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Justice Black | dissenting | false | Rogers v. Bellei | 1971-04-05T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108307/rogers-v-bellei/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/108307/ | 1,971 | 1970-079 | 1 | 5 | 4 | Less than four years ago this Court held that
"the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship." Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
The holding was clear. Congress could not, until today, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a *837 law stripping an American of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily renounced or given up. Now this Court, by a vote of five to four through a simple change in its composition, overrules that decision.
The Court today holds that Congress can indeed rob a citizen of his citizenship just so long as five members of this Court can satisfy themselves that the congressional action was not "unreasonable, arbitrary," ante, at 831; "misplaced or arbitrary," ante, at 832; or "irrational or arbitrary or unfair," ante, at 833. My first comment is that not one of these "tests" appears in the Constitution. Moreover, it seems a little strange to find such "tests" as these announced in an opinion which condemns the earlier decisions it overrules for their resort to cliches, which it describes as "too handy and too easy, and, like most cliches, can be misleading." Ante, at 835. That description precisely fits those words and clauses which the majority uses, but which the Constitution does not.
The Constitution, written for the ages, cannot rise and fall with this Court's passing notions of what is "fair," or "reasonable," or "arbitrary." The Fourteenth Amendment commands:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
Speaking of this very language, the Court held in Afroyim that no American can be deprived of his citizenship without his assent. Today, the Court overrules that holding. This precious Fourteenth Amendment American citizenship should not be blown around by every passing political wind that changes the composition of this Court. I dissent.
Bellei became an American citizen under the terms of *838 § 1993 of the Revised Statutes, as amended,[1] and he has neither renounced his American citizenship nor voluntarily assented to any governmental act terminating it. He has never given any indication of wanting to expatriate himself but, rather, has consistently maintained that he wants to keep his American citizenship. In my view, the decision in Afroyim, therefore, requires the Court to hold here that Bellei has been unconstitutionally deprived by § 301 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952[2] of his right to be an American citizen. Since § 301 (b) does not take into account in any way whether the citizen intends or desires to relinquish his citizenship, that section is inevitably inconsistent with the constitutional principles declared in Afroyim.
The Court today holds that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to Bellei. The Court first notes that Afroyim was essentially a case construing the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Citizenship Clause declares that: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States . . . ," the Court reasons that the protections against involuntary expatriation declared in Afroyim do not protect all American citizens, but only those "born or naturalized in the United States." Afroyim, the argument runs, was naturalized in this country so he was protected by the Citizenship Clause, but Bellei, since he acquired his American citizenship at birth in Italy as a foreign-born child of an American citizen, was neither born nor naturalized in the United States and, hence, falls outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees declared in Afroyim. One could hardly call this a generous reading of the *839 great purposes the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to bring about.
While conceding that Bellei is an American citizen, the majority states: "He simply is not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen." Therefore, the majority reasons, the congressional revocation of his citizenship is not barred by the Constitution. I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizenship of some Americans and not others.
Indeed, the concept of a hierarchy of citizenship, suggested by the majority opinion, was flatly rejected in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964): "We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive." Id., at 165. The Court there held that Congress could not deprive Mrs. Schneider of her citizenship, which she, like Mr. Bellei in the present case, acquired derivatively through her citizen mother. Consequently, the majority in its rush to overrule Afroyim must also, in effect, overrule Schneider as well.
Under the view adopted by the majority today, all children born to Americans while abroad would be excluded from the protections of the Citizenship Clause and would instead be relegated to the permanent status of second-class citizenship, subject to revocation at the will of Congress. The Court rejected such narrow, restrictive, and super-technical interpretations of the Citizenship Clause when it held in Afroyim that that Clause "was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation . . . ." 387 U.S., at 268.
Afroyim's broad interpretation of the scope of the Citizenship Clause finds ample support in the language and history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bellei was not "born . . . in the United States," but he was, constitutionally speaking, "naturalized in the United States." Although those Americans who acquire their citizenship *840 under statutes conferring citizenship on the foreign-born children of citizens are not popularly thought of as naturalized citizens, the use of the word "naturalize" in this way has a considerable constitutional history. Congress is empowered by the Constitution to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," Art. I, § 8. Anyone acquiring citizenship solely under the exercise of this power is, constitutionally speaking, a naturalized citizen. The first congressional exercise of this power, entitled "An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," was passed in 1790 at the Second Session of the First Congress. It provided in part:
"And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States." 1 Stat. 103, 104.
This provision is the earliest form of the statute under which Bellei acquired his citizenship. Its enactment as part of a "Rule of Naturalization" shows, I think, that the First Congress conceived of this and most likely all other purely statutory grants of citizenship as forms or varieties of naturalization. However, the clearest expression of the idea that Bellei and others similarly situated should for constitutional purposes be considered as naturalized citizens is to be found in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898):
"The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. . . contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere *841 fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts." 169 U.S., at 702-703.
The Court in Wong Kim Ark thus stated a broad and comprehensive definition of naturalization. As shown in Wong Kim Ark, naturalization when used in its constitutional sense is a generic term describing and including within its meaning all those modes of acquiring American citizenship other than birth in this country. All means of obtaining American citizenship which are dependent upon a congressional enactment are forms of naturalization. This inclusive definition has been adopted in several opinions of this Court besides United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra. Thus in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 167 (1875), the Court said: "Additions might always be made to the citizenship of the United States in two ways: first, by birth, and second, by naturalization. . . . [N]ew citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization." And in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), the Court took the position that the Fourteenth Amendment
"contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. . . . Persons *842 not . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired." 112 U.S., at 101-102.
Moreover, this concept of naturalization is the only one permitted by this Court's consistent adoption of the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to supply a comprehensive definition of American citizenship. In an opinion written shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court stated that one of the primary purposes of the Citizenship Clause was "to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a State." Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73 (1873). In his study, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Professor Flack similarly concluded that the Citizenship Clause "put beyond doubt and cavil in the original law, who were citizens of the United States." H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 89 (1908). And in Afroyim both majority and dissenting Justices appear to have agreed on the basic proposition that the scope of the Citizenship Clause, whatever its effect, did reach all citizens. The opinion of the Court in Afroyim described the Citizenship Clause as "calculated completely to control the status of citizenship." 387 U.S., at 262. And the dissenting Justices agreed with this proposition to the extent of holding that the Citizenship Clause was a "declaration of the classes of individuals to whom citizenship initially attaches." Id., at 292.
The majority opinion appears at times to rely on the argument that Bellei, while he concededly might *843 have been a naturalized citizen, was not naturalized "in the United States." This interpretation obviously imposes a limitation on the scope of the Citizenship Clause which is inconsistent with the conclusion expressed above that the Fourteenth Amendment provides a comprehensive definition of American citizenship, for the majority's view would exclude from the protection of that Clause all those who acquired American citizenship while abroad. I cannot accept the narrow and extraordinarily technical reading of the Fourteenth Amendment employed by the Court today. If, for example, Congress should decide to vest the authority to naturalize aliens in American embassy officials abroad rather than having the ceremony performed in this country, I have no doubt that those so naturalized would be just as fully protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as are those who go through our present naturalization procedures. Rather than the technical reading adopted by the majority, it is my view that the word "in" as it appears in the phrase "in the United States" was surely meant to be understood in two somewhat different senses: one can become a citizen of this country by being born within it or by being naturalized into it. This interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the Citizenship Clause. That clause was added in the Senate rather late in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, and as originally introduced its reference was to all those "born in the United States or naturalized by the laws thereof." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768. (Emphasis added.) The final version of the Citizenship Clause was undoubtedly intended to have this same scope. See Flack, supra, at 88-89.
The majority takes the position that Bellei, although admittedly a citizen of this country, was not entitled to the protections of the Citizenship Clause. I would not depart from the holding in Afroyim that every American *844 citizen has Fourteenth Amendment citizenship. Bellei, as a naturalized American, is entitled to all the rights and privileges of American citizenship, including the right to keep his citizenship until he voluntarily renounces or relinquishes it.
The Court today puts aside the Fourteenth Amendment as a standard by which to measure congressional action with respect to citizenship, and substitutes in its place the majority's own vague notions of "fairness." The majority takes a new step with the recurring theme that the test of constitutionality is the Court's own view of what is "fair, reasonable, and right." Despite the concession that Bellei was admittedly an American citizen, and despite the holding in Afroyim that the Fourteenth Amendment has put citizenship, once conferred, beyond the power of Congress to revoke, the majority today upholds the revocation of Bellei's citizenship on the ground that the congressional action was not "irrational or arbitrary or unfair." The majority applies the "shock-the-conscience" test to uphold, rather than strike, a federal statute. It is a dangerous concept of constitutional law that allows the majority to conclude that, because it cannot say the statute is "irrational or arbitrary or unfair," the statute must be constitutional.
Of course the Court's construction of the Constitution is not a "strict" one. On the contrary, it proceeds on the premise that a majority of this Court can change the Constitution day by day, month by month, and year by year, according to its shifting notions of what is fair, reasonable, and right. There was little need for the founders to draft a written constitution if this Court can say it is only binding when a majority finds it fair, reasonable, and right to make it so. That is the loosest construction that could be employed. It is true that England has moved along very well in the world without a written constitution. But with complete familiarity *845 with the English experience, our ancestors determined to draft a written constitution which the members of this Court are sworn to obey. While I remain on the Court I shall continue to oppose the power of judges, appointed by changing administrations, to change the Constitution from time to time according to their notions of what is "fair" and "reasonable." I would decide this case not by my views of what is "arbitrary," or what is "fair," but rather by what the Constitution commands.
