\n\nI think morality is similar: morality is real in the sense that it is a pattern that we identify and can reason about, however it is not objective because we construct the rules and meaning, and without our projecting such rules on the reality, then it would not exist." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Can morality be defined without considering well-being? In our world, what else could it be rooted in? We should care about the well-being of others because, as members of society, their welfare has a direct impact on us. The well-being of society as a whole is crucial." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It's frustrating hearing Harris refer to well-being. It dismisses the work that philosophers of the Continental and existential traditions have put into the meaning and impact of values. Identity, purpose, and experience revolve around values - personal, subjective values. Taking a term like well-being and running with it pretends that well-being itself is not based on individual values." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Isn’t wellbeing exempt or separate from the status that values hold as values are intrinsically subjective, and being in a state of wellbeing is the natural state that we either are or are not in? It’s an objective state of all living beings to be in a state of flourishment (look to Schopenhauer’s concept of Wille). It’s entirely separate from our ‘desire’ or ‘want’ to be in this state, which would be value. You either are in well-being or you are not." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It's frustrating hearing Harris refer to well-being. It dismisses the work that philosophers of the Continental and existential traditions have put into the meaning and impact of values. Identity, purpose, and experience revolve around values - personal, subjective values. Taking a term like well-being and running with it pretends that well-being itself is not based on individual values." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Physical well-being has nothing to do with values." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It's frustrating hearing Harris refer to well-being. It dismisses the work that philosophers of the Continental and existential traditions have put into the meaning and impact of values. Identity, purpose, and experience revolve around values - personal, subjective values. Taking a term like well-being and running with it pretends that well-being itself is not based on individual values." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Bingo." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "This reminds me a of a debate I watched between Alex and an Objectivist. The problem I have with Alex's analogies in this space is that they inadvertently remove something key about objective morality. To use my own analogy, a person advocating for objective morality is like an engineer explaining how a complex machine works. To say that something is good or bad is to say that it's either in accordance with that machine's functioning or inhibits it. \n\nBut then Alex is essentially asking, \"what if we fundamentally changed some pretty major parts, would that same machine still work?\" Likely the answer is no, but that's not a defeater of an objective machinery of morality at play in the structure of the universe. It's presenting a reality that doesn't exist and then asking why our reality's machinery can't accommodate it." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I think the objection is that the machine's functioning is not the same for everyone. If we fundamentally changed some pretty major parts, your machine would likely not work, but that doesn't mean there isn't someone for whom it might work." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "This reminds me a of a debate I watched between Alex and an Objectivist. The problem I have with Alex's analogies in this space is that they inadvertently remove something key about objective morality. To use my own analogy, a person advocating for objective morality is like an engineer explaining how a complex machine works. To say that something is good or bad is to say that it's either in accordance with that machine's functioning or inhibits it. \n\nBut then Alex is essentially asking, \"what if we fundamentally changed some pretty major parts, would that same machine still work?\" Likely the answer is no, but that's not a defeater of an objective machinery of morality at play in the structure of the universe. It's presenting a reality that doesn't exist and then asking why our reality's machinery can't accommodate it." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Engineering and machinery are dealing with objective components. There can be objectively faster or more effective ways to assemble a machine. And there can be ways to objectively measure that speed or effectiveness.\n\nMorality is inherently subjective, and cannot be objectively measured. Why, because our moral views and convictions are dependent on our proverbial minds. Machines, and the speed or effectiveness of assembling them, are outside of our minds.\n\nIt's the technical difference between an opinion and a fact. I not only believe, I *insist* that Nazi Germany's was a despicable, repugnant system of government. But technically speaking it's not a *fact* that it was. It is my convicted vehement opinion, and that of many others, but it is not a fact. By the definition of 'fact.'" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I've listened to the full discussion and I think Alex had a fundamental misunderstanding of Sam's argument. Sam is not making an 'ought' argument, he is only make an 'is' argument. His claim is that it is the case that 'morality' is about the subjective experience of conscious beings, that's what 'morality' means as a concept. In the absence of conscious beings 'morality' becomes meaningless. He isn't telling us that we 'ought' to be moral. He is saying that if we intend to be then by definition we should focus on improving the subjective experience of conscious beings.\n\nAlex misunderstands this claim as being that we 'ought' to be moral (i.e, ought to value the experience of subjective beings) but Sam isn't claiming that." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "But unless \"well-being\" is stretched beyond meaning, well-being is not what all people consider moral." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I've listened to the full discussion and I think Alex had a fundamental misunderstanding of Sam's argument. Sam is not making an 'ought' argument, he is only make an 'is' argument. His claim is that it is the case that 'morality' is about the subjective experience of conscious beings, that's what 'morality' means as a concept. In the absence of conscious beings 'morality' becomes meaningless. He isn't telling us that we 'ought' to be moral. He is saying that if we intend to be then by definition we should focus on improving the subjective experience of conscious beings.\n\nAlex misunderstands this claim as being that we 'ought' to be moral (i.e, ought to value the experience of subjective beings) but Sam isn't claiming that." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">He is saying that if we intend to be then by definition we **should** focus on improving the subjective experience of conscious beings.\n\nShould means ought." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I've listened to the full discussion and I think Alex had a fundamental misunderstanding of Sam's argument. Sam is not making an 'ought' argument, he is only make an 'is' argument. His claim is that it is the case that 'morality' is about the subjective experience of conscious beings, that's what 'morality' means as a concept. In the absence of conscious beings 'morality' becomes meaningless. He isn't telling us that we 'ought' to be moral. He is saying that if we intend to be then by definition we should focus on improving the subjective experience of conscious beings.\n\nAlex misunderstands this claim as being that we 'ought' to be moral (i.e, ought to value the experience of subjective beings) but Sam isn't claiming that." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I think you are trying to brush the problem under the rug.\n\nSam still is making the claim that the preferred definition of morality should be such that improving the wellbeing of conscious beings is moral, and worsening them is not.\n\nYou can say that he is just using the term morality in this way, but could have easily called it Binglepop instead of Morality\n\nSure, but then you again go back into the issue that Alex is bringing up. That is what is the objective reason Binglepop should be prioritised." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "_Subjective_\n\nMerriam-Webster:\n\n3 a :\ncharacteristic of or belonging to reality as perceived **rather than as independent of mind**\n\nb : relating to or being experience or knowledge **as conditioned by personal mental** characteristics or states\n\n4 b : arising from conditions **within the brain** or sense organs and not directly caused by external stimuli\n\n[Bold emphases mine.]\n\nDictionary.com:\n\n1 existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought\n\n4 [In] Philosophy[:] relating to or of the nature of an object as it is known in the mind as distinct from a thing in itself.\n\nTheFreeDictionary:\n\n1. a. Dependent on or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world\n\nCollins Dictionary:\n\nSomething that is subjective is based on personal opinions and feelings rather than on facts.