I dissent.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. | Less than four years ago this Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship" The holding was clear Congress could not, until today, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a *837 law stripping an American of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily renounced or given up Now this Court, by a vote of five to four through a simple change in its composition, overrules that decision The Court today holds that Congress can indeed rob a citizen of his citizenship just so long as five members of this Court can satisfy themselves that the congressional action was not "unreasonable, arbitrary," ante, at 831; "misplaced or arbitrary," ante, at 832; or "irrational or arbitrary or unfair," ante, at 833 My first comment is that not one of these "tests" appears in the Constitution Moreover, it seems a little strange to find such "tests" as these announced in an opinion which condemns the earlier decisions it overrules for their resort to cliches, which it describes as "too handy and too easy, and, like most cliches, can be misleading" Ante, at 835 That description precisely fits those words and clauses which the majority uses, but which the Constitution does not The Constitution, written for the ages, cannot rise and fall with this Court's passing notions of what is "fair," or "reasonable," or "arbitrary" The Fourteenth Amendment commands: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside" Speaking of this very language, the Court held in Afroyim that no American can be deprived of his citizenship without his assent Today, the Court overrules that holding This precious Fourteenth Amendment American citizenship should not be blown around by every passing political wind that changes the composition of this Court I dissent Bellei became an American citizen under the terms of *838 1993 of the Revised Statutes, as amended,[1] and he has neither renounced his American citizenship nor voluntarily assented to any governmental act terminating it He has never given any indication of wanting to expatriate himself but, rather, has consistently maintained that he wants to keep his American citizenship In my view, the decision in Afroyim, therefore, requires the Court to hold here that Bellei has been unconstitutionally deprived by 301 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952[2] of his right to be an American citizen Since 301 (b) does not take into account in any way whether the citizen intends or desires to relinquish his citizenship, that section is inevitably inconsistent with the constitutional principles declared in Afroyim The Court today holds that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to Bellei The Court first notes that Afroyim was essentially a case construing the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Since the Citizenship Clause declares that: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States" the Court reasons that the protections against involuntary expatriation declared in Afroyim do not protect all American citizens, but only those "born or naturalized in the United States" Afroyim, the argument runs, was naturalized in this country so he was protected by the Citizenship Clause, but Bellei, since he acquired his American citizenship at birth in Italy as a foreign-born child of an American citizen, was neither born nor naturalized in the United States and, hence, falls outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees declared in Afroyim One could hardly call this a generous reading of the *839 great purposes the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to bring about While conceding that Bellei is an American citizen, the majority states: "He simply is not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen" Therefore, the majority reasons, the congressional revocation of his citizenship is not barred by the Constitution I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizenship of some Americans and not others Indeed, the concept of a hierarchy of citizenship, suggested by the majority opinion, was flatly rejected in : "We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive" The Court there held that Congress could not deprive Mrs Schneider of her citizenship, which she, like Mr Bellei in the present case, acquired derivatively through her citizen mother Consequently, the majority in its rush to overrule Afroyim must also, in effect, overrule Schneider as well Under the view adopted by the majority today, all children born to Americans while abroad would be excluded from the protections of the Citizenship Clause and would instead be relegated to the permanent status of second-class citizenship, subject to revocation at the will of Congress The Court rejected such narrow, restrictive, and super-technical interpretations of the Citizenship Clause when it held in Afroyim that that Clause "was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation " 387 US, at Afroyim's broad interpretation of the scope of the Citizenship Clause finds ample support in the language and history of the Fourteenth Amendment Bellei was not "born in the United States," but he was, constitutionally speaking, "naturalized in the United States" Although those Americans who acquire their citizenship *840 under statutes conferring citizenship on the foreign-born children of citizens are not popularly thought of as naturalized citizens, the use of the word "naturalize" in this way has a considerable constitutional history Congress is empowered by the Constitution to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," Art I, 8 Anyone acquiring citizenship solely under the exercise of this power is, constitutionally speaking, a naturalized citizen The first congressional exercise of this power, entitled "An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," was passed in 1790 at the Second Session of the First Congress It provided in part: "And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States" 1 Stat 103, 104 This provision is the earliest form of the statute under which Bellei acquired his citizenship Its enactment as part of a "Rule of Naturalization" shows, I think, that the First Congress conceived of this and most likely all other purely statutory grants of citizenship as forms or varieties of naturalization However, the clearest expression of the idea that Bellei and others similarly situated should for constitutional purposes be considered as naturalized citizens is to be found in United States v Wong Kim 169 US 649 : "The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law But citizenship by birth is established by the mere *841 fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts" 169 US, at 702-703 The Court in Wong Kim thus stated a broad and comprehensive definition of naturalization As shown in Wong Kim naturalization when used in its constitutional sense is a generic term describing and including within its meaning all those modes of acquiring American citizenship other than birth in this country All means of obtaining American citizenship which are dependent upon a congressional enactment are forms of naturalization This inclusive definition has been adopted in several opinions of this Court besides United States v Wong Kim supra Thus in Minor v Happersett, 21 Wall 162, the Court said: "Additions might always be made to the citizenship of the United States in two ways: first, by birth, and second, by naturalization [N]ew citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization" And in Elk v Wilkins, 112 US 94 the Court took the position that the Fourteenth Amendment "contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization Persons *842 not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired" 112 US, at 101-102 Moreover, this concept of naturalization is the only one permitted by this Court's consistent adoption of the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to supply a comprehensive definition of American citizenship In an opinion written shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court stated that one of the primary purposes of the Citizenship Clause was "to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a State" Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36, In his study, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Professor similarly concluded that the Citizenship Clause "put beyond doubt and cavil in the original law, who were citizens of the United States" H The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 89 (1908) And in Afroyim both majority and dissenting Justices appear to have agreed on the basic proposition that the scope of the Citizenship Clause, whatever its effect, did reach all citizens The opinion of the Court in Afroyim described the Citizenship Clause as "calculated completely to control the status of citizenship" 387 US, at 262 And the dissenting Justices agreed with this proposition to the extent of holding that the Citizenship Clause was a "declaration of the classes of individuals to whom citizenship initially attaches" The majority opinion appears at times to rely on the argument that Bellei, while he concededly might *843 have been a naturalized citizen, was not naturalized "in the United States" This interpretation obviously imposes a limitation on the scope of the Citizenship Clause which is inconsistent with the conclusion expressed above that the Fourteenth Amendment provides a comprehensive definition of American citizenship, for the majority's view would exclude from the protection of that Clause all those who acquired American citizenship while abroad I cannot accept the narrow and extraordinarily technical reading of the Fourteenth Amendment employed by the Court today If, for example, Congress should decide to vest the authority to naturalize aliens in American embassy officials abroad rather than having the ceremony performed in this country, I have no doubt that those so naturalized would be just as fully protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as are those who go through our present naturalization procedures Rather than the technical reading adopted by the majority, it is my view that the word "in" as it appears in the phrase "in the United States" was surely meant to be understood in two somewhat different senses: one can become a citizen of this country by being born within it or by being naturalized into it This interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the Citizenship Clause That clause was added in the Senate rather late in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, and as originally introduced its reference was to all those "born in the United States or naturalized by the laws thereof" Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess, 2768 (Emphasis added) The final version of the Citizenship Clause was undoubtedly intended to have this same scope See The majority takes the position that Bellei, although admittedly a citizen of this country, was not entitled to the protections of the Citizenship Clause I would not depart from the holding in Afroyim that every American *844 citizen has Fourteenth Amendment citizenship Bellei, as a naturalized American, is entitled to all the rights and privileges of American citizenship, including the right to keep his citizenship until he voluntarily renounces or relinquishes it The Court today puts aside the Fourteenth Amendment as a standard by which to measure congressional action with respect to citizenship, and substitutes in its place the majority's own vague notions of "fairness" The majority takes a new step with the recurring theme that the test of constitutionality is the Court's own view of what is "fair, reasonable, and right" Despite the concession that Bellei was admittedly an American citizen, and despite the holding in Afroyim that the Fourteenth Amendment has put citizenship, once conferred, beyond the power of Congress to revoke, the majority today upholds the revocation of Bellei's citizenship on the ground that the congressional action was not "irrational or arbitrary or unfair" The majority applies the "shock-the-conscience" test to uphold, rather than strike, a federal statute It is a dangerous concept of constitutional law that allows the majority to conclude that, because it cannot say the statute is "irrational or arbitrary or unfair," the statute must be constitutional Of course the Court's construction of the Constitution is not a "strict" one On the contrary, it proceeds on the premise that a majority of this Court can change the Constitution day by day, month by month, and year by year, according to its shifting notions of what is fair, reasonable, and right There was little need for the founders to draft a written constitution if this Court can say it is only binding when a majority finds it fair, reasonable, and right to make it so That is the loosest construction that could be employed It is true that England has moved along very well in the world without a written constitution But with complete familiarity *845 with the English experience, our ancestors determined to draft a written constitution which the members of this Court are sworn to obey While I remain on the Court I shall continue to oppose the power of judges, appointed by changing administrations, to change the Constitution from time to time according to their notions of what is "fair" and "reasonable" I would decide this case not by my views of what is "arbitrary," or what is "fair," but rather by what the Constitution commands I dissent MR JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR |
Justice Scalia | second_dissenting | false | American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner | 1987-06-23T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111942/american-trucking-assns-inc-v-scheiner/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/111942/ | 1,987 | 1986-147 | 1 | 5 | 4 | I agree with the Court that the "internal consistency" test it adopts requires invalidation of the Pennsylvania axle tax and marker fee as it would any unapportioned flat tax involving *304 multistate activities. For the reasons given in my dissent in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, ante, p. 254, I do not believe that test can be derived from the Constitution or is compelled by our past decisions. The same tax is imposed on in-state as on out-of-state trucks; that is all I would require. See Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935).
The Court's disposition relieves it of the need to address appellants' narrower contention that the axle tax is facially discriminatory because the same law that introduced it reduced registration fees for Pennsylvania-based trucks by, for all practical purposes, precisely the amount of the axle taxes. I would reject that challenge as well. The axle tax is imposed uniformly on both in-state and out-of-state vehicles, and is therefore not facially discriminatory. The registration fee is imposed only on in-state trucks, and its reduction likewise does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce. Since both the axle tax and the reduction in registration fees are independently nondiscriminatory, I would sustain them.
Appellants rely on Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), in which we invalidated Louisiana's use tax on offshore gas because the State credited payments of that tax against other taxes imposed on local commerce, such as the severance tax on in-state production, and exempted gas used for certain in-state activities from the tax. Id., at 732-733, 756. That case is readily distinguishable. Pennsylvania provides no exemption from its axle tax for in-state truckers, and does not permit axle tax payments to be used as credits against the registration fee. The axle tax alone unlike the gas tax in Maryland v. Louisiana is on its face nondiscriminatory.
*305 It may well be that the lowering of the exclusively intrastate registration fee has the same net effect as would a tax credit for the axle tax. But so would have the establishment of the registration fee and the axle tax at their current levels in the first place. To determine the facially discriminatory character of a tax not on the basis of the tax alone, but on the basis of the structure of a State's tax code, is to extend our case law into a new field, and one in which principled distinctions become impossible. What if, for example, the registration fees for Pennsylvania-based barges, rather than trucks, had been reduced in an amount that precisely compensated for the additional revenues to be derived from the increased axle fees? Or what if Pennsylvania had enacted the axle tax without reducing registration fees, and then one year later made a corresponding reduction in truck registration fees? This case, of course, is more difficult than those examples, because the tax reduction and axle tax both apply to the same mode of transport and were enacted simultaneously. However, to inquire whether a tax reduction is close enough in time or in mode to another tax so that "in effect" the latter should be treated as facially discriminatory is to ask a question that has no answer.
Legislative action adjusting taxes on interstate and intrastate activities spans a spectrum, ranging from the obviously discriminatory to the manipulative to the ambiguous to the wholly innocent. Courts can avoid arbitrariness in their review only by policing the entire spectrum (which is impossible), by policing none of it, or by adopting rules which subject to scrutiny certain well-defined classes of actions thought likely to come at or near the discriminatory end of the spectrum. We have traditionally followed the last course, confining our disapproval to forms of tax that seem clearly designed to discriminate,[*] and accepting the fact that some amount *306 of discrimination may slip through our net. A credit against intrastate taxes falls readily within the highly suspect category; a reduction of intrastate taxes to take account of increased revenue from a nondiscriminatory axle tax does not.
I acknowledge that the distinction between a credit and a straight reduction is a purely formal one, but it seems to me less absurd than what we will be driven to if we abandon it. The axle tax and registration fee reduction in this case appeared in the same bill. Extend the rule to treat that as "in effect" a tax credit, and the next case will involve two different bills enacted the same day, or a week apart, or at the beginning and end of the same session. A line must be drawn somewhere, and (in the absence of direction from any authoritative text) I would draw it here.
| I agree with the Court that the "internal consistency" test it adopts requires invalidation of the Pennsylvania axle tax and marker fee as it would any unapportioned flat tax involving *304 multistate activities. For the reasons given in my dissent in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, ante, p. 254, I do not believe that test can be derived from the Constitution or is compelled by our past decisions. The same tax is imposed on in-state as on out-of-state trucks; that is all I would require. See Capitol Greyhound ; Aero Mayflower Transit ; Aero Mayflower Transit The Court's disposition relieves it of the need to address appellants' narrower contention that the axle tax is facially discriminatory because the same law that introduced it reduced registration fees for Pennsylvania-based trucks by, for all practical purposes, precisely the amount of the axle taxes. I would reject that challenge as well. The axle tax is imposed uniformly on both in-state and out-of-state vehicles, and is therefore not facially discriminatory. The registration fee is imposed only on in-state trucks, and its reduction likewise does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce. Since both the axle tax and the reduction in registration fees are independently nondiscriminatory, I would sustain them. Appellants rely on in which we invalidated Louisiana's use tax on offshore gas because the State credited payments of that tax against other taxes imposed on local commerce, such as the severance tax on in-state production, and exempted gas used for certain in-state activities from the tax. That case is readily distinguishable. Pennsylvania provides no exemption from its axle tax for in-state truckers, and does not permit axle tax payments to be used as credits against the registration fee. The axle tax alone unlike the gas tax in is on its face nondiscriminatory. *305 It may well be that the lowering of the exclusively intrastate registration fee has the same net effect as would a tax credit for the axle tax. But so would have the establishment of the registration fee and the axle tax at their current levels in the first place. To determine the facially discriminatory character of a tax not on the basis of the tax alone, but on the basis of the structure of a State's tax code, is to extend our case law into a new field, and one in which principled distinctions become impossible. What if, for example, the registration fees for Pennsylvania-based barges, rather than trucks, had been reduced in an amount that precisely compensated for the additional revenues to be derived from the increased axle fees? Or what if Pennsylvania had enacted the axle tax without reducing registration fees, and then one year later made a corresponding reduction in truck registration fees? This case, of course, is more difficult than those examples, because the tax reduction and axle tax both apply to the same mode of transport and were enacted simultaneously. However, to inquire whether a tax reduction is close enough in time or in mode to another tax so that "in effect" the latter should be treated as facially discriminatory is to ask a question that has no answer. Legislative action adjusting taxes on interstate and intrastate activities spans a spectrum, ranging from the obviously discriminatory to the manipulative to the ambiguous to the wholly innocent. Courts can avoid arbitrariness in their review only by policing the entire spectrum (which is impossible), by policing none of it, or by adopting rules which subject to scrutiny certain well-defined classes of actions thought likely to come at or near the discriminatory end of the spectrum. We have traditionally followed the last course, confining our disapproval to forms of tax that seem clearly designed to discriminate,[*] and accepting the fact that some amount *306 of discrimination may slip through our net. A credit against intrastate taxes falls readily within the highly suspect category; a reduction of intrastate taxes to take account of increased revenue from a nondiscriminatory axle tax does not. I acknowledge that the distinction between a credit and a straight reduction is a purely formal one, but it seems to me less absurd than what we will be driven to if we abandon it. The axle tax and registration fee reduction in this case appeared in the same bill. Extend the rule to treat that as "in effect" a tax credit, and the next case will involve two different bills enacted the same day, or a week apart, or at the beginning and end of the same session. A line must be drawn somewhere, and (in the absence of direction from any authoritative text) I would draw it here. |
Justice Marshall | dissenting | true | Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen | 1980-01-07T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110165/stryckers-bay-neighborhood-council-inc-v-karlen/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/110165/ | 1,980 | 1979-014 | 1 | 8 | 1 | The issue raised by these cases is far more difficult than the per curiam opinion suggests. The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had acted arbitrarily in concluding that prevention of a delay in the construction process justified the selection of a housing site which could produce adverse social environmental effects, including racial and economic concentration. Today the majority responds that "once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences," and that in this litigation "there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more." The majority finds support for this conclusion in the closing paragraph *229 of our decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
Vermont Yankee does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority advances today. The relevant passage in that opinion was meant to be only a "further observation of some relevance to this case," id., at 557. That "observation" was a response to this Court's perception that the Court of Appeals in that case was attempting "under the guise of judicial review of agency action" to assert its own policy judgment as to the desirability of developing nuclear energy as an energy source for this Nation, a judgment which is properly left to Congress. Id., at 558. The Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the agency because of "a single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, urged by parties who never fully cooperated or indeed raised the issue below," ibid. It was in this context that the Court remarked that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." Ibid. (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, "[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute," ibid. (emphasis supplied). Thus Vermont Yankee does not stand for the proposition that a court reviewing agency action under NEPA is limited solely to the factual issue of whether the agency's "considered" environmental consequences. The agency's decision must still be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S. C. § 706 (2) (A), and the reviewing court must still insure that the agency "has taken a `hard look' at environmental consequences," Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals did not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions," ibid., for HUD in its *230 Special Environmental Clearance Report acknowledged the adverse environmental consequences of its proposed action: "the choice of Site 30 for development as a 100 percent low-income project has raised valid questions about the potential social environmental impacts involved." These valid questions arise from the fact that 68% of all public housing units would be sited on only one crosstown axis in this area of New York City. As the Court of Appeals observed, the resulting high concentration of low-income housing would hardly further racial and economic integration. The environmental "impact . . . on social fabric and community structures" was given a B rating in the report, indicating that from this perspective the project is "questionable" and ameliorative measures are "mandated." The report lists 10 ameliorative measures necessary to make the project acceptable. The report also discusses two alternatives, Sites 9 and 41, both of which are the appropriate size for the project and require "only minimal" amounts of relocation and clearance. Concerning Site 9 the report explicitly concludes that "[f]rom the standpoint of social environmental impact, this location would be superior to Site 30 for the development of low-rent public housing." The sole reason for rejecting the environmentally superior site was the fact that if the location were shifted to Site 9, there would be a projected delay of two years in the construction of the housing.