\n\nIf Sam Harris wants to use different definitions of *subjective* and *objective* than are normally used, then he should make it clear that that's what he's doing. But we all know that's not the explanation. He's using laughably faulty logic as a result of hubris (or else to appear insightful to those who don't know better), in the same way Ayn Rand did with her philosophy of \"Objectivism.\"" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "> If Sam Harris wants to use different definitions of subjective and objective than are normally used,\n\nHe doesn't. You are just confusing two levels of discussion. Whether cilantro tastes good is subjective, because the answer to that question depends on the individual observing the taste. For some it tastes good, for others it doesn't. But whether cilantro tastes good to a given person still is an objective fact, because that does not depend on the person observing it. No matter who asks them whether cilantro tastes good to them, they will always give the same answer. You are confusing those two." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "_Subjective_\n\nMerriam-Webster:\n\n3 a :\ncharacteristic of or belonging to reality as perceived **rather than as independent of mind**\n\nb : relating to or being experience or knowledge **as conditioned by personal mental** characteristics or states\n\n4 b : arising from conditions **within the brain** or sense organs and not directly caused by external stimuli\n\n[Bold emphases mine.]\n\nDictionary.com:\n\n1 existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the object of thought\n\n4 [In] Philosophy[:] relating to or of the nature of an object as it is known in the mind as distinct from a thing in itself.\n\nTheFreeDictionary:\n\n1. a. Dependent on or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world\n\nCollins Dictionary:\n\nSomething that is subjective is based on personal opinions and feelings rather than on facts.\n\nIf Sam Harris wants to use different definitions of *subjective* and *objective* than are normally used, then he should make it clear that that's what he's doing. But we all know that's not the explanation. He's using laughably faulty logic as a result of hubris (or else to appear insightful to those who don't know better), in the same way Ayn Rand did with her philosophy of \"Objectivism.\"" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": " A bug in IT it's not the same as a bug in biology, Even if the first have it's root in the second" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I’m confused by your suggestion. Different reflective surfaces with different light-scattering properties may exist independently of perception. And different wavelengths of light may exist independently of perception. But the color blue IS the phenomenal experience of those wavelength, and as such does not exist independently of perception. Am I missing something?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I think you are 100% correct. I would even go further. As the problem of hard solipsism can only be overcome by creating an axiom and assuming that what we perceive to be real is somewhat congruent to something that indeed *is* real, any claim about objectivity, even regarding otherwise concrete physical phenomena, has to be preliminary and can never be *truly* objective." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I’m confused by your suggestion. Different reflective surfaces with different light-scattering properties may exist independently of perception. And different wavelengths of light may exist independently of perception. But the color blue IS the phenomenal experience of those wavelength, and as such does not exist independently of perception. Am I missing something?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I think the problem with Alex's analogy exists even if you were to consider non-experiential phenomena - like number, for example." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "This sticking point always loses me somewhat. Is Alex's contention similar to the Is–ought problem people have brought up with Sam's view on morality?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Sam’s argument has always felt rather circular to me. He assumes act utilitarianism is true and then goes on to argue that moral questions have objective answers. But he never provides an explanation for why act utilitarianism is not only true but an objective fact." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "This sticking point always loses me somewhat. Is Alex's contention similar to the Is–ought problem people have brought up with Sam's view on morality?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Sam's argument is fundamentally an attempt to cross the is-ought gap. That is why it is controversial. \n\n\nTo me Sam's formulation is helpful in that it reduces the problem of morality from an existence problem to a navigation problem and it requires very little in the way of concession." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">while the color blue exists independently of perception,\n\nThe colour blue only exists in perception and cannot exist without conscious minds.\n\nPhotons that cause a chain of events that ends up in us perceiving blue exist independently of the mind, but blue itself only exists in perception." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Light of the wavelength we call blue and pigmented surfaces we call blue exist, whether someone is there to view them, or not.\n\nVisible light spectrum cameras don't have minds but they record colors." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "If 100% of people don't like getting stabbed in the eye, then it is objectively true that people prefer to not get stabbed in the eye. \n\nHowever, biological preference, 100% or not, is not an objective fact like gravity or time, because outside of biology, you cannot find independent facts that say we must follow our biological preference, as the universe and reality are not conscious and have no default preferences. \n\nIs it possible that some people have very different or even opposing biological preferences, sure, I bet you could find someone who likes getting stabbed in the eye, but that's not the point, because we are trying to put things in the right categories, objective Vs subjective, NOT find exceptions to the rule. \n\nProblem is, people define objectivity and subjectivity differently and cannot agree on the same definition and nuances. \n\nThe way I see it, when it comes to morality, objectivity/subjectivity doesn't matter, because morality is about what you can live with, your strongest feelings for/against various behaviors, which is what Alex is trying to argue for; emotivism. \n\nIf 99% of people feel strongly about something, they will claim it's moral/immoral, but as long as the 1% feel strongly in the opposite direction, then their claims are also valid, as we have no objective benchmark to prove them wrong/right. The 99% cannot change the minds of the 1% and vice versa, so we will always end up with majority rule, like it or not, as this is how morality works, through statistical domination/consensus, not how \"right/wrong\" we are. \n\nSo, if 99% of people prefer to not physically suffer and define that as \"well being\", then it will be the objectively true preference of the 99% and subjectively true moral consensus of the majority. BUT, it is still a feeling, not an independent fact of the universe." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">The way I see it, when it comes to morality, objectivity/subjectivity doesn't matter, because morality is about what you can live with, your strongest feelings for/against various behaviors, which is what Alex is trying to argue for; emotivism. \n\nThe problem is that this is literally just subjectivity. The argument that morality is objective is essentially a meaningless word game.\n\n\"God says so\" just means God made a subjective judgment. The only way that morality could be objective is if we discovered something like a \"Morality Particle\" that would cling to people doing \"good\" things and would flee from people doing \"bad\" things, but even in that extremely impossible case, our *value* that we assign to having more of the good particle would be subjective." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "If morality isn't rooted in the well-being of conscious minds, then we're discussing something entirely different. It's nothing to do with the morality." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "If you're making this argument in favor of objective morality, it fails right out the gate because it presupposes conscious minds are the most important thing, or that they are important at all, which is a subjective view. People can have moral values unrelated to their own or any conscious being's well-being. Misanthropy for instance is almost necessarily composed of moral value judgements against humans. Or I could be an eco-terrorist and say that humans are destroying the environment, that harming the environment is a moral wrong, that other animals could potentially evolve to be as smart as humans and do the same thing, and thus all conscious life must be exterminated to ensure the safety of the environment. A core aspect of moral reasoning is empathy and compassion. You can extend those things to non-conscious objects, some ancient religions were built around this concept.\n\nMorality isn't rooted in the well-being of conscious minds, it is simply rooted in conscious minds. And no two conscious minds are alike, thus making it almost by definition subjective." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. \n\nAlex is right. Just because you can more-or-less measure \"well-being\" objectively (e.g. a living thing is more \"well\" than a dead thing), that doesn't mean the value you place on \"well-being\" isn't subjective. For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not. By the way, this example also illustrates the flaw of Harris's answer, when he referred to the happiness gained by a certain preference. A sadist is really happy when hurting someone – that doesn't make it objectively good." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Does that make his behaviour objectively good? \n\n\nIt would if he hurts masochists." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. \n\nAlex is right. Just because you can more-or-less measure \"well-being\" objectively (e.g. a living thing is more \"well\" than a dead thing), that doesn't mean the value you place on \"well-being\" isn't subjective. For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not. By the way, this example also illustrates the flaw of Harris's answer, when he referred to the happiness gained by a certain preference. A sadist is really happy when hurting someone – that doesn't make it objectively good." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Sam has a good answer to your sadist dilemma in the interview. I'm guessing you're only making this comment because you haven't seen the full interview - it is worth a watch." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. \n\nAlex is right. Just because you can more-or-less measure \"well-being\" objectively (e.g. a living thing is more \"well\" than a dead thing), that doesn't mean the value you place on \"well-being\" isn't subjective. For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not. By the way, this example also illustrates the flaw of Harris's answer, when he referred to the happiness gained by a certain preference. A sadist is really happy when hurting someone – that doesn't make it objectively good." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "What definition could you use, then, to describe a morality that is objectively good? Is it a morality that is adhered to by all persons?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. \n\nAlex is right. Just because you can more-or-less measure \"well-being\" objectively (e.g. a living thing is more \"well\" than a dead thing), that doesn't mean the value you place on \"well-being\" isn't subjective. For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not. By the way, this example also illustrates the flaw of Harris's answer, when he referred to the happiness gained by a certain preference. A sadist is really happy when hurting someone – that doesn't make it objectively good." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "> For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not.\n\n This is not entirely the case. The exception is if the sadist only hurts willing masochists, and they like it, his actions can be perceived as good." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "> Sam should have clarified that while the color blue exists independently of perception, its value is subjective, tied to human preferences. In contrast, well-being cannot exist without conscious minds, yet its existence is an objective fact. Even though well-being is subjective, we can make objective statements about it.\n\nYes we can make objective statements about subjective preferences, but Sam Harris is trying to get us to believe the subjective preferences themselves are objective.\n\n> Alex asserts that claims like “well-being is good” are only subjectively true, but he overlooks that words like “good” and “bad” derive their meaning from their connection to well-being. Without this reference, these terms would lack meaning.\n\nThat's beside the point, but it's also not true. In \"Tim is a good baseballs player,\" \"good\" doesn't derive its meaning from any connection to well-being. Or \"oxygen is good for sustaining fire.\"\n\nBut it's beside the point because good and bad and well-being are still subjective value judgements. And maybe more importantly, there's no objective measure of morality even using well-being as the standard.\n\nSome people consider their own well-being are that of their families to weigh more heavily than the well-being of others. Some people (like myself) consider it more important to reduce the suffering of those suffering than to enhance the well-being of the already well-off (however that should be defined). Some people would think it's morally preferable to sacrifice the well-being of the few to increase the well-being of the many, while others do not. And even that's a reductive way of stating the nuance and complexity of moral questions related to well-being.\n\nSam Harris is using some profoundly simple and flawed logic with this.\n\n> Even religious morality, which might prioritize divine command, ultimately ties back to well-being, whether in this life or the hereafter.\n\nYeah, well that's a bigger point of subjective contention: whether in this life we know or the likely nonexistent and surely uncertain 'next.'\n\nNone of this makes morality objectively measurable. It is, by definition, subjective." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "You’re missing a big part of Sam arguments about morality. He explicitly states that there are many “right”answers to what is good and bad. If you prefer to help strangers that is good because it increases the well being of others and also you, directly and indirectly. I can prefer to focus on only my immediate family, that is also good. Both are objectively true statements on Sam’s account. Your personal preference is irrelevant to whether these increase human well being. Your personal preference will inform your behavior and that is to be expected." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam should have stuck to neuroscience. He's terrible at this stuff." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I liked his debate with Chomsky where he was unable to grasp consequentialism... despite having just published a book advocating consequentialism." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Clearly well-being exists independently of conscious minds, if “well-being” simply means “being well,” “existing in a fine way.” A flower can do this, or a barnacle.\n\nWhat a conscious mind adds is simply awareness of well-being. Unlike a flower or a barnacle, I can value my well-being and the well-being of others. I can even value the well-being of a flower or a barnacle, even though I understand that they do not have minds like mine.\n\nMoreover, the capability of subjectivity is restricted to conscious beings—it is not a flaw but a feature, and is the grounds for objective knowledge.\n\nSam’s argument is a bit strange. Someone like Aristotle would lose his mind. Recall that Sam is an atheist, so presumably there is no deity directing the “laws of nature,” and therefore unless Sam can define the laws of the mind then I’m afraid his argument is nonsense.\n\nIf the mind is a natural thing, then it need not obey some general laws of nature—it need only obey the laws of the mind. Frankly the mind is not well understood, so why not suppose that we do not yet understand the nature of the mind?\n\nFor example, if it just is the case that the mind is a non-deterministic sort of phenomena, then it will be natural for it to be so. There may well be invariances that we can call laws. But Sam seems to think, like Enlightnment thinkers, that the mind is governed by the deterministic laws of atomic physics.\n\nWhat is the reason for such confidence in reductionism, given how unsuccessful it has been as a program for understanding the mind?\n\nThis is the rather anti-scientific risk of approaching arguments as if nature is able to be described by the propositional content of simple logical arguments. You risk falling into word games.\n\nWe might simply ask Sam if he thinks that love, or art, should also turn out to be governed by the “laws of nature,” such that we can find objective answers to them. And why not, as they are produced by the mind just as morality is. Why should we not also be able to determine the best film, the best husband, or the perfect cake?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "That was an awfully long winded way to sneak in “god did it”" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Can morality be defined without considering well-being? In our world, what else could it be rooted in? We should care about the well-being of others because, as members of society, their welfare has a direct impact on us. The well-being of society as a whole is crucial." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "It somewhat depends on what you mean by well-being. I think morality can be rooted in desires, which stem from intuitions we have, as well as adherence to moral action in a deontic sense. You could say us fulfilling our desires is a type of \"promotion of well-being\", but in practice, the implications of the two views diverge radically. For example, utilitarians may argue that a reformed criminal who never paid for their crime committed years ago ought not be punished because it would do no good, no well-being would be improved by doing so. However, I think the criminal ought to be punished, within reason, regardless of the loss or gain of well-being. Primarily, it's to uphold the integrity of justice, but additionally, I think if the criminal has good character, they would accept their punishment.