The issue before the Court of Appeals, therefore, was whether HUD was free under NEPA to reject an alternative acknowledged to be environmentally preferable solely on the ground that any change in sites would cause delay. This was hardly a "peripheral issue" in the case. Whether NEPA, which sets forth "significant substantive goals," Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, supra, at 558, permits a projected 2-year time difference to be controlling over environmental superiority is by no means clear. Resolution of the issue, however, is certainly within the normal scope of review of agency action to determine if it is arbitrary, *231 capricious, or an abuse of discretion.[*] The question whether HUD can make delay the paramount concern over environmental superiority is essentially a restatement of the question whether HUD in considering the environmental consequences of its proposed action gave those consequences a "hard look," which is exactly the proper question for the reviewing court to ask. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra, at 410, n. 21.
The issue of whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary or capricious is sufficiently difficult and important to merit plenary consideration in this Court. Further, I do not subscribe to the Court's apparent suggestion that Vermont Yankee limits the reviewing court to the essentially mindless task of determining whether an agency "considered" environmental factors even if that agency may have effectively decided to ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion. Indeed, I cannot believe that the Court would adhere to that position in a different factual setting. Our cases establish that the arbitrary-or-capricious standard prescribes a "searching and careful" judicial inquiry designed to ensure that the agency has not exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Believing that today's summary reversal represents a departure from that principle, I respectfully dissent.
It is apparent to me that this is not the type of case for a summary disposition. We should at least have a plenary hearing.
| The issue raised by these cases is far more difficult than the per curiam opinion suggests. The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had acted arbitrarily in concluding that prevention of a delay in the construction process justified the selection of a housing site which could produce adverse social environmental effects, including racial and economic concentration. Today the majority responds that "once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences," and that in this litigation "there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more." The majority finds support for this conclusion in the closing paragraph *229 of our decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Vermont Yankee does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority advances today. The relevant passage in that opinion was meant to be only a "further observation of some relevance to this case," That "observation" was a response to this Court's perception that the Court of Appeals in that case was attempting "under the guise of judicial review of agency action" to assert its own policy judgment as to the desirability of developing nuclear energy as an energy source for this Nation, a judgment which is properly left to Congress. at The Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the agency because of "a single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, urged by parties who never fully cooperated or indeed raised the issue below," It was in this context that the Court remarked that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." Accordingly, "[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute," Thus Vermont Yankee does not stand for the proposition that a court reviewing agency action under NEPA is limited solely to the factual issue of whether the agency's "considered" environmental consequences. The agency's decision must still be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S. C. 706 (2) (A), and the reviewing court must still insure that the agency "has taken a `hard look' at environmental consequences," In the present case, the Court of Appeals did not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions," ib for HUD in its *230 Special Environmental Clearance Report acknowledged the adverse environmental consequences of its proposed action: "the choice of Site 30 for development as a 100 percent low-income project has raised valid questions about the potential social environmental impacts involved." These valid questions arise from the fact that 68% of all public housing units would be sited on only one crosstown axis in this area of New York City. As the Court of Appeals observed, the resulting high concentration of low-income housing would hardly further racial and economic integration. The environmental "impact on social fabric and community structures" was given a B rating in the report, indicating that from this perspective the project is "questionable" and ameliorative measures are "mandated." The report lists 10 ameliorative measures necessary to make the project acceptable. The report also discusses two alternatives, Sites 9 and 41, both of which are the appropriate size for the project and require "only minimal" amounts of relocation and clearance. Concerning Site 9 the report explicitly concludes that "[f]rom the standpoint of social environmental impact, this location would be superior to Site 30 for the development of low-rent public housing." The sole reason for rejecting the environmentally superior site was the fact that if the location were shifted to Site 9, there would be a projected delay of two years in the construction of the housing. The issue before the Court of Appeals, therefore, was whether HUD was free under NEPA to reject an alternative acknowledged to be environmentally preferable solely on the ground that any change in sites would cause delay. This was hardly a "peripheral issue" in the case. Whether NEPA, which sets forth "significant substantive goals," Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power at permits a projected 2-year time difference to be controlling over environmental superiority is by no means clear. Resolution of the issue, however, is certainly within the normal scope of review of agency action to determine if it is arbitrary, *231 capricious, or an abuse of discretion.[*] The question whether HUD can make delay the paramount concern over environmental superiority is essentially a restatement of the question whether HUD in considering the environmental consequences of its proposed action gave those consequences a "hard look," which is exactly the proper question for the reviewing court to ask. at The issue of whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary or capricious is sufficiently difficult and important to merit plenary consideration in this Court. Further, I do not subscribe to the Court's apparent suggestion that Vermont Yankee limits the reviewing court to the essentially mindless task of determining whether an agency "considered" environmental factors even if that agency may have effectively decided to ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion. Indeed, I cannot believe that the Court would adhere to that position in a different factual setting. Our cases establish that the arbitrary-or-capricious standard prescribes a "searching and careful" judicial inquiry designed to ensure that the agency has not exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Believing that today's summary reversal represents a departure from that principle, I respectfully dissent. It is apparent to me that this is not the type of case for a summary disposition. We should at least have a plenary hearing. |
Justice White | majority | false | Longshoremen v. Davis | 1986-05-27T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111673/longshoremen-v-davis/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/111673/ | 1,986 | 1985-089 | 2 | 9 | 0 | The opinion in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), set forth a general standard for determining when state proceedings or regulations are pre-empted by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), see 29 U.S. C. § 151 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II): Subject to exception only in limited circumstances, "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act [29 U.S. C. § 157 or § 158], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S., at 245. This general standard has been applied in a multitude of cases decided since Garmon, and it must be applied again today. Before addressing that question, however, we must consider the very nature of such pre-emption whether Garmon pre-emption is in the nature of an affirmative defense *382 that must be asserted in the trial court or be considered forever waived or whether it is in the nature of a challenge to a court's power to adjudicate that may be raised at any time.
I
Appellee Larry Davis was formerly employed by Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. in Mobile, Alabama. At the times relevant to the events that gave rise to this suit, he was a ship superintendent or trainee ship superintendent. The ship superintendents apparently served as the immediate superiors of the longshoremen employed by Ryan-Walsh. They were on salary, however, and their compensation was generally lower than that received by the longshoremen, who worked on an hourly basis.
In early 1981, Ben Trione, one of the ship superintendents who worked for Ryan-Walsh, contacted appellant International Longshoremen's Association (ILA or Union), a union that represents longshoremen and other employees on the waterfront, to discuss the possibility of organizing the superintendents and affiliating with the Union. Although the parties here dispute the content of the conversations that occurred at this stage between Trione and the ILA representatives regarding the ship superintendents and their eligibility for union membership, it is undisputed that a meeting of the superintendents was organized by Trione and attended by Benny Holland, an ILA official from Houston, Texas.
At this meeting, several of the superintendents expressed a fear of being discharged for participating in union-related activities. According to Davis' witnesses, Holland's response to this was to reassure them that the Union would get them their jobs back with backpay if that happened. According to Holland, however, Holland's response was that they would be protected in that manner only if they were determined not to be supervisors under the Act and that he did *383 not know whether or not they would be considered supervisors.[1] Holland further testified that he had submitted this issue to the Union's lawyers and had not received a definitive opinion from them by the time of the meeting. The meeting, according to all witnesses, resulted in a number of the ship superintendents, including Davis, signing pledge cards and a union charter application with the ILA.[2]
On the day following the organizational meeting, Ryan-Walsh fired Trione. Trione contacted the ILA, which supplied him with an attorney. The attorney filed an unfair labor practice charge against Ryan-Walsh with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that Trione was an employee under the Act and that Ryan-Walsh had violated § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging him for participating in *384 union activities. See 29 U.S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3).[3] The NLRB's Regional Director, however, determined that Trione was a supervisor under the Act and declined to issue a complaint.[4] Trione did not, as he had a right to do, appeal this determination to the NLRB General Counsel. See 29 CFR § 102.19 (1985). Shortly thereafter, Davis was also discharged *385 by Ryan-Walsh, apparently for his continued efforts to organize the ship superintendents and to join the Union.
In response to his discharge, Davis filed this suit against the ILA in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, alleging fraud and misrepresentation under Ala. Code § 6-5-101 (1975).[5] The case proceeded to trial, and a jury entered a verdict in Davis' favor in the amount of $75,000. Throughout the trial, the Union defended the suit on the merits, raising no issue that the suit was pre-empted by the NLRA. In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, the ILA raised for the first time a claim that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the filed had "been pre-empted by federal law and federal jurisdiction." App. 96a. The Circuit Court denied the Union's motion without opinion and entered judgment on the jury's verdict.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, the ILA argued that pre-emption was not a waivable defense and that the state fraud and misrepresentation action was pre-empted under Garmon. Although acknowledging that other state courts had adopted the ILA's position that NLRA pre-emption was nonwaivable,[6] the Alabama court held that "[i]t is not the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a damage claim for the tort of fraud even if it arises in the context of a labor-related dispute that is pre-empted. Rather, it is the state court's exercise of that power that is subject to preemption." 470 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (1985). The court's view was that as a state court of general jurisdiction the Circuit Court had had subject-matter jurisdiction over this ordinary tort claim for damages. As a waivable defense, the pre-emption claim was required under Alabama *386 law to be affirmatively pleaded. Since it was not so pleaded, it was deemed waived.[7]
The Alabama Supreme Court, although holding that the ILA's pre-emption claim had been waived, stated in a footnote that if it had had occasion to reach the merits, it would have found no pre-emption:
"The instant facts fall squarely within the `peripheral concern' exception to federal preemption of state jurisdiction of labor-related disputes. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959). The National Labor Relations Board has already determined that an employer's supervisors are not protected by the Labor Management Relations Act. Thus, in this case, [Davis] has no remedy before the NLRB, and this dispute, although somewhat laborrelated, is, at most, only of `peripheral concern' to the NLRB. See, e. g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)." Id., at 1216-1217, n. 2 (citations omitted).
The Alabama Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the judgment against the Union. The Union appealed to this Court; Davis moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground because the Alabama Supreme Court's decision was based on an application of a state procedural rule. The ILA's submission, however, raised a substantial question whether reliance on the procedural rule rested on an erroneous view of the scope of Garmon pre-emption, a matter of *387 federal law, and hence whether the procedural ground relied on was adequate and independent. We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U.S. 899 (1985).[8]
II
A
Given the reliance of the Alabama Supreme Court on its procedural rule governing the presentation of affirmative defenses, we first decide whether that rule in this case represents an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment below. If it does, our review is at an end, for we have no authority to review state determinations of purely state law. Nor do we review federal issues that can have no effect on the state court's judgment. See, e. g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1977); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). The inquiry into the sufficiency of the asserted state ground, however, is one that we undertake ourselves. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 (1931).