\n\nBut why care about justice? Surely the end goal of justice is to assure the well-being of people within a community anyway, right? Simply, I think our intuitions and intentions in acting morally reveal more about the nature of morality, rather than well-being which is often a byproduct of that, like the justice example. \n\nSo yes, morality ought to consider well-being, and while well-being may be a product of our actions, it isn't necessarily the reason we act in the first place." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Can morality be defined without considering well-being? In our world, what else could it be rooted in? We should care about the well-being of others because, as members of society, their welfare has a direct impact on us. The well-being of society as a whole is crucial." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I'm not even religious, but oviously for a religious person morality can be completely divorced from well-being if morality is about holiness. The video asks \"why should you do what God commands\" and answers \"because God rewards you with well-being (or punishes if you don't)\". That's a mistake only a non-religious person can make about religion, by seeing it in non-religious terms. For a religious person, you do what God commands because God commands it: because God is the ultimate good. The reward/punishment is just God doing Pavlovian conditioning on us, but the good of doing the thing is not dependent on that, any more than the morality of a child not stealing is dependent on whether we (as adults) reward or punish the child." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Isn’t wellbeing exempt or separate from the status that values hold as values are intrinsically subjective, and being in a state of wellbeing is the natural state that we either are or are not in? It’s an objective state of all living beings to be in a state of flourishment (look to Schopenhauer’s concept of Wille). It’s entirely separate from our ‘desire’ or ‘want’ to be in this state, which would be value. You either are in well-being or you are not." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Isn’t wellbeing exempt or separate from the status that values hold as values are intrinsically subjective, and being in a state of wellbeing is the natural state that we either are or are not in? \n\nIf you accept a morality tied to an objective sense of well being. Are you not implicitly undermining the values that go against this objective truth?\n\n>an objective state of all living beings to be in a state of flourishment\n\nare all flourishments commensurate? can you align all interests to flourish equally?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Isn’t wellbeing exempt or separate from the status that values hold as values are intrinsically subjective, and being in a state of wellbeing is the natural state that we either are or are not in? It’s an objective state of all living beings to be in a state of flourishment (look to Schopenhauer’s concept of Wille). It’s entirely separate from our ‘desire’ or ‘want’ to be in this state, which would be value. You either are in well-being or you are not." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I don't see the connection between well-being and S's wille. As the underlying motivation of our striving, wille manifests through willing into a world of subjective and disparate acts representing the individual's *attempt* at well-being. \n\nI have a hard time understanding how well-being, which includes emotional well-being, could not be tied to subjective, individual values. \n\nMy emotional well-being is contingent on addressing my world of internal needs, drives, and insecurities that result from the world's impression on me. Part of my well-being includes ample alone time and the freedom to express myself without judgment. Others conceptualize well-being as assimilative, requiring conformity to common practices and expectations. \n\nTell me if this question is misguided in addressing Harris's argument: is true that others can tell me what's best for me?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Isn’t wellbeing exempt or separate from the status that values hold as values are intrinsically subjective, and being in a state of wellbeing is the natural state that we either are or are not in? It’s an objective state of all living beings to be in a state of flourishment (look to Schopenhauer’s concept of Wille). It’s entirely separate from our ‘desire’ or ‘want’ to be in this state, which would be value. You either are in well-being or you are not." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "What is objective flourishment? I'm not familiar with Schopenhauer's Wille." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think the objection is that the machine's functioning is not the same for everyone. If we fundamentally changed some pretty major parts, your machine would likely not work, but that doesn't mean there isn't someone for whom it might work." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I think there's still some wires crossing there. It's not an individual machine. There's an objective reality that is mind-independent, but does include human and animal minds. That reality has a structure and within that structure, you can inductively reason towards an emergent hierarchy of values. Within those parameters, you can determine more or less effective strategies—given a goal state that is either teleological in nature or derived logically from the apparent value map. It's like game theory, but the parameters of the game are those of reality itself. Strategies are arrived at and evaluated subjectively, but I think our discoveries about their viability (which we encode in moral teachings) connect to the structure of objective reality." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Engineering and machinery are dealing with objective components. There can be objectively faster or more effective ways to assemble a machine. And there can be ways to objectively measure that speed or effectiveness.\n\nMorality is inherently subjective, and cannot be objectively measured. Why, because our moral views and convictions are dependent on our proverbial minds. Machines, and the speed or effectiveness of assembling them, are outside of our minds.\n\nIt's the technical difference between an opinion and a fact. I not only believe, I *insist* that Nazi Germany's was a despicable, repugnant system of government. But technically speaking it's not a *fact* that it was. It is my convicted vehement opinion, and that of many others, but it is not a fact. By the definition of 'fact.'" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "But the universe can be described as a machine, albeit an unfathomably complex one. It has certain constants, predictable physical interactions, and an apparent progression of functionality across its lifespan. Maybe that makes it more like an organism, but the point is that we exist in an objective structure that defines the parameters of our biology (and therefore our minds). So any values we think we're inventing subjectively come directly from that objective reality. In that way, I think we discover moral truths like how we discover mathematical truths.\n\nNow the question with both the machine and the universe is this: what is its purpose? The purpose constrains/defines the structure and makes it possible to say what's good, bad, or more or less efficient about the machine. That same teleological question is a lot more contentious for the universe. I think what I'm saying about morality pretty much requires a purpose—which yes, also implies a mindful creator—but I think it bears out in the logical structure of reality and our evolved intuitions within that structure." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "But unless \"well-being\" is stretched beyond meaning, well-being is not what all people consider moral." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">But unless \"well-being\" is stretched beyond meaning, well-being is not what all people consider moral.\n\nAnd it's Sam's claim that those people are wrong in the same way that flat earthers are wrong." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">He is saying that if we intend to be then by definition we **should** focus on improving the subjective experience of conscious beings.\n\nShould means ought." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Yeah, if you intend to be moral then you 'ought' to behave this way. But that 'ought' doesn't come from the 'is' of morality, it comes from your own intentions." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think you are trying to brush the problem under the rug.\n\nSam still is making the claim that the preferred definition of morality should be such that improving the wellbeing of conscious beings is moral, and worsening them is not.\n\nYou can say that he is just using the term morality in this way, but could have easily called it Binglepop instead of Morality\n\nSure, but then you again go back into the issue that Alex is bringing up. That is what is the objective reason Binglepop should be prioritised." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Sam still is making the claim that the preferred definition of morality should be such that improving the wellbeing of conscious beings is moral, and worsening them is not.\n\nYeah, that is the substance of the claim he defends in the video.\n\n>You can say that he is just using the term morality in this way, but could have easily called it Binglepop instead of Morality\n\nYou could make the same argument for any word. What matters is the concept. He is saying that morality as a concept is about the experience of conscious beings.\n\n>Sure, but then you again go back into the issue that Alex is bringing up. That is what is the objective reason Binglepop should be prioritised.\n\nSam isn't claiming there is one. He says we have very good reason to be moral (being conscious beings ourselves), but nothing objectively requires us to be. But if you do happen to want to be moral then you should care about the experience of conscious beings." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "> If Sam Harris wants to use different definitions of subjective and objective than are normally used,\n\nHe doesn't. You are just confusing two levels of discussion. Whether cilantro tastes good is subjective, because the answer to that question depends on the individual observing the taste. For some it tastes good, for others it doesn't. But whether cilantro tastes good to a given person still is an objective fact, because that does not depend on the person observing it. No matter who asks them whether cilantro tastes good to them, they will always give the same answer. You are confusing those two." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Trouble is, Harris is NOT arguing that it's an objective fact that people can have the moral value of improving well-being. If he did that, no-one would be disagreeing. He is arguing that the moral value of improving well-being is objectively true or correct. Using your analogy, that's like saying it's objectively true that cilantro tastes good." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "> If Sam Harris wants to use different definitions of subjective and objective than are normally used,\n\nHe doesn't. You are just confusing two levels of discussion. Whether cilantro tastes good is subjective, because the answer to that question depends on the individual observing the taste. For some it tastes good, for others it doesn't. But whether cilantro tastes good to a given person still is an objective fact, because that does not depend on the person observing it. No matter who asks them whether cilantro tastes good to them, they will always give the same answer. You are confusing those two." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I'm not confusing these things at all.\n\n> Whether cilantro tastes good is subjective, because the answer to that question depends on the individual observing the taste. For some it tastes good, for others it doesn't. But whether cilantro tastes good to a given person still is an objective fact, because that does not depend on the person observing it. No matter who asks them whether cilantro tastes good to them, they will always give the same answer.\n\nCorrect. This is a great distinction to point out, and a good description and analogy.\n\nSo we can more or less — or, on some limited level at least — objectively measure what people's moral views are by asking them, but we cannot objectively measure morality or what moral views a person *should* hold.\n\nI mean this is just appalling logic for someone who has spent so much of his career critiquing and lambasting theism and theistic beliefs. He's falling into the same fallacious trap many fundamentalist theists do." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": " A bug in IT it's not the same as a bug in biology, Even if the first have it's root in the second" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Correct. And that means what? That in science and philosophy and dictionaries subjective/objective might mean one thing, but in the field of Sam Harris'ism it means something else?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam’s argument has always felt rather circular to me. He assumes act utilitarianism is true and then goes on to argue that moral questions have objective answers. But he never provides an explanation for why act utilitarianism is not only true but an objective fact." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "It’s supposed to be circular. That’s the whole point. If our search for moral behavior is derived from an inherent drive toward maximizing well-being, then maximization of well-being itself is objectively the purpose of morality. \n\nI don’t know. It sorta makes sense. But I don’t think it answers deeper questions about what well-being *is* or how we can agree on that." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Light of the wavelength we call blue and pigmented surfaces we call blue exist, whether someone is there to view them, or not.\n\nVisible light spectrum cameras don't have minds but they record colors." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">Light of the wavelength we call blue\n\nYes, we call that light, blue light, but there is nothing blue about the light, blueness only arises when that light hits the appropriate light cone and our brain process it correctly.\n\nThat is light carries wavelength information, our brain uses that to create blue.\n\n>pigmented surfaces we call blue\n\nAgain, we call the surfaces blue, but the surfaces themselves have no colour, it just so happens that the surface absorbs wavelengths of light other than blue preferentially, so that the light coming from that direction has the particular wavelength we call blue, that results in blue in our minds.\n\n>Visible light spectrum cameras don't have minds but they record colors.\n\nDitto. Wavelength gets converted into code, that gets converted into slightly different wavelength, eventually becoming colour in our mind." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Light of the wavelength we call blue and pigmented surfaces we call blue exist, whether someone is there to view them, or not.\n\nVisible light spectrum cameras don't have minds but they record colors." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Waves are not real in the same sense that triangles are not real, rather its energy which causes a \"wave-like\" disturbance in our eyes. When I say waves are not real, I say that because triangles are not real which is what waves are derived from, also circles are not real either which the triangle that is used to produce the wave function is derived from. You cannot create perfect circle in reality, nor a perfect triangle. No perfect sine wave has ever been observed.\n\nThis \"blue\" you speak of is merely only observable in the sense that it \"moves electrons\" from a \"valance\" to another in particular molecules equal to the energy contained in what we call a \"wave\". We have never seen an \"electron\" we measured using a instrument a \"wave-like\" substance. This \"valance\" band is an abstraction based on these \"wave-like\" substances changing in reaction to other \"wave-like\" substances.\n\nA pure wave doesnt exist, nor has one ever been measured, nor is it possible to produce a tool that can measure a pure wave. By definition a pure wave exists for eternity at a single frequency that repeats perfectly forever. Every point which it exists it will exist again and again at the same rate forever. To create perfect pure wave we need an infinite amount of pure waves...which cannot exist because that is a singularity or a infinite amount of energy.\n\nThus \"real waves\" (ie: light, ocean waves, sound) lose their pure wave structure and collapse with a bed of \"noise\". We call it \"noise\" because it makes the waves look unpure, but the waves were always unpure. But the noise is real. This \"wavelength\" which you call \"blue\" is really a wavelength plus a bunch of who know what.\n\nUltimately \"blue\" is an /type/ of energy of a particular amount (around 2eV) which transforms into other forms once it comes into contact with your retina. It causes wave-particles (whatever the fuck that means) to shift from one energy level to another.... and apparently this process is quantum and subject to a probabilistic wave function... ie: Its not even deterministic.\n\nYou did not observe the wave.\n\nThat \"wave-like\" disturbance we call \"blue\" \"somehow\" renders this \"color\" in our consciousness which may or may not (we do not know) have the same representation in other consciousnesses. It exhibits emotional responses and memories. This can make us suffer or feel pleasure or complete apathy.\n\nI will repeat that you do not OBSERVE a wave, you FEEL energy and you FEEL what consciousness arises from that original FEELING of energy.\n\nYour camera doesnt record \"colors\". Its basically the opposite of a LCD screen. It merely measures in discrete steps (RGB) the amount of \"wave-particles\" of a particular energy level in a given time period (exposure time).\n\nSpeeking of \"Time\", we only can think that time is human and perhaps a trait of mammal brains, but when you think of the consciousness of lets say plants, it could be perceived that time in those consciousness is not a priori. Without time, space itself looses its meaning. Its possible there are alien beings who have a mode of existence that is outside of space and time... this would imply that blue is arbitrarily human (or of those species which consciousness has a basis in space and time).\n\nYou brain thinks its the most remarkable organ in the history of organs that it sees its rendering of reality an absolute, and that there is no other way for a rendering to occur. \n\n\"Blue is fundamental, it must be because it be like that to me\"\n\n-brain" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">The way I see it, when it comes to morality, objectivity/subjectivity doesn't matter, because morality is about what you can live with, your strongest feelings for/against various behaviors, which is what Alex is trying to argue for; emotivism. \n\nThe problem is that this is literally just subjectivity. The argument that morality is objective is essentially a meaningless word game.