In concluding that the Union's pre-emption claim was procedurally barred, the Alabama Supreme Court first held that because the Mobile County Circuit Court, as a state court of general jurisdiction, had subject-matter jurisdiction over the simple tort claim of misrepresentation, there could be no pre-emption of that court's actual jurisdiction. Only the exercise of that jurisdiction could be pre-empted.
This explanation has a certain logic to it; but the point is not whether state law gives the state courts jurisdiction over particular controversies but whether jurisdiction provided by *388 state law is itself pre-empted by federal law vesting exclusive jurisdiction over that controversy in another body. It is clearly within Congress' powers to establish an exclusive federal forum to adjudicate issues of federal law in a particular area that Congress has the authority to regulate under the Constitution. See, e. g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). Whether it has done so in a specific case is the question that must be answered when a party claims that a state court's jurisdiction is pre-empted. Such a determination of congressional intent and of the boundaries and character of a pre-empting congressional enactment is one of federal law. Pre-emption, the practical manifestation of the Supremacy Clause, is always a federal question.
If the Alabama procedural ruling under state law implicates an underlying question of federal law, however, the state law is not an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment:
"[W]hen resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded. . . . In such a case, the federal-law holding is integral to the state court's disposition of the matter, and our ruling on the issue is in no respect advisory." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, supra, at 126; Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917)).
To determine the sufficiency of the state procedural ground relied upon by the Alabama Supreme Court we must ascertain whether that court correctly resolved the antecedent federal question regarding the nature of Garmon pre-emption under the NLRA. Specifically, the question is whether Garmon pre-emption is a waivable affirmative defense such that a state court may adjudicate an otherwise pre-empted claim if the Garmon defense is not timely raised *389 or whether Garmon pre-emption is a nonwaivable foreclosure of the state court's very jurisdiction to adjudicate.
B
The Court's opinion in Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 490-491 (1953), articulated what has come to be the accepted basis for the broadly pre-emptive scope of the NLRA:
"Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law."
Building on this cornerstone, the Garmon Court went on to set out the now well-established scope of NLRA pre-emption. Given the NLRA's "complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration," 359 U.S., at 243, the Court held that "due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield," id., at 244, when the activities sought to be regulated by a State are clearly or may fairly be assumed to be within the purview of § 7 or § 8. The Court acknowledged that "[a]t times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections." Ibid. Even in such ambiguous *390 situations, however, the Court concluded that "courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board." Id., at 244-245. Thus, the Court held that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id., at 245.
In Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), we considered the application of these principles to a situation in which the Georgia courts had awarded relief based on a complaint that contained allegations that made out "at least an arguable violation of § 8(b)." Id., at 546. There, we reviewed a claim that "the subject matter of [the] suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board," id., at 543, and held that, even though the state court was authorized to adjudicate the claim as a matter of state law, the state court "clearly exceeded its power" in awarding relief on the complaint. Id., at 548. Specifically, "the state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to adjudicate this controversy, which lay within the exclusive powers of the National Labor Relations Board." Id., at 546-547.
That our conclusion was in fact jurisdictional was accentuated by our discussion of the procedural context in which the case arose. The state court had awarded a temporary injunction only, and a permanent order had not yet been issued. We rejected, however, the argument that the judgment was not yet final for purposes of our own jurisdiction:
"[W]e believe our power to review this case rests upon solid ground. The federal question raised by petitioner in the Georgia court, and here, is whether the Georgia courts had power to proceed with and determine this controversy. The issue ripe for review is not whether a *391 Georgia court has erroneously decided a matter of federal law in a case admittedly within its jurisdiction nor is it the question of whether federal or state law governs a case properly before the Georgia courts. What we do have here is a judgment of the Georgia court finally and erroneously asserting its jurisdiction to deal with a controversy which is beyond its power and instead is within the exclusive domain of the National Labor Relations Board." Id., at 548 (citations omitted).
See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 497-498, n. 5 (1983). Curry made clear that when a state proceeding or regulation is claimed to be pre-empted by the NLRA under Garmon, the issue is a choice-of-forum rather than a choice-of-law question. As such, it is a question whether the State or the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute. If there is pre-emption under Garmon, then state jurisdiction is extinguished.[9]
Since Garmon and Curry, we have reiterated many times the general pre-emption standard set forth in Garmon and the jurisdictional nature of Garmon pre-emption; we have also reaffirmed that our decisions describing the nature of Garmon pre-emption and defining its boundaries have rested on a determination that in enacting the NLRA Congress intended for the Board generally to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in this area. See, e. g., Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698 (1963); Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 708 (1963); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 309-310 (1964); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60 (1966); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179 (1967); Motor Coach Employees *392 v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-291 (1971); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296-297, 305 (1977); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 188-190 (1978); Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676 (1983); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra, at 510-511; Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 502-503 (1984); Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986).
Davis does not seriously dispute this conclusion at least as a general matter. He concedes, in fact, that "when a particular issue has been placed by Congress within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, a state court will have no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue. In such cases, any judgment issued by the state court will be void ab initio because subject matter jurisdiction is pre-empted." Brief for Appellee 13. Davis notes, however, that this Court has acknowledged that Garmon does not pre-empt "all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Lockridge, supra, at 289. Specifically, Davis points to Garmon's own recognition that some controversies that are arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 are not pre-empted:
"[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system . . . has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." 359 U.S., at 243-244 (citations omitted).
Both before and since Garmon we have identified claims that fall within one or both these articulated exceptions. See, e. g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra; Farmer v. Carpenters, *393 supra; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra; Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).[10] But these cases serve only as more precise demarcations of the scope of Garmon pre-emption. They have not redefined the nature of that pre-emption in any way. A claim of Garmon pre-emption is a claim that the state court has no power to adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and when a claim of Garmon pre-emption is raised, it must be considered and resolved by the state court. Consequently, the state procedural rule relied on by the Alabama Supreme Court to support the judgment below was not a sufficient state ground, and the Union was and is entitled to an adjudication of its pre-emption claim on the merits.[11]
*394 III
As the Garmon line of cases directs, the pre-emption inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. That much is clear. There is also no dispute that if Davis was a supervisor, he was legally fired,[12] the Union misspoke if it represented that there was legal redress for the discharge, and there is no pre-emption. But if Davis was an employee, his discharge for union activities was an unfair practice, the Union was protected in its attempt to interest him in the Union, and it did not err in representing that if he was discharged for joining the Union, there would be a remedy. We should inquire, then, whether Davis was arguably an employee, rather than a supervisor. If he was, the issue was to be initially decided by the NLRB, not the state courts.
The precondition for pre-emption, that the conduct be "arguably" protected or prohibited, is not without substance. It is not satisfied by a conclusory assertion of pre-emption and would therefore not be satisfied in this case by a claim, *395 without more, that Davis was an employee rather than a supervisor. If the word "arguably" is to mean anything, it must mean that the party claiming pre-emption is required to demonstrate that his case is one that the Board could legally decide in his favor. That is, a party asserting pre-emption must advance an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language and that has not been "authoritatively rejected" by the courts or the Board. Marine Engineers v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 184 (1962). The party must then put forth enough evidence to enable the court to find that the Board reasonably could uphold a claim based on such an interpretation. In this case, therefore, because the pre-emption issue turns on Davis' status, the Union's claim of pre-emption must be supported by a showing sufficient to permit the Board to find that Davis was an employee, not a supervisor. Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that the Union has not carried its burden in this case.
Expecting that the Union would put its best foot forward in this Court, we look first at its submission here that there is an arguable case for pre-emption. The Union's brief states that its conduct was protected by federal law if Davis was an employee, that in order to find the Union liable the jury must have found that Davis was a supervisor, and that "the state law controversy of whether the Union made a misrepresentation and the federal controversy of whether the superintendents were in fact supervisors are `the same in a fundamental respect.' " Brief for Appellant 16 (quoting Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U. S., at 682). So far, the argument proceeds in the right direction. As for the critical issue of whether Davis is an employee or a supervisor, the Union asserts only that "[a]bsent a clear determination by the NLRB that the ship superintendents are supervisors rather than employees, superintendents are arguably employees and the state is preempted from applying its law." Brief for Appellant 13. In making this contention, the ILA *396 relies on our cases indicating that pre-emption can be avoided if an individual's supervisory status has been determined " `with unclouded legal significance.' " Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers, 382 U.S. 181, 190 (1965) (quoting Garmon, 359 U. S., at 246). See also Jones, supra, at 680. It does not undertake any examination of Davis' duties as a ship superintendent. It makes no attempt to show that Davis was more like an employee than a supervisor as those terms are defined in §§ 2(1) and (11) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. §§ 152(1) and (11).[13] It points to no evidence in the record indicating that Davis was not a supervisor. It does not argue that Davis' job was different from Trione's or that the Regional Director was wrong in finding that Trione was a supervisor. Its sole submission is that Davis was arguably an employee because the Board has not decided that he was a supervisor.
We cannot agree that Davis' arguable status as a supervisor is made out by the mere fact that the Board has not finally determined his status. The lack of a Board decision in no way suggests how it would or could decide the case if it had the opportunity to do so. To accept the Union's submission would be essentially equivalent to allowing a conclusory claim of pre-emption and would effectively eliminate the necessity to make out an arguable case. The better view is that those claiming pre-emption must carry the burden of showing at least an arguable case before the jurisdiction of a state court will be ousted.
Moreover, neither Garmon nor Hanna Mining supports the Union's position. Garmon itself is the source of the arguably protected or prohibited standard for pre-emption. The Court stated, 359 U.S., at 244:
"When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by *397 § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of the federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law."
Later the Court said: "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence" of the Board. Id., at 245. Of course, the Court explained, the Board might decide the case one way or the other, but in the "absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither protected or prohibited," id., at 246, it is not for the courts to decide the case. It is apparent from these passages that a court first must decide whether there is an arguable case for pre-emption; if there is, it must defer to the Board, and only if the Board decides that the conduct is not protected or prohibited may the court entertain the litigation. Nothing in Garmon suggests that an arguable case for pre-emption is made out simply because the Board has not decided the general issue one way or the other.
Hanna Mining also does nothing for the Union's submission. The Court there, relying on Garmon, held that there was no pre-emption because the Board or its General Counsel had in fact adversely decided the issues on which the claim of pre-emption rested. Obviously, no inference may be drawn from that decision that a party makes out a case for pre-emption by merely asserting that the issue involved has not been decided by the Board. The Union's position is also negated by Interlake S. S. Co., supra, where the Court found pre-emption only after examining the facts and deciding "whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that either of [the organizations] was arguably a `labor organization' within the contemplation of § 8(b)." Id., at 178. The Court went on to hold that while there was persuasive evidence *398 that the marine engineers were supervisors, the Board had nevertheless effectively decided that the union involved was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. While agreeing with the principles announced by the Court, Justice Douglas dissented because he had a different view of the facts of the case. Consequently, a party asserting pre-emption must put forth enough evidence to enable a court to conclude that the activity is arguably subject to the Act.
Here, the Union points to no evidence in support of its assertion that Davis was arguably an employee. The Union's claim of pre-emption in the state courts was also devoid of any factual or legal showing that Davis was arguably not a supervisor but an employee. In this respect, its brief in the Alabama Supreme Court was similar to its brief here, and its post-trial motion for judgment in the trial court contained no more than a conclusory assertion that state jurisdiction was pre-empted. Until that motion, no claim of pre-emption had been made out, but whether Davis was a supervisor or an employee was a relevant inquiry in making out his case. He alleged in his complaint that he was a supervisor. The Union answered that it was without sufficient information to form a belief as to whether or not he was. Moreover, in moving for summary judgment or for directed verdict at the close of Davis' case and at the close of all the evidence the Union did not assert that Davis was an employee, not a supervisor, let alone point to any evidence to support such a claim.[14] In sum, the Union has not met its burden of showing that the conduct here was arguably subject to the Act.
IV
We hold that where state law is pre-empted by the NLRA under Garmon and our subsequent cases, the state courts lack the very power to adjudicate the claims that trigger pre-emption. *399 Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court's holding that the ILA had waived its pre-emption claim by noncompliance with state procedural rules governing affirmative defenses did not present an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment below, and that court erred in declining to address that claim on the merits. On the merits, we reject the ILA's characterization of our prior cases as holding that the mere lack of a conclusive determination by the Board that an activity is without the purview of the Act renders that activity arguably subject to the Act. Rather, we reaffirm our previously expressed view that the party asserting pre-emption must make an affirmative showing that the activity is arguably subject to the Act and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court.