\n\n\"God says so\" just means God made a subjective judgment. The only way that morality could be objective is if we discovered something like a \"Morality Particle\" that would cling to people doing \"good\" things and would flee from people doing \"bad\" things, but even in that extremely impossible case, our *value* that we assign to having more of the good particle would be subjective." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "You're absolutely right and yet being downvoted.\n\nThis is the most asinine argument. It is remarkable how many people here are just eating it up and accepting it.\nMorality is not in the purview of science! Morality is not objective. No matter how many times he repeats the same fallacious and irrelevant points." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "If you're making this argument in favor of objective morality, it fails right out the gate because it presupposes conscious minds are the most important thing, or that they are important at all, which is a subjective view. People can have moral values unrelated to their own or any conscious being's well-being. Misanthropy for instance is almost necessarily composed of moral value judgements against humans. Or I could be an eco-terrorist and say that humans are destroying the environment, that harming the environment is a moral wrong, that other animals could potentially evolve to be as smart as humans and do the same thing, and thus all conscious life must be exterminated to ensure the safety of the environment. A core aspect of moral reasoning is empathy and compassion. You can extend those things to non-conscious objects, some ancient religions were built around this concept.\n\nMorality isn't rooted in the well-being of conscious minds, it is simply rooted in conscious minds. And no two conscious minds are alike, thus making it almost by definition subjective." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Not minds, but a mind: God’s.\n\nWith a creator morality will necessarily be rootes in His nature. If one presupposes naturalism then all models for morality will end up in relativism." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "If you're making this argument in favor of objective morality, it fails right out the gate because it presupposes conscious minds are the most important thing, or that they are important at all, which is a subjective view. People can have moral values unrelated to their own or any conscious being's well-being. Misanthropy for instance is almost necessarily composed of moral value judgements against humans. Or I could be an eco-terrorist and say that humans are destroying the environment, that harming the environment is a moral wrong, that other animals could potentially evolve to be as smart as humans and do the same thing, and thus all conscious life must be exterminated to ensure the safety of the environment. A core aspect of moral reasoning is empathy and compassion. You can extend those things to non-conscious objects, some ancient religions were built around this concept.\n\nMorality isn't rooted in the well-being of conscious minds, it is simply rooted in conscious minds. And no two conscious minds are alike, thus making it almost by definition subjective." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Without conscious minds, you'd be nothing more than a zombie. For humans, consciousness is paramount and cannot be disputed. Empathy and compassion are deeply tied to the well-being of conscious minds, which is the most fundamental aspect of morality." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">Does that make his behaviour objectively good? \n\n\nIt would if he hurts masochists." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Is it *objectively* good for masochists to have their masochistic desires sated?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">Does that make his behaviour objectively good? \n\n\nIt would if he hurts masochists." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "This reminds of a joke...\n\nMasochist: \"Hurt me, please!\"\n\nSadist: \"No.\"" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Sam has a good answer to your sadist dilemma in the interview. I'm guessing you're only making this comment because you haven't seen the full interview - it is worth a watch." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "He has an answer yes: that most people don't consider sadists etc. to be reasonable people and such. Great, it doesn't change the fact that morality is subjective by how subjective and objective are defined.\n\nIt doesn't change the fact that morality is outside the domain of science. (It can surely inform morality, but not determine it.) What are they gonna do, take a survey?\n\nMaybe they could ask 1,000 respondents how they'd handle the trolley problem, and if more than 500 answered one way then it could be declared that scientists have discovered the morally best way to handle the trolley problem. Ever disagree with the majority on a morally relevant question? Oh, it's now a scientific fact you are wrong.\n\nAnd while we're at it, science can create an objective measure for aesthetic beauty and animal cuteness and tastiest dish and best song ever written — oh and love. Science can measure love now. Objectively." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "What definition could you use, then, to describe a morality that is objectively good? Is it a morality that is adhered to by all persons?" }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "\"Objectively good\" in the moral sense is a contradiction in terms, because what's morally good exists only subjectively in people's minds. Good and evil, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. All people agreeing on a moral view (e.g. slavery is wrong) just means they share a cultural viewpoint, which is the domain of inter-subjectivity.\n\nThe domain of the objective world is basically physical stuff – they exist whether you think about them or not. But moral ideas don't exist unless you think about them, and that's what \"subjective\" means – mind-dependent." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "> For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not.\n\n This is not entirely the case. The exception is if the sadist only hurts willing masochists, and they like it, his actions can be perceived as good." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "The exceptions are exactly why \"good\" and \"bad\" are subjective – it depends on a person's view." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "> For example, a sadist may think his well-being is improved by hurting other people. Does that make his behaviour objectively good? Obviously not.\n\n This is not entirely the case. The exception is if the sadist only hurts willing masochists, and they like it, his actions can be perceived as good." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "But other people might think it is wrong to indulge masochists.\n\nThat is the point, the whole thing can only ever be subjective. People get caught up in a weird idea that something being subjective meanst that it is inherently less valuable or important than something that is objective, but in human experience that is definitely not the case. All of our experience is subjective, and out experience is all we know, so it is really, really important to us.\n\nUsually those who try to hold to a strictly objective view of morality do so to attempt to smuggle in ideas that objective morality would make nessecary. You see this more often with theists, who think that if they can prove that morality is objective, and that human experience is subjective, then morality cannoy be explained as a human creation. That gives them an opening to insert God.\n\nThe problem with the argument is that even if God has defined morality, that does not make it objective if the God is a conscious being. Anything God does would be subjective from it's perspective, and it's perspective would be the most real/valuable/important, and so morality would still be subjective. It would just be a subjective judgment we are not allowed to question.\n\nIn short, it is a weird argument that means pretty much nothing." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "You’re missing a big part of Sam arguments about morality. He explicitly states that there are many “right”answers to what is good and bad. If you prefer to help strangers that is good because it increases the well being of others and also you, directly and indirectly. I can prefer to focus on only my immediate family, that is also good. Both are objectively true statements on Sam’s account. Your personal preference is irrelevant to whether these increase human well being. Your personal preference will inform your behavior and that is to be expected." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Ok, I'm glad he recognizes and acknowledges that —unless he means there are many *objectively* right answers to what is good and bad, rather than many answers that he and/or everyone see as right answers, as the former would still be the fallacy.\n\nIf not, I'm fine with all that. But that's exactly what makes morality subjective.\n\nSo he's still wrong if he's saying morality is or can be objective. I mean, by definition it's not. I might wish it could be, but it's not — anymore than beauty or taste or quality of government.\n\nHe has not solved a way out of the is-ought distinction, because it cannot be solved without altering definitions, because the words mean different things. It's like trying to solve a purple-yellow problem. What problem? We use different words to describe different colors, and there's no way to change that except to say purple and yellow mean/represent different colors than they do." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It somewhat depends on what you mean by well-being. I think morality can be rooted in desires, which stem from intuitions we have, as well as adherence to moral action in a deontic sense. You could say us fulfilling our desires is a type of \"promotion of well-being\", but in practice, the implications of the two views diverge radically. For example, utilitarians may argue that a reformed criminal who never paid for their crime committed years ago ought not be punished because it would do no good, no well-being would be improved by doing so. However, I think the criminal ought to be punished, within reason, regardless of the loss or gain of well-being. Primarily, it's to uphold the integrity of justice, but additionally, I think if the criminal has good character, they would accept their punishment.\n\nBut why care about justice? Surely the end goal of justice is to assure the well-being of people within a community anyway, right? Simply, I think our intuitions and intentions in acting morally reveal more about the nature of morality, rather than well-being which is often a byproduct of that, like the justice example. \n\nSo yes, morality ought to consider well-being, and while well-being may be a product of our actions, it isn't necessarily the reason we act in the first place." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Well-being pertains to the health and harmony of our conscious minds. A psychopath who desires to inflict pain isn't exactly enhancing the well-being of others. Morality can only emerge on the layer of well-being." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I'm not even religious, but oviously for a religious person morality can be completely divorced from well-being if morality is about holiness. The video asks \"why should you do what God commands\" and answers \"because God rewards you with well-being (or punishes if you don't)\". That's a mistake only a non-religious person can make about religion, by seeing it in non-religious terms. For a religious person, you do what God commands because God commands it: because God is the ultimate good. The reward/punishment is just God doing Pavlovian conditioning on us, but the good of doing the thing is not dependent on that, any more than the morality of a child not stealing is dependent on whether we (as adults) reward or punish the child." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": ">For a religious person, you do what God commands because God commands it: because God is the ultimate good. The reward/punishment is just God doing Pavlovian conditioning on us, but the good of doing the thing is not dependent on that\n\nBut if we imagined a scenario in which God commanded us to do a 'good' thing which caused nothing but harm in every way that could be conceived then in what sense would doing it be 'good'?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I think there's still some wires crossing there. It's not an individual machine. There's an objective reality that is mind-independent, but does include human and animal minds. That reality has a structure and within that structure, you can inductively reason towards an emergent hierarchy of values. Within those parameters, you can determine more or less effective strategies—given a goal state that is either teleological in nature or derived logically from the apparent value map. It's like game theory, but the parameters of the game are those of reality itself. Strategies are arrived at and evaluated subjectively, but I think our discoveries about their viability (which we encode in moral teachings) connect to the structure of objective reality." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "But surely you have to take into account the individual differences in values? Sure, you can see the whole human race with its psychological variation as the machine, and if you have that machine you can determine more or less effective strategies - for individuals, or for groups, but not for everyone because people have different values.\n\n\"To say that something is good or bad is to say that it's either in accordance with that machine's functioning or inhibits it.\" -> To say something is good or bad is to say that it's either in accordance with that machine's functioning or inhibits it *for a particular individual or group*. And then you have just described moral subjectivism from an objective point of view.\n\nedit: unless you subscribe to an extreme version of utilitarianism where the whole human race is taken as the target group and \"good\" is whatever works for the majority. Your personal morality is opposed to it? Tough luck, the majority of humanity is religious and values things like no lgbt rights and less rights for women." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "But the universe can be described as a machine, albeit an unfathomably complex one. It has certain constants, predictable physical interactions, and an apparent progression of functionality across its lifespan. Maybe that makes it more like an organism, but the point is that we exist in an objective structure that defines the parameters of our biology (and therefore our minds). So any values we think we're inventing subjectively come directly from that objective reality. In that way, I think we discover moral truths like how we discover mathematical truths.\n\nNow the question with both the machine and the universe is this: what is its purpose? The purpose constrains/defines the structure and makes it possible to say what's good, bad, or more or less efficient about the machine. That same teleological question is a lot more contentious for the universe. I think what I'm saying about morality pretty much requires a purpose—which yes, also implies a mindful creator—but I think it bears out in the logical structure of reality and our evolved intuitions within that structure." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "None of that is relevant to subjectivity and objectivity though.\n\nSure, human brains are part of the material universe, and our subjective values are products of that. (I would say they're determined by it.) But that doesn't make any kinds of values objective or capable of being objectively measured.\n\nIt's like beauty. I might look at a sunset and think, \"oh that's beautiful.\" I might even think \"How could you not think so\" to someone who disagreed, but it's still subjective and outside the realm of objective measurement. By definition. We could even map brain states that correlated with perception of beauty or of enjoyment or of morality, and that still would not provide us with an objective measure.\n\nSam Harris could say, \"But the perception of beauty is inside the brain/mind, and brains/minds are part of the natural world.\" Sure, but it doesn't make concepts, values, and perceptions objective or objectively measurable." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": ">But unless \"well-being\" is stretched beyond meaning, well-being is not what all people consider moral.\n\nAnd it's Sam's claim that those people are wrong in the same way that flat earthers are wrong." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Yes, he makes that claim, but he doesn't justify it. He's saying \"this is a way morality could be a coherent system\", but doesn't give any reasons why specifically that would be the reality." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Yeah, if you intend to be moral then you 'ought' to behave this way. But that 'ought' doesn't come from the 'is' of morality, it comes from your own intentions." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Agreed. I just disagree about Sam \"not making an 'ought' claim\". He's not just saying people *can* behave in certain ways to improve overall well-being, he's saying people *should* improve well-being as an \"objective\" good. For instance, in his thought-experiment about pushing a button that would improve well-being for everyone, he said you'd have to be a psychopath not to push it. Clearly he's using the word \"psychopath\" in a disapproving way." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Trouble is, Harris is NOT arguing that it's an objective fact that people can have the moral value of improving well-being. If he did that, no-one would be disagreeing. He is arguing that the moral value of improving well-being is objectively true or correct. Using your analogy, that's like saying it's objectively true that cilantro tastes good." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Yes!, thank you. Perfectly put. I always envy people who can make good sound arguments so concisely and clearly." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "I'm not confusing these things at all.\n\n> Whether cilantro tastes good is subjective, because the answer to that question depends on the individual observing the taste. For some it tastes good, for others it doesn't. But whether cilantro tastes good to a given person still is an objective fact, because that does not depend on the person observing it. No matter who asks them whether cilantro tastes good to them, they will always give the same answer.