So ordered.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE POWELL, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. | The opinion in San Diego Building Trades set forth a general standard for determining when state proceedings or regulations are pre-empted by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), see 29 U.S. C. 151 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II): Subject to exception only in limited circumstances, "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to 7 or 8 of the Act [29 U.S. C. 157 or 158], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." This general standard has been applied in a multitude of cases decided since and it must be applied again today. Before addressing that question, however, we must consider the very nature of such pre-emption whether pre-emption is in the nature of an affirmative defense *382 that must be asserted in the trial court or be considered forever waived or whether it is in the nature of a challenge to a court's power to adjudicate that may be raised at any time. I Appellee Larry Davis was formerly employed by Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. in Mobile, Alabama. At the times relevant to the events that gave rise to this suit, he was a ship superintendent or trainee ship superintendent. The ship superintendents apparently served as the immediate superiors of the longshoremen employed by Ryan-Walsh. They were on salary, however, and their compensation was generally lower than that received by the longshoremen, who worked on an hourly basis. In early 1981, Ben Trione, one of the ship superintendents who worked for Ryan-Walsh, contacted appellant International Longshoremen's Association (ILA or Union), a union that represents longshoremen and other employees on the waterfront, to discuss the possibility of organizing the superintendents and affiliating with the Union. Although the parties here dispute the content of the conversations that occurred at this stage between Trione and the ILA representatives regarding the ship superintendents and their eligibility for union membership, it is undisputed that a meeting of the superintendents was organized by Trione and attended by Benny Holland, an ILA official from Houston, Texas. At this meeting, several of the superintendents expressed a fear of being discharged for participating in union-related activities. According to Davis' witnesses, Holland's response to this was to reassure them that the Union would get them their jobs back with backpay if that happened. According to Holland, however, Holland's response was that they would be protected in that manner only if they were determined not to be supervisors under the Act and that he did *383 not know whether or not they would be considered supervisors.[1] Holland further testified that he had submitted this issue to the Union's lawyers and had not received a definitive opinion from them by the time of the meeting. The meeting, according to all witnesses, resulted in a number of the ship superintendents, including Davis, signing pledge cards and a union charter application with the ILA.[2] On the day following the organizational meeting, Ryan-Walsh fired Trione. Trione contacted the ILA, which supplied him with an attorney. The attorney filed an unfair labor practice charge against Ryan-Walsh with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that Trione was an employee under the Act and that Ryan-Walsh had violated 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging him for participating in *384 union activities. See 29 U.S. C. 158(a)(1), (3).[3] The NLRB's Regional Director, however, determined that Trione was a supervisor under the Act and declined to issue a complaint.[4] Trione did not, as he had a right to do, appeal this determination to the NLRB General Counsel. See 29 CFR 102.19 Shortly thereafter, Davis was also discharged *385 by Ryan-Walsh, apparently for his continued efforts to organize the ship superintendents and to join the Union. In response to his discharge, Davis filed this suit against the ILA in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, alleging fraud and misrepresentation under Ala. Code 6-5-101 (19).[5] The case proceeded to trial, and a jury entered a verdict in Davis' favor in the amount of $,000. Throughout the trial, the Union defended the suit on the merits, raising no issue that the suit was pre-empted by the NLRA. In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, the ILA raised for the first time a claim that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the filed had "been pre-empted by federal law and federal jurisdiction." App. 96a. The Circuit Court denied the Union's motion without opinion and entered judgment on the jury's verdict. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, the ILA argued that pre-emption was not a waivable defense and that the state fraud and misrepresentation action was pre-empted under Although acknowledging that other state courts had adopted the ILA's position that NLRA pre-emption was nonwaivable,[6] the Alabama court held that "[i]t is not the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a damage claim for the tort of fraud even if it arises in the context of a labor-related dispute that is pre-empted. Rather, it is the state court's exercise of that power that is subject to preemption." The court's view was that as a state court of general jurisdiction the Circuit Court had had subject-matter jurisdiction over this ordinary tort claim for damages. As a waivable defense, the pre-emption claim was required under Alabama *386 law to be affirmatively pleaded. Since it was not so pleaded, it was deemed waived.[7] The Alabama Supreme Court, although holding that the ILA's pre-emption claim had been waived, in a footnote that if it had had occasion to reach the merits, it would have found no pre-emption: "The instant facts fall squarely within the `peripheral concern' exception to federal preemption of state jurisdiction of labor-related disputes. San Diego Building Trades The National Labor Relations Board has already determined that an employer's supervisors are not protected by the Labor Management Relations Act. Thus, in this case, [Davis] has no remedy before the NLRB, and this dispute, although somewhat laborrelated, is, at most, only of `peripheral concern' to the NLRB. See, e. g.," at -1217, n. 2 The Alabama Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the judgment against the Union. The Union appealed to this Court; Davis moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground because the Alabama Supreme Court's decision was based on an application of a state procedural rule. The ILA's submission, however, raised a substantial question whether reliance on the procedural rule rested on an erroneous view of the scope of pre-emption, a matter of *387 federal law, and hence whether the procedural ground relied on was adequate and independent. We noted probable jurisdiction,[8] II A Given the reliance of the Alabama Supreme Court on its procedural rule governing the presentation of affirmative defenses, we first decide whether that rule in this case represents an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment below. If it does, our review is at an end, for we have no authority to review state determinations of purely state law. Nor do we review federal issues that can have no effect on the state court's judgment. See, e. g., ; ; Fox Film The inquiry into the sufficiency of the asserted state ground, however, is one that we undertake ourselves. See ; Abie State In concluding that the Union's pre-emption claim was procedurally barred, the Alabama Supreme Court first held that because the Mobile County Circuit Court, as a state court of general jurisdiction, had subject-matter jurisdiction over the simple tort claim of misrepresentation, there could be no pre-emption of that court's actual jurisdiction. Only the exercise of that jurisdiction could be pre-empted. This explanation has a certain logic to it; but the point is not whether state law gives the state courts jurisdiction over particular controversies but whether jurisdiction provided by *388 state law is itself pre-empted by federal law vesting exclusive jurisdiction over that controversy in another body. It is clearly within Congress' powers to establish an exclusive federal forum to adjudicate issues of federal law in a particular area that Congress has the authority to regulate under the Constitution. See, e. g., Whether it has done so in a specific case is the question that must be answered when a party claims that a state court's jurisdiction is pre-empted. Such a determination of congressional intent and of the boundaries and character of a pre-empting congressional enactment is one of federal law. Pre-emption, the practical manifestation of the Supremacy Clause, is always a federal question. If the Alabama procedural ruling under state law implicates an underlying question of federal law, however, the state law is not an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment: "[W]hen resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded. In such a case, the federal-law holding is integral to the state court's disposition of the matter, and our ruling on the issue is in no respect advisory." ). To determine the sufficiency of the state procedural ground relied upon by the Alabama Supreme Court we must ascertain whether that court correctly resolved the antecedent federal question regarding the nature of pre-emption under the NLRA. Specifically, the question is whether pre-emption is a waivable affirmative defense such that a state court may adjudicate an otherwise pre-empted claim if the defense is not timely raised *389 or whether pre-emption is a nonwaivable foreclosure of the state court's very jurisdiction to adjudicate. B The Court's opinion in articulated what has come to be the accepted basis for the broadly pre-emptive scope of the NLRA: "Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law." Building on this cornerstone, the Court went on to set out the now well-established scope of NLRA pre-emption. Given the NLRA's "complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration," the Court held that "due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield," when the activities sought to be regulated by a State are clearly or may fairly be assumed to be within the purview of 7 or 8. The Court acknowledged that "[a]t times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by 7 or 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections." Even in such ambiguous *390 situations, however, the Court concluded that "courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board." -245. Thus, the Court held that "[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to 7 or 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." In Construction we considered the application of these principles to a situation in which the Georgia courts had awarded relief based on a complaint that contained allegations that made out "at least an arguable violation of 8(b)." There, we reviewed a claim that "the subject matter of [the] suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board," and held that, even though the state court was authorized to adjudicate the claim as a matter of state law, the state court "clearly exceeded its power" in awarding relief on the complaint. Specifically, "the state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to adjudicate this controversy, which lay within the exclusive powers of the National Labor Relations Board." -547. That our conclusion was in fact jurisdictional was accentuated by our discussion of the procedural context in which the case arose. The state court had awarded a temporary injunction only, and a permanent order had not yet been issued. We rejected, however, the argument that the judgment was not yet final for purposes of our own jurisdiction: "[W]e believe our power to review this case rests upon solid ground. The federal question raised by petitioner in the Georgia court, and here, is whether the Georgia courts had power to proceed with and determine this controversy. The issue ripe for review is not whether a *391 Georgia court has erroneously decided a matter of federal law in a case admittedly within its jurisdiction nor is it the question of whether federal or state law governs a case properly before the Georgia courts. What we do have here is a judgment of the Georgia court finally and erroneously asserting its jurisdiction to deal with a controversy which is beyond its power and instead is within the exclusive domain of the National Labor Relations Board." See also Belknap, Curry made clear that when a state proceeding or regulation is claimed to be pre-empted by the NLRA under the issue is a choice-of-forum rather than a choice-of-law question. As such, it is a question whether the State or the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute. If there is pre-emption under then state jurisdiction is extinguished.[9] Since and Curry, we have reiterated many times the general pre-emption standard set forth in and the jurisdictional nature of pre-emption; we have also reaffirmed that our decisions describing the nature of pre-emption and defining its boundaries have rested on a determination that in enacting the NLRA Congress intended for the Board generally to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in this area. See, e. g., ; Iron ; 3 U.S. 301, ; ; ; Motor Coach Employees ; ; Sears, Roebuck & ; Operating 4 U.S. 669, ; Belknap, ; ; Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human 4 U.S. 282, Davis does not seriously dispute this conclusion at least as a general matter. He concedes, in fact, that "when a particular issue has been placed by Congress within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, a state court will have no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue. In such cases, any judgment issued by the state court will be void ab initio because subject matter jurisdiction is pre-empted." Brief for Appellee 13. Davis notes, however, that this Court has acknowledged that does not pre-empt "all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Lockridge, Specifically, Davis points to 's own recognition that some controversies that are arguably subject to 7 or 8 are not pre-empted: "[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." -244 Both before and since we have identified claims that fall within one or both these articulated exceptions. See, e. g., Belknap, *393 Automobile v. Russell, ; ; ; Construction v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,[10] But these cases serve only as more precise demarcations of the scope of pre-emption. They have not redefined the nature of that pre-emption in any way. A claim of pre-emption is a claim that the state court has no power to adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and when a claim of pre-emption is raised, it must be considered and resolved by the state court. Consequently, the state procedural rule relied on by the Alabama Supreme Court to support the judgment below was not a sufficient state ground, and the Union was and is entitled to an adjudication of its pre-emption claim on the merits.[11] *394 III As the line of cases directs, the pre-emption inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. That much is clear. There is also no dispute that if Davis was a supervisor, he was legally fired,[12] the Union misspoke if it represented that there was legal redress for the discharge, and there is no pre-emption. But if Davis was an employee, his discharge for union activities was an unfair practice, the Union was protected in its attempt to interest him in the Union, and it did not err in representing that if he was discharged for joining the Union, there would be a remedy. We should inquire, then, whether Davis was arguably an employee, rather than a supervisor. If he was, the issue was to be initially decided by the NLRB, not the state courts. The precondition for pre-emption, that the conduct be "arguably" protected or prohibited, is not without substance. It is not satisfied by a conclusory assertion of pre-emption and would therefore not be satisfied in this case by a claim, *395 without more, that Davis was an employee rather than a supervisor. If the word "arguably" is to mean anything, it must mean that the party claiming pre-emption is required to demonstrate that his case is one that the Board could legally decide in his favor. That is, a party asserting pre-emption must advance an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language and that has not been "authoritatively rejected" by the courts or the Board. Marine The party must then put forth enough evidence to enable the court to find that the Board reasonably could uphold a claim based on such an interpretation. In this case, therefore, because the pre-emption issue turns on Davis' status, the Union's claim of pre-emption must be supported by a showing sufficient to permit the Board to find that Davis was an employee, not a supervisor. Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that the Union has not carried its burden in this case. Expecting that the Union would put its best foot forward in this Court, we look first at its submission here that there is an arguable case for pre-emption. The Union's brief states that its conduct was protected by federal law if Davis was an employee, that in order to find the Union liable the jury must have found that Davis was a supervisor, and that "the state law controversy of whether the Union made a misrepresentation and the federal controversy of whether the superintendents were in fact supervisors are `the same in a fundamental respect.' " Brief for Appellant 16 (quoting Operating 4 U. S., at 682). So far, the argument proceeds in the right direction. As for the critical issue of whether Davis is an employee or a supervisor, the Union asserts only that "[a]bsent a clear determination by the NLRB that the ship superintendents are supervisors rather than employees, superintendents are arguably employees and the state is preempted from applying its law." Brief for Appellant 13. In making this contention, the ILA *396 relies on our cases indicating that pre-emption can be avoided if an individual's supervisory status has been determined " `with unclouded legal significance.' " Hanna Mining See also It does not undertake any examination of Davis' duties as a ship superintendent. It makes no attempt to show that Davis was more like an employee than a supervisor as those terms are defined in 2(1) and (11) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. 