\n\nCorrect. This is a great distinction to point out, and a good description and analogy.\n\nSo we can more or less — or, on some limited level at least — objectively measure what people's moral views are by asking them, but we cannot objectively measure morality or what moral views a person *should* hold.\n\nI mean this is just appalling logic for someone who has spent so much of his career critiquing and lambasting theism and theistic beliefs. He's falling into the same fallacious trap many fundamentalist theists do." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "This is just another confusion of two levels of discussion.\n\nHe is using a definition of \"morality\" that is something along the lines of \"behaviour that maximizes well-being\". And based on that definition, he argues that you can objectively determine what is moral and what is not.\n\nAll you are saying here is that other people could be using different definitions. Which is true, because definitions of words are, after all, subjective. But for one, that doesn't contradict his arguments, and also, it's a trivial argument to make, because this \"objection\" applies to any argument whatsoever.\n\nSomeone could be using a definition of \"tastes good\" of \"creates a burning sensation\", and suddenly cilantro doesn't taste good to anyone, but chilis taste good to everyone. That doesn't invalidate the conclusions that other people arrive at under a definition along the lines of \"creates a sensation that the person enjoys\", and it also has no influence on whether their conclusions are objective. All it means is that their conclusions don't apply under different definitions, i.e., that an equivocation fallacy is a fallacy.\n\nAnd also, you can show that the definition of morality that he uses has a strong overlap with what most people mean by it, so it is not just an arbitrary redefinition to make his conclusion work out that has no relevance to anyone else, but rather objectively(!) is relevant to the vast majority of people. In particular, even people who will tell you that they think that morality is what god wants to a large degree don't actually believe that, because their behaviour as well as other statements that they make are inconsistent with that position. See, for example, the well-etablished pattern of people claiming to follow god's word, and that the bible is god's word, but then somehow for mysterious reasons objecting to stoning people for picking up sticks on the sabath (or whatever other nonsense the bible suggests is moral under such a definition).\n\nSo, your argument is at best equivalent to \"but there are people who say that what 'tastes good' is defined as what this book says tastes good\", where the book says \"cilantro tastes good\", and the people among them who happen to have a certain gene refuse to eat cilantro because they hate the taste." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "It’s supposed to be circular. That’s the whole point. If our search for moral behavior is derived from an inherent drive toward maximizing well-being, then maximization of well-being itself is objectively the purpose of morality. \n\nI don’t know. It sorta makes sense. But I don’t think it answers deeper questions about what well-being *is* or how we can agree on that." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "Only if you assume that “our search for moral behavior” is the same thing as pre-existing objective truths about morality. The things we value, and that evolution has programmed us to value, aren’t necessarily true. This would be a form of the naturalistic fallacy.\n\nThe question of what wellbeing is is an important question, but it’s independent of the metaethical issues surrounding what moral claims are and what the nature of moral truth is.\n\nPersonally, I’m a welfare hedonist. I think the only thing that make your life go well *for you* is happiness. I think people are often misled by other types of values in considering the question of wellbeing. There are some things which are good or bad *about* your life which are not good or bad *for you*. For instance, a life in the experience machine would be good for you, but there is still something bad about a situation where you’re deceived about everything." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "You're absolutely right and yet being downvoted.\n\nThis is the most asinine argument. It is remarkable how many people here are just eating it up and accepting it.\nMorality is not in the purview of science! Morality is not objective. No matter how many times he repeats the same fallacious and irrelevant points." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "You're not understanding Harris' argument. He's arguing for a science of morality with a goal of well being similar to medicine, which also has a goal of well being. Just like we can make objective claims about subjective experience/ outcomes in medicine, we can make objective claims about subjective experience/outcomes with respect to living a good life. \n\nOnce you assume well being as the goal, just like we've done for medicine, there are objectively right and wrong answers." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "Not minds, but a mind: God’s.\n\nWith a creator morality will necessarily be rootes in His nature. If one presupposes naturalism then all models for morality will end up in relativism." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "As many have pointed out, this is still not objective morality but God's subjective view which has the most importance placed on it due to his position. One could still deviate from God's moral code to favor their own, thus God's morals are still subjective, he just has the authority to condemn those who don't follow them.\n\nTrue objective morality would be impossible to not follow even if you diagreed with it conceptually. It is an objective fact for instance that gravity exists. No matter how unfair I believe it is that humans can't just float of their own free will, it ain't happening. Meanwhile, while God can say \"Murder is wrong\" that doesn't stop me from murdering someone and justifying it to myself. \n\nI believe by \"objective\" you really mean \"on order from highest authority\" which could be used to support an argument that the order is \"right,\" but right doesn't necessarily mean objective fact and a subjective judgement is still subjective no matter the authority it comes from." } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "He has an answer yes: that most people don't consider sadists etc. to be reasonable people and such. Great, it doesn't change the fact that morality is subjective by how subjective and objective are defined.\n\nIt doesn't change the fact that morality is outside the domain of science. (It can surely inform morality, but not determine it.) What are they gonna do, take a survey?\n\nMaybe they could ask 1,000 respondents how they'd handle the trolley problem, and if more than 500 answered one way then it could be declared that scientists have discovered the morally best way to handle the trolley problem. Ever disagree with the majority on a morally relevant question? Oh, it's now a scientific fact you are wrong.\n\nAnd while we're at it, science can create an objective measure for aesthetic beauty and animal cuteness and tastiest dish and best song ever written — oh and love. Science can measure love now. Objectively." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "I don't understand why \"science\" is being used this way. Wouldn't a scientific approach be more driven by biology and psychology than just doing surveys? Is that how you think scientific truths are discovered? By popular vote?" } ]

[ { "from": "human", "value": "\"Objectively good\" in the moral sense is a contradiction in terms, because what's morally good exists only subjectively in people's minds. Good and evil, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. All people agreeing on a moral view (e.g. slavery is wrong) just means they share a cultural viewpoint, which is the domain of inter-subjectivity.\n\nThe domain of the objective world is basically physical stuff – they exist whether you think about them or not. But moral ideas don't exist unless you think about them, and that's what \"subjective\" means – mind-dependent." }, { "from": "gpt", "value": "The lines you're drawing are somewhat at odds, I think. You're implying the existence of an \"objective truth\" that applies to \"physical stuff,\" but truth isn't in the stuff either. You can't say that a tree is true or a rock is false (unless perhaps it's hiding a key to your house). True and false are attributes of a description. True and false are contingent on language, even when what's being described is purely physical.\n\nAs such, \"objectively good\" as a phrase cannot, objectively, be a contradiction for the same reason. It is only subjectively a contradiction, to you, because what those words mean to you is subjective to your experience and language. The presence or absence of a contradiction, similarly, only exist in the mind. The same words are not a contradiction to others.\n\nMy point is, you don't have the authority to state, objectively, that \"objective morality\" is a contradiction because according to your own argument, your experience (like the sadist) doesn't qualify you to make that claim to anyone but yourself. Yet it is the entire basis for your argument. You're presenting your definition as something objective while also claiming there cannot be something objective.\n\nAnd I don't think you can have it both ways. I don't find it compelling." } ]