152(1) and (11).[13] It points to no evidence in the record indicating that Davis was not a supervisor. It does not argue that Davis' job was different from Trione's or that the Regional Director was wrong in finding that Trione was a supervisor. Its sole submission is that Davis was arguably an employee because the Board has not decided that he was a supervisor. We cannot agree that Davis' arguable status as a supervisor is made out by the mere fact that the Board has not finally determined his status. The lack of a Board decision in no way suggests how it would or could decide the case if it had the opportunity to do so. To accept the Union's submission would be essentially equivalent to allowing a conclusory claim of pre-emption and would effectively eliminate the necessity to make out an arguable case. The better view is that those claiming pre-emption must carry the burden of showing at least an arguable case before the jurisdiction of a state court will be ousted. Moreover, neither nor Hanna Mining supports the Union's position. itself is the source of the arguably protected or prohibited standard for pre-emption. The Court 359 U.S., : "When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by *397 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of the federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law." Later the Court said: "When an activity is arguably subject to 7 or 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence" of the Board. Of course, the Court explained, the Board might decide the case one way or the other, but in the "absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither protected or prohibited," it is not for the courts to decide the case. It is apparent from these passages that a court first must decide whether there is an arguable case for pre-emption; if there is, it must defer to the Board, and only if the Board decides that the conduct is not protected or prohibited may the court entertain the litigation. Nothing in suggests that an arguable case for pre-emption is made out simply because the Board has not decided the general issue one way or the other. Hanna Mining also does nothing for the Union's submission. The Court there, relying on held that there was no pre-emption because the Board or its General Counsel had in fact adversely decided the issues on which the claim of pre-emption rested. Obviously, no inference may be drawn from that decision that a party makes out a case for pre-emption by merely asserting that the issue involved has not been decided by the Board. The Union's position is also negated by Interlake S. S. Co., where the Court found pre-emption only after examining the facts and deciding "whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that either of [the organizations] was arguably a `labor organization' within the contemplation of 8(b)." The Court went on to hold that while there was persuasive evidence *398 that the marine engineers were supervisors, the Board had nevertheless effectively decided that the union involved was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. While agreeing with the principles announced by the Court, Justice Douglas dissented because he had a different view of the facts of the case. Consequently, a party asserting pre-emption must put forth enough evidence to enable a court to conclude that the activity is arguably subject to the Act. Here, the Union points to no evidence in support of its assertion that Davis was arguably an employee. The Union's claim of pre-emption in the state courts was also devoid of any factual or legal showing that Davis was arguably not a supervisor but an employee. In this respect, its brief in the Alabama Supreme Court was similar to its brief here, and its post-trial motion for judgment in the trial court contained no more than a conclusory assertion that state jurisdiction was pre-empted. Until that motion, no claim of pre-emption had been made out, but whether Davis was a supervisor or an employee was a relevant inquiry in making out his case. He alleged in his complaint that he was a supervisor. The Union answered that it was without sufficient information to form a belief as to whether or not he was. Moreover, in moving for summary judgment or for directed verdict at the close of Davis' case and at the close of all the evidence the Union did not assert that Davis was an employee, not a supervisor, let alone point to any evidence to support such a claim.[14] In sum, the Union has not met its burden of showing that the conduct here was arguably subject to the Act. IV We hold that where state law is pre-empted by the NLRA under and our subsequent cases, the state courts lack the very power to adjudicate the claims that trigger pre-emption. *399 Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court's holding that the ILA had waived its pre-emption claim by noncompliance with state procedural rules governing affirmative defenses did not present an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment below, and that court erred in declining to address that claim on the merits. On the merits, we reject the ILA's characterization of our prior cases as holding that the mere lack of a conclusive determination by the Board that an activity is without the purview of the Act renders that activity arguably subject to the Act. Rather, we reaffirm our previously expressed view that the party asserting pre-emption must make an affirmative showing that the activity is arguably subject to the Act and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. So ordered. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE POWELL, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice White | majority | false | Malone v. White Motor Corp. | 1978-04-03T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109826/malone-v-white-motor-corp/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/109826/ | 1,978 | 1977-062 | 1 | 4 | 3 | A Minnesota statute, the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, Minn. Stat. § 181B.01 et seq. (1976) (Pension Act), passed in April 1974, established minimum standards for the funding and vesting of employee pensions. The question in this case is whether this statute, which since January 1, 1975, has been pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),[1] was pre-empted prior to that time by federal labor policy insofar as it purported to override or control the terms of collective-bargaining agreements negotiated under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). A Federal District Court held that it was not, 412 F. Supp. 372 (Minn. 1976), but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and held the Pension Act invalid. 545 F.2d 599 (1976). Because the case fell within our mandatory appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1254 (2), we noted probable jurisdiction. 434 U.S. 813. We reverse.
I
In 1963, White Motor Corp. and its subsidiary, White Farm Equipment Co. (hereafter collectively referred to as appellee), *500 purchased from another company two farm equipment manufacturing plants, located in Hopkins, Minn., and Minneapolis, Minn. (on Lake Street). The employees at these plants, represented by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), were covered by a pension plan established through collective bargaining.
Under the 1971 collective-bargaining contract, the Pension Plan provided that an employee who attained the age of 40 and completed 10 or more years of credited service with the company was entitled to a pension. The amount of the pension would depend upon the age at which the employee retired. In language unchanged since 1950, the 1971 Plan provided that "[p]ensions shall be payable only from the Fund, and rights to pensions shall be enforceable only against the Fund." App. 155.[2] The Plan, however, was to be funded in part on a deferred basis. The unpaid past service liability the excess of accrued liability over the present value of the assets of the Fundwas to be met through contributions by the employer from its continuing operations.[3]
*501 Section 10.02 of the Plan provided that "[t]he Company shall have the sole right at any time to terminate the entire plan." During the 1968 and 1971 negotiations, however, the UAW obtained from appellee guarantees that, upon termination, pensions for those entitled to them would remain at certain designated levels, though lower than those specified in the Plan.[4] By virtue of these guarantees, appellee assumed a direct liability for pension payments amounting to $7 million above the assets in the Fund.
Appellee exercised its contractual right to terminate the Pension Plan on May 1, 1974.[5] A few weeks before, however, the Pension Act had been enacted. This statute imposed "a pension funding charge" directly against any employer who ceased to operate a place of employment or a pension plan. This charge would be sufficient to insure that all employees with 10 or more years of service would receive whatever pension benefits had accrued to them, regardless of whether their rights to those benefits had "vested" within the terms of *502 the Plan. The funds obtained through the pension funding charge would then be used to purchase an annuity payable to the employee when he reached normal retirement age. Although the Pension Act did not compel an employer to adopt or continue a pension plan, it did guarantee to employees with 10 or more years' service full payment of their accrued pension benefits.
Pursuant to the Pension Act, the appellant, Commissioner of Labor and Industry of the State of Minnesota, undertook an investigation of the pension plan termination here involved and later certified that the sum necessary to achieve compliance with the Pension Act was $19,150,053. Under the Pension Act, a pension funding charge in this amount became a lien on the assets of appellee. Appellee promptly filed this suit in Federal District Court.
Appellee's complaint, as amended, asserted violations of the Supremacy Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause claim was based on the argument that the Pension Act was in conflict with several provisions of the NLRA,[6] as amended, 29 U.S. C. § 151 et seq., because it "interferes with the right of Plaintiffs to free collective bargaining under federal law and . . . vitiates collective bargaining agreements entered into under the authority of federal law, by imposing upon Plaintiffs obligations which, by the express terms of such collective bargaining agreements, Plaintiffs were not required to assume." App. A-9A-10. Appellee moved for partial summary judgment or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction based on the pre-emption claim.
Distinguishing Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), and relying on evidence of congressional intent contained in *503 the federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act), 72 Stat. 997, as amended, 76 Stat. 35, 29 U.S. C. § 301 et seq., the District Court held that the Pension Act was not pre-empted by federal law. 412 F. Supp. 372 (Minn. 1976). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the Pension Act was pre-empted by federal labor law, and reversed the District Court. 545 F.2d 599 (1976). The reason was that the Pension Act purported to override the terms of the existing pension plan, arrived at through collective bargaining, in at least three ways: It granted employees vested rights not available under the pension plan; to the extent of any deficiency in the pension fund, it required payment from the general assets of the employer, while the pension plan provided that benefits shall be paid only out of the pension fund; and the Pension Act imposed liability for post-termination payments to the pension fund beyond those specifically guaranteed. This, the court ruled, the State could not do; for if, under Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), "states cannot control the economic weapons of the parties at the bargaining table, a fortiori, they may not directly control the substantive terms of the contract which results from that bargaining." 545 F.2d, at 606. Further, as the court understood the opinion in Oliver, supra, "a state cannot modify or change an otherwise valid and effective provision of a collective bargaining agreement." 545 F.2d, at 608. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that the pre-emption disclaimer in the Disclosure Act relied on by the District Court related only
"to state statutes governing those obligations of trust undertaken by persons managing, administrating or operating employee benefit funds, the violation of which gives rise to civil and criminal penalties. Accordingly, no warrant exists for construing this legislation to leave to a state the power to change substantive terms of pension plan agreements." Id., at 609.
*504 II
It is uncontested that whether the Minnesota statute is invalid under the Supremacy Clause depends on the intent of Congress. "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). Often Congress does not clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to pre-empt state laws; and in such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., ante, at 157-158; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 540-541 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). "We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971). The Pension Act "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible." Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953). Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Minnesota statute was invalid because it trenched on what the court considered to be subjects that Congress had committed for determination to the collective-bargaining process.
There is little doubt that under the federal statutes governing labor-management relations, an employer must bargain about wages, hours, and working conditions and that pension benefits are proper subjects of compulsory bargaining. But there is nothing in the NLRA, including those sections on which appellee relies, which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those issues, such as pension *505 plans, that may be the subject of collective bargaining. If the Pension Act is pre-empted here, the congressional intent to do so must be implied from the relevant provisions of the labor statutes. We have concluded, however, that such implication should not be made here and that a far more reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority to regulate pension plans is to be found in § 10 of the Disclosure Act. Section 10 (b) provided:
"The provisions of this Act, except subsection (a) of this section and section 13 and any action taken thereunder, shall not be held to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of the United States or of any State affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare or pension benefit plans, or in any manner to authorize the operation or administration of any such plan contrary to any such law."
Also, § 10 (a), after shielding an employer from duplicating state and federal filing requirements, makes clear that other state laws remained unaffected:
"Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any State from obtaining such additional information relating to any such plan as it may desire, or from otherwise regulating such plan."
Contrary to the Court of Appeals, we believe that the foregoing provisions, together with the legislative history of the 1958 Disclosure Act, clearly indicate that Congress at that time recognized and preserved state authority to regulate pension plans, including those plans which were the product of collective bargaining. Because the 1958 Disclosure Act was in effect at the time of the crucial events in this case, the expression of congressional intent included therein should control the decision here.[7]
*506 Congressional consideration of the problems in the pension field began in 1954, after the President sent a message to Congress recommending that
"Congress initiate a thorough study of welfare and pension funds covered by collective bargaining agreements, with a view of enacting such legislation as will protect and conserve these funds for the millions of working men and women who are the beneficiaries."[8]
In the next four years, through hearings, studies, and investigations, a Senate Subcommittee canvassed the problems of the nearly unregulated pension field and possible solutions to them. Although Congress turned up extensive evidence of kickbacks, embezzlement, and mismanagement, it concluded:
"The most serious single weakness in this private social insurance complex is not in the abuses and failings enumerated above. Overshadowing these is the too frequent practice of withholding from those most directly affected, the employee-beneficiaries, information which will permit them to determine (1) whether the program is being administered efficiently and equitably, and (2) more importantly, whether or not the assets and prospective income of the programs are sufficient to guarantee the benefits which have been promised to them." S. Rep. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1958) (hereinafter S. Rep.).
As a first step toward protection of the workers' interests in their pensions, Congress enacted the 1958 Disclosure Act. The statute required plan administrators to file with the Labor *507 Department and make available upon request both a description of the plan and an annual report containing financial information. In the case of a plan funded through a trust, the annual report was to include, inter alia,
"the type and basis of funding, actuarial assumptions used, the amount of current and past service liabilities, and the number of employees both retired and nonretired covered by the plan . . . ,"
as well as a valuation of the assets of the fund.
The statute did not, however, prescribe any substantive rules to achieve either of the two purposes described above. The Senate Report explained:
"[T]he legislation proposed is not a regulatory statute. It is a disclosure statute and by design endeavors to leave regulatory responsibility to the States." S. Rep. 18.
This objective was reflected in §§ 10 (a) and 10 (b), quoted above. As the Senate Report explained, the statute was designed "to leave to the States the detailed regulations relating to insurance, trusts and other phases of their operations." S. Rep. 19. There was "no desire to get the Federal Government involved in the regulation of these plans but a disclosure statute which is administered in close cooperation with the States could also be of great assistance to the States in carrying out their regulatory functions." Id., at 18.
There is also no doubt that the Congress which adopted the Disclosure Act recognized that it was legislating with respect to pension funds many of which had been established by collective bargaining. The message from the President which had prompted the original inquiry had focused on the need to protect workers "covered by collective bargaining agreements." The problems that Congress had identified were characteristic of bargained-for plans as well as of others. The Reports of both the Senate and House Committees explained that pension funds were frequently established *508 through the collective-bargaining process. S. Rep. 8; H. R. Rep. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1958) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). The Senate Report emphasized the need for protection even where the plan was incorporated in a collective-bargaining agreement. S. Rep. 4, 8, 14. Congressmen explaining the bill on the floor also made clear that the bill would apply to pension plans "whether or not they have been brought into existence through collective bargaining." 104 Cong. Rec. 16420 (1958) (remarks of Cong. Lane); id., at 16425 (remarks of Cong. Wolverton); see id., at 7049-7052 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Indeed, the bill met opposition in both the Senate and the House on the ground that its approach would "require employers to surrender to labor unions economic and bargaining power which should be negotiated through the normal channels of collective bargaining." S. Rep. 34 (minority view of Sen. Allott); accord, H. R. Rep. 25 (minority views).[9] Yet neither the bill as enacted nor its *509 legislative history drew a distinction between collectively bargained and all other plans, either with regard to the disclosure role of the federal legislation or the regulatory functions that would remain with the States.
Appellee argues that the Disclosure Act's allocation of regulatory responsibility to the States is irrelevant here because the Disclosure Act was "enacted to deal with corruption and mismanagement of funds." Brief for Appellees 36. We think that the appellee advances an excessively narrow view of the legislative history. Congress was concerned not only with corruption, but also with the possibility that honestly managed pension plans would be terminated by the employer, leaving the employees without funded pensions at retirement age.
The Senate Report specifically stated: "Entirely aside from abuses or violations, there are compelling reasons why there should be disclosure of the financial operation of all types of plans." S. Rep. 16. The Report then reproduced a chart showing the number of pension plans registered with the Internal Revenue Service that had been terminated during a 2-month period. Ibid. The Senate Committee also observed: "Trusteed pension plans commonly limit benefits, even though fixed, to what can be paid out of the funds in the pension trust." Id., at 15. As an illustration, the Report quoted language from a collectively bargained pension plan disclaiming any liability of the company in the event of termination. *510 Ibid.[10] The Senate Report also showed an awareness of the problems posed by vesting requirements[11] and expressed concern that "employees whose rights do not mature within such contract period must rely upon the expectation that their union will be able to renew the contract or negotiate a similar one upon its termination." Id., at 8. Thus, Congress was concerned with many of the same issues as are involved in this caseunexpected termination, inadequate funding, unfair vesting requirements. In preserving generally state laws "affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare or pension benefit plans," 72 Stat. 1003, Congress indicated that the States had and were to have authority to deal with these problems.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that § 10 of the Disclosure Act referred specifically to the "future," as well as *511 "present" laws of the States. Congress was aware that the States had thus far attempted little regulation of pension plans.[12] The federal Disclosure Act was envisioned as laying a foundation for future state regulation. The Congress sought "to provide adequate information in disclosure legislation for possible later State . . . regulatory laws." H. R. Rep. 2. Senator Kennedy, a manager of the bill, explained to his colleagues:
"The objective of the bill is to provide more adequate protection for the employee-beneficiaries of these plans through a uniform Federal disclosure act which will . . . make the facts available not only to the participants and the Federal Government but to the States, in order that any desired State regulation can be more effectively accomplished." 104 Cong. Rec. 7050 (1958).
See also S. Rep. 18. Senator Kennedy had "no doubt that this [was] an area in which the States [were] going to begin to move." 104 Cong. Rec. 7053 (1958).
The aim of the Disclosure Act was perhaps best summarized by Senator Smith, the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee and a supporter of the bill. He stated:
"It seems to be the policy of the pending legislation to extend beyond the problem of corruption. As stated in the language of the bill, one of its aims is to make available to the employee-beneficiaries information which will permit them to determine, first, whether the program is being administered efficiently and equitably; and, second, more importantly, whether or not the assets and *512 prospective income of the programs are sufficient to guarantee the benefits which have been promised to them.
"This present bill provides for far more than anticorruption legislation directed against the machinations of dishonest men who betray their trust. Rather, it inaugurates a new social policy of accountability. . . .
"This policy could very well lead to the establishment of mandatory standards by which these plans must be governed." Id., at 7517.
It is also clear that Congress contemplated that the primary responsibility for developing such "mandatory standards" would lie with the States.
Although Congress came to a quite different conclusion in 1974 when ERISA was adopted, the 1958 Disclosure Act clearly anticipated a broad regulatory role for the States. In light of this history, we cannot hold that the Pension Act is nevertheless implicitly pre-empted by the collective-bargaining provisions of the NLRA. Congress could not have intended that bargained-for plans, which were among those that had given rise to the very problems that had so concerned. Congress, were to be free from either state or federal regulation insofar as their substantive provisions were concerned. The Pension Act seeks to protect the accrued benefits of workers in the event of plan termination and to insure that the assets and prospective income of the plan are sufficient to guarantee the benefits promisedexactly the kind of problems which the 85th Congress hoped that the States would solve.
This conclusion is consistent with the Court's decision in Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), which concerned a claimed conflict between a state antitrust law and the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement specially adapted to the trucking business. The agreement prescribed a wage scale for truckdrivers and, in order to prevent evasion, provided that drivers who own and drive their own vehicles should be paid, in addition to the prescribed wage, a stated minimum rental *513 for the use of their vehicles. An Ohio court had invalidated this portion of the collective-bargaining agreement under Ohio antitrust law. This Court reversed, noting that "[t]he application [of the Ohio law] would frustrate the parties' solution of a problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no limitations relevant here." Id., at 296.
The Oliver opinion contains broad language affirming the independence of the collective-bargaining process from state interference:
"Federal law here created the duty upon the parties to bargain collectively; Congress has provided for a system of federal law applicable to the agreement the parties made in response to that duty . . . and federal law sets some outside limits (not contended to be exceeded here) on what their agreement may provide . . . . We believe that there is no room in this scheme for the application here of this state policy limiting the solutions that the parties' agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working conditions." Ibid. (citations omitted).
The opinion nevertheless recognizes exceptions to this general rule. One of them, necessarily anticipated, was the situation where it is evident that Congress intends a different result:
"The solution worked out by the parties was not one of a sort which Congress has indicated may be left to prohibition by the several States. Cf. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 307-312." Ibid.[13]
*514 As we understand the 1958 Disclosure Act and its legislative history, the collective-bargaining provisions at issue here dealt with precisely the sort of subject matter "which Congress . . . indicated may be left to [regulation] by the several states." Congress clearly envisioned the exercise of state regulation power over pension funds, and we do not depart from Oliver in sustaining the Minnesota statute.
III
Insofar as the Supremacy Clause issue is concerned, no different conclusion is called for because the Minnesota statute was enacted after the UAW-White Motor Corp. agreement had been in effect for several years. Appellee points out that the parties to the 1971 collective-bargaining agreement therefore had no opportunity to consider the impact of any such legislation. Although we understand the equitable considerations which underlie appellee's argument, they are not material to the resolution of the pre-emption issue since they do not render the Minnesota Pension Act any more or less consistent with congressional policy at the time it was adopted.[14]
Our decision in this case is, of course, limited to appellee's claim that the Minnesota statute is inconsistent with the federal labor statutes. Appellee's other constitutional claims are not before us. It remains for the District Court to consider on remand the contentions that the Minnesota Pension Act impairs contractual obligations and fails to provide due *515 process in violation of the United States Constitution. Without intimating any views on the merits of those questions,[15] we note that appellee's claim of unfair retroactive impact can be considered in that context. All that we decide here is that the decision of the Court of Appeals finding federal preemption of the Minnesota Pension Act should be and hereby is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. | A Minnesota statute, the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, Minn. Stat. 181B.01 et seq. (Pension Act), passed in April 1974, established minimum standards for the funding and vesting of employee pensions. The question in this case is whether this statute, which since January 1, 1975, has been pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),[1] was pre-empted prior to that time by federal labor policy insofar as it purported to override or control the terms of collective-bargaining agreements negotiated under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). A Federal District Court held that it was not, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and held the Pension Act invalid. Because the case fell within our mandatory appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1254 (2), we noted probable jurisdiction. We reverse. I In 1963, White Motor Corp. and its subsidiary, White Farm Equipment Co. (hereafter collectively referred to as appellee), *500 purchased from another company two farm equipment manufacturing plants, located in Hopkins, Minn., and Minneapolis, Minn. (on Lake Street). The employees at these plants, represented by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), were covered by a pension plan established through collective bargaining. Under the 1971 collective-bargaining contract, the Pension Plan provided that an employee who attained the age of 40 and completed 10 or more years of credited service with the company was entitled to a pension. The amount of the pension would depend upon the age at which the employee retired. In language unchanged since 1950, the 1971 Plan provided that "[p]ensions shall be payable only from the Fund, and rights to pensions shall be enforceable only against the Fund." App. 155.[2] The Plan, however, was to be funded in part on a deferred basis. The unpaid past service liability the excess of accrued liability over the present value of the assets of the Fundwas to be met through contributions by the employer from its continuing operations.[3] *501 Section 10.02 of the Plan provided that "[t]he Company shall have the sole right at any time to terminate the entire plan." During the 1968 and 1971 negotiations, however, the UAW obtained from appellee guarantees that, upon termination, pensions for those entitled to them would remain at certain designated levels, though lower than those specified in the Plan.[4] By virtue of these guarantees, appellee assumed a direct liability for pension payments amounting to $7 million above the assets in the Fund. Appellee exercised its contractual right to terminate the Pension Plan on May 1, 1974.[5] A few weeks before, however, the Pension Act had been enacted. This statute imposed "a pension funding charge" directly against any employer who ceased to operate a place of employment or a pension plan. This charge would be sufficient to insure that all employees with 10 or more years of service would receive whatever pension benefits had accrued to them, regardless of whether their rights to those benefits had "vested" within the terms of *502 the Plan. The funds obtained through the pension funding charge would then be used to purchase an annuity payable to the employee when he reached normal retirement age. Although the Pension Act did not compel an employer to adopt or continue a pension plan, it did guarantee to employees with 10 or more years' service full payment of their accrued pension benefits. Pursuant to the Pension Act, the appellant, Commissioner of Labor and Industry of the State of Minnesota, undertook an investigation of the pension plan termination here involved and later certified that the sum necessary to achieve compliance with the Pension Act was $19,150,053. Under the Pension Act, a pension funding charge in this amount became a lien on the assets of appellee. Appellee promptly filed this suit in Federal District Court. Appellee's complaint, as amended, asserted violations of the Supremacy Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause claim was based on the argument that the Pension Act was in conflict with several provisions of the NLRA,[6] as amended, 29 U.S. C. 151 et seq., because it "interferes with the right of Plaintiffs to free collective bargaining under federal law and vitiates collective bargaining agreements entered into under the authority of federal law, by imposing upon Plaintiffs obligations which, by the express terms of such collective bargaining agreements, Plaintiffs were not required to assume." App. A-9A-10. Appellee moved for partial summary judgment or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction based on the pre-emption claim. Distinguishing and relying on evidence of congressional intent contained in *503 the federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 301 et seq., the District Court held that the Pension Act was not pre-empted by federal law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the Pension Act was pre-empted by federal labor law, and reversed the District Court. The reason was that the Pension Act purported to override the terms of the existing pension plan, arrived at through collective bargaining, in at least three ways: It granted employees vested rights not available under the pension plan; to the extent of any deficiency in the pension fund, it required payment from the general assets of the employer, while the pension plan provided that benefits shall be paid only out of the pension fund; and the Pension Act imposed liability for post-termination payments to the pension fund beyond those specifically guaranteed. This, the court ruled, the State could not do; for if, under "states cannot control the economic weapons of the parties at the bargaining table, a fortiori, they may not directly control the substantive terms of the contract which results from that bargaining." Further, as the court understood the opinion in "a state cannot modify or change an otherwise valid and effective provision of a collective bargaining agreement." Finally, the Court of Appeals found that the pre-emption disclaimer in the Disclosure Act relied on by the District Court related only "to state statutes governing those obligations of trust undertaken by persons managing, administrating or operating employee benefit funds, the violation of which gives rise to civil and criminal penalties. Accordingly, no warrant exists for construing this legislation to leave to a state the power to change substantive terms of pension plan agreements." *504 II It is uncontested that whether the Minnesota statute is invalid under the Supremacy Clause depends on the intent of Congress. "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Retail Often Congress does not clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to pre-empt state laws; and in such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., ante, 7-158; ; "We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Motor Coach The Pension Act "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible." Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Minnesota statute was invalid because it trenched on what the court considered to be subjects that Congress had committed for determination to the collective-bargaining process. There is little doubt that under the federal statutes governing labor-management relations, an employer must bargain about wages, hours, and working conditions and that pension benefits are proper subjects of compulsory bargaining. But there is nothing in the NLRA, including those sections on which appellee relies, which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those issues, such as pension *505 plans, that may be the subject of collective bargaining. If the Pension Act is pre-empted here, the congressional intent to do so must be implied from the relevant provisions of the labor statutes. We have concluded, however, that such implication should not be made here and that a far more reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority to regulate pension plans is to be found in 10 of the Disclosure Act. Section 10 (b) provided: "The provisions of this Act, except subsection (a) of this section and section 13 and any action taken thereunder, shall not be held to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of the United States or of any State affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare or pension benefit plans, or in any manner to authorize the operation or administration of any such plan contrary to any such law." Also, 10 (a), after shielding an employer from duplicating state and federal filing requirements, makes clear that other state laws remained unaffected: "Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any State from obtaining such additional information relating to any such plan as it may desire, or from otherwise regulating such plan." Contrary to the Court of Appeals, we believe that the foregoing provisions, together with the legislative history of the 1958 Disclosure Act, clearly indicate that Congress at that time recognized and preserved state authority to regulate pension plans, including those plans which were the product of collective bargaining. Because the 1958 Disclosure Act was in effect at the time of the crucial events in this case, the expression of congressional intent included therein should control the decision here.[7] *506 Congressional consideration of the problems in the pension field began in 1954, after the President sent a message to Congress recommending that "Congress initiate a thorough study of welfare and pension funds covered by collective bargaining agreements, with a view of enacting such legislation as will protect and conserve these funds for the millions of working men and women who are the beneficiaries."[8] In the next four years, through hearings, studies, and investigations, a Senate Subcommittee canvassed the problems of the nearly unregulated pension field and possible solutions to them. Although Congress turned up extensive evidence of kickbacks, embezzlement, and mismanagement, it concluded: "The most serious single weakness in this private social insurance complex is not in the abuses and failings enumerated above. Overshadowing these is the too frequent practice of withholding from those most directly affected, the employee-beneficiaries, information which will permit them to determine (1) whether the program is being administered efficiently and equitably, and (2) more importantly, whether or not the assets and prospective income of the programs are sufficient to guarantee the benefits which have been promised to them." S. Rep. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1958) (hereinafter S. Rep.). As a first step toward protection of the workers' interests in their pensions, Congress enacted the 1958 Disclosure Act. The statute required plan administrators to file with the Labor *507 Department and make available upon request both a description of the plan and an annual report containing financial information. In the case of a plan funded through a trust, the annual report was to include, inter alia, "the type and basis of funding, actuarial assumptions used, the amount of current and past service liabilities, and the number of employees both retired and nonretired covered by the plan" as well as a valuation of the assets of the fund. The statute did not, however, prescribe any substantive rules to achieve either of the two purposes described above. The Senate Report explained: "[T]he legislation proposed is not a regulatory statute. It is a disclosure statute and by design endeavors to leave regulatory responsibility to the States." S. Rep. 18. This objective was reflected in 10 (a) and 10 (b), quoted above. As the Senate Report explained, the statute was designed "to leave to the States the detailed regulations relating to insurance, trusts and other phases of their operations." S. Rep. 19. There was "no desire to get the Federal Government involved in the regulation of these plans but a disclosure statute which is administered in close cooperation with the States could also be of great assistance to the States in carrying out their regulatory functions." There is also no doubt that the Congress which adopted the Disclosure Act recognized that it was legislating with respect to pension funds many of which had been established by collective bargaining. The message from the President which had prompted the original inquiry had focused on the need to protect workers "covered by collective bargaining agreements." The problems that Congress had identified were characteristic of bargained-for plans as well as of others. The Reports of both the Senate and House Committees explained that pension funds were frequently established *508 through the collective-bargaining process. S. Rep. 8; H. R. Rep. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1958) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). The Senate Report emphasized the need for protection even where the plan was incorporated in a collective-bargaining agreement. S. Rep. 4, 8, 14. Congressmen explaining the bill on the floor also made clear that the bill would apply to pension plans "whether or not they have been brought into existence through collective bargaining." 104 Cong. Rec. 16420 (1958) (remarks of Cong. Lane); ; see Indeed, the bill met opposition in both the Senate and the House on the ground that its approach would "require employers to surrender to labor unions economic and bargaining power which should be negotiated through the normal channels of collective bargaining." S. Rep. 34 (minority view of Sen. Allott); accord, H. R. Rep. 25 (minority views).[9] Yet neither the bill as enacted nor its *509 legislative history drew a distinction between collectively bargained and all other plans, either with regard to the disclosure role of the federal legislation or the regulatory functions that would remain with the States. Appellee argues that the Disclosure Act's allocation of regulatory responsibility to the States is irrelevant here because the Disclosure Act was "enacted to deal with corruption and mismanagement of funds." Brief for Appellees 36. We think that the appellee advances an excessively narrow view of the legislative history. Congress was concerned not only with corruption, but also with the possibility that honestly managed pension plans would be terminated by the employer, leaving the employees without funded pensions at retirement age. The Senate Report specifically stated: "Entirely aside from abuses or violations, there are compelling reasons why there should be disclosure of the financial operation of all types of plans." S. Rep. 16. The Report then reproduced a chart showing the number of pension plans registered with the Internal Revenue Service that had been terminated during a 2-month period. The Senate Committee also observed: "Trusteed pension plans commonly limit benefits, even though fixed, to what can be paid out of the funds in the pension trust." As an illustration, the Report quoted language from a collectively bargained pension plan disclaiming any liability of the company in the event of termination. *510 [10] The Senate Report also showed an awareness of the problems posed by vesting requirements[11] and expressed concern that "employees whose rights do not mature within such contract period must rely upon the expectation that their union will be able to renew the contract or negotiate a similar one upon its termination." Thus, Congress was concerned with many of the same issues as are involved in this caseunexpected termination, inadequate funding, unfair vesting requirements. In preserving generally state laws "affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare or pension benefit plans," Congress indicated that the States had and were to have authority to deal with these problems. Moreover, it should be emphasized that 10 of the Disclosure Act referred specifically to the "future," as well as *511 "present" laws of the States. Congress was aware that the States had thus far attempted little regulation of pension plans.[12] The federal Disclosure Act was envisioned as laying a foundation for future state regulation. The Congress sought "to provide adequate information in disclosure legislation for possible later State regulatory laws." H. R. Rep. 2. Senator Kennedy, a manager of the bill, explained to his colleagues: "The objective of the bill is to provide more adequate protection for the employee-beneficiaries of these plans through a uniform Federal disclosure act which will make the facts available not only to the participants and the Federal Government but to the States, in order that any desired State regulation can be more effectively accomplished." 104 Cong. Rec. 7050 (1958). See also S. Rep. 18. Senator Kennedy had "no doubt that this [was] an area in which the States [were] going to begin to move." 104 Cong. Rec. 7053 (1958). The aim of the Disclosure Act was perhaps best summarized by Senator Smith, the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee and a supporter of the bill. He stated: "It seems to be the policy of the pending legislation to extend beyond the problem of corruption. As stated in the language of the bill, one of its aims is to make available to the employee-beneficiaries information which will permit them to determine, first, whether the program is being administered efficiently and equitably; and, second, more importantly, whether or not the assets and *512 prospective income of the programs are sufficient to guarantee the benefits which have been promised to them. "This present bill provides for far more than anticorruption legislation directed against the machinations of dishonest men who betray their trust. Rather, it inaugurates a new social policy of accountability. "This policy could very well lead to the establishment of mandatory standards by which these plans must be governed." It is also clear that Congress contemplated that the primary responsibility for developing such "mandatory standards" would lie with the States. Although Congress came to a quite different conclusion in 1974 when ERISA was adopted, the 1958 Disclosure Act clearly anticipated a broad regulatory role for the States. In light of this history, we cannot hold that the Pension Act is nevertheless implicitly pre-empted by the collective-bargaining provisions of the NLRA. Congress could not have intended that bargained-for plans, which were among those that had given rise to the very problems that had so concerned. Congress, were to be free from either state or federal regulation insofar as their substantive provisions were concerned. The Pension Act seeks to protect the accrued benefits of workers in the event of plan termination and to insure that the assets and prospective income of the plan are sufficient to guarantee the benefits promisedexactly the kind of problems which the 85th Congress hoped that the States would solve. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's decision in which concerned a claimed conflict between a state antitrust law and the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement specially adapted to the trucking business. The agreement prescribed a wage scale for truckdrivers and, in order to prevent evasion, provided that drivers who own and drive their own vehicles should be paid, in addition to the prescribed wage, a stated minimum rental *513 for the use of their vehicles. An Ohio court had invalidated this portion of the collective-bargaining agreement under Ohio antitrust law. This Court reversed, noting that "[t]he application [of the Ohio law] would frustrate the parties' solution of a problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no limitations relevant here." The opinion contains broad language affirming the independence of the collective-bargaining process from state interference: "Federal law here created the duty upon the parties to bargain collectively; Congress has provided for a system of federal law applicable to the agreement the parties made in response to that duty and federal law sets some outside limits (not contended to be exceeded here) on what their agreement may provide We believe that there is no room in this scheme for the application here of this state policy limiting the solutions that the parties' agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working conditions." The opinion nevertheless recognizes exceptions to this general rule. One of them, necessarily anticipated, was the situation where it is evident that Congress intends a different result: "The solution worked out by the parties was not one of a sort which Congress has indicated may be left to prohibition by the several States. Cf. Algoma Plywood & Veneer" [13] *514 As we understand the 1958 Disclosure Act and its legislative history, the collective-bargaining provisions at issue here dealt with precisely the sort of subject matter "which Congress indicated may be left to [regulation] by the several states." Congress clearly envisioned the exercise of state regulation power over pension funds, and we do not depart from in sustaining the Minnesota statute. III Insofar as the Supremacy Clause issue is concerned, no different conclusion is called for because the Minnesota statute was enacted after the UAW-White Motor Corp. agreement had been in effect for several years. Appellee points out that the parties to the 1971 collective-bargaining agreement therefore had no opportunity to consider the impact of any such legislation. Although we understand the equitable considerations which underlie appellee's argument, they are not material to the resolution of the pre-emption issue since they do not render the Minnesota Pension Act any more or less consistent with congressional policy at the time it was adopted.[14] Our decision in this case is, of course, limited to appellee's claim that the Minnesota statute is inconsistent with the federal labor statutes. Appellee's other constitutional claims are not before us. It remains for the District Court to consider on remand the contentions that the Minnesota Pension Act impairs contractual obligations and fails to provide due *515 process in violation of the United States Constitution. Without intimating any views on the merits of those questions,[15] we note that appellee's claim of unfair retroactive impact can be considered in that context. All that we decide here is that the decision of the Court of Appeals finding federal preemption of the Minnesota Pension Act should be and hereby is Reversed. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. |
Justice Blackmun | majority | false | Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co. | 1982-04-27T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110700/southern-pacific-transp-co-v-commercial-metals-co/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/110700/ | 1,982 | 1981-084 | 2 | 9 | 0 | "This case presents the question whether a common carrier's violation of credit regulations issued b(...TRUNCATED) | "This case presents the question whether a common carrier's violation of credit regulations issued b(...TRUNCATED) |
Justice Marshall | majority | false | United States v. Miller | 1985-04-01T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111404/united-states-v-miller/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/111404/ | 1,985 | 1984-072 | 1 | 8 | 0 | "The issue presented is whether the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee[1] is violated when a def(...TRUNCATED) | "The issue presented is whether the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee[1] is violated when a def(...TRUNCATED) |
Justice Marshall | dissenting | false | Illinois v. Rodriguez | 1990-06-21T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112475/illinois-v-rodriguez/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/112475/ | 1,990 | 1989-123 | 1 | 6 | 3 | "Dorothy Jackson summoned police officers to her house to report that her daughter Gail Fischer had (...TRUNCATED) | "Dorothy Jackson summoned police officers to her house to report that her daughter Gail Fischer had (...TRUNCATED) |
Justice Stevens | concurring | false | United States v. Broce | 1989-01-23T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112177/united-states-v-broce/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/112177/ | 1,989 | 1988-027 | 1 | 6 | 3 | "While I join the Court's opinion, I write separately to identify the doubtful character of the basi(...TRUNCATED) | "While I join the Court's opinion, I write separately to identify the doubtful character of the basi(...TRUNCATED) |
Justice Scalia | majority | false | Coy v. Iowa | 1988-06-29T00:00:00 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112146/coy-v-iowa/ | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/clusters/112146/ | 1,988 | 1987-157 | 2 | 6 | 2 | "Appellant was convicted of two counts of lascivious acts with a child after a jury trial in which a(...TRUNCATED) | "Appellant was convicted of two counts of lascivious acts with a child after a jury trial in which a(...TRUNCATED) |
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