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Dharmamitra 43

teṣām puruṣāṇāṃ vidaḥ saṃvittayaḥ pratyekamabhiṣvaṅgādimātraikarūpaniyamādekākārāḥ saṃvedyanta ity arthaḥ

The cognitions of those persons are perceived as one-formed, since their form is determined solely by individual factors like attachment and so forth.

tā iti saṃvidaḥ tatreti śabdādau bhāvinya iti pāramārthikya ity arthaḥ

These [refers to] the cognitions, "there" [refers to] sound and other [objects], "truly" means "ultimately real."

kasmān na yujyanta ity āha tadvilakṣaṇā iti

To [the question] "Why are they not possible?" he answers "because they are different from it."

tadālambanavastuvilakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ

[This] means they are different from the object that serves as their basis.

prayogaḥ yadyadākārasaṃvedanaṃ na bhavati na tat tadviṣayaṃ yathā cakṣurjñānaṃ na śabdaviṣayaṃ

The argument is: Whatever does not apprehend the form of something cannot have that thing as its object, just as visual cognition cannot have sound as its object.

tryātmakavastvākāraśūnyāś ca yathoktāḥ saṃvida iti vyākānupalabdhir atiprasaṅgāpattiviparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ

And the aforementioned cognitions are devoid of the tripartite object's form - thus [there is] non-apprehension of the pervasion [and] there is a defeating proof in the form of undesirable consequences if [we accept] the opposite.

syād tad yathā pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīto 'pi sarvātmanā śabdādike vastuni bhāvanādivaśena kvacid eva kṣaṇikatvādau niścayotpattir bhavati na sarvatra tadvad adṛṣṭādivaśenaikākārā saṃvidbhaviṣyatīti

[One] might say: "Even though an object like sound is apprehended through perception in its entirety, due to [mental] dispositions the definite cognition arises only with respect to certain aspects like momentariness, not everywhere; similarly, due to the unseen [force] and other [factors], cognition will have one form."

tadetad asamyak

This is incorrect.

na hi kṣaṇikādivikalpasyādi paramārthato vastuviṣayatvamasmākam iṣṭaṃ

For according to us, conceptual constructions like "momentariness" and so forth do not have real entities as their objects in the ultimate sense.

sarvavikalpātītatvād vastunaḥ

Because a real entity transcends all conceptual constructions.

pāramparyeṇa tu vastuni pratibandhāt tathāvidhavastuprāptihetutayā tasya prāmāṇyaṃ

However, due to [their] indirect connection with the real entity, by being means for attaining such an entity, they [the conceptual constructions] gain their status as valid means of knowledge.

prītyādīnāṃ tu parair vastuviṣayatvam eva paramārthata iṣṭaṃ

But [our] opponents accept that love and other [emotions] do have real entities as their objects in the ultimate sense.

anyathā hi nirālambanatve sati sukhādyātmanāṃ śabdādīnām anubhavat sukhādyanubhavakhyātirityetan na syāt

For otherwise, if they were without support, there could not be the cognition of pleasure and other [feelings] from experiencing sounds and other [objects] which are of the nature of pleasure.

teṣāṃ ca prītyādīnāṃ savikalpakatvād aniścitaṃ na kiñcid rūpam astīti sarvātmanānubhavakhyātiḥ syāt

And since these [feelings] like love are determinate, there is no uncertain aspect [to them], therefore the cognition of experience would be of their entire form.

iyam eva hi niścayānāṃ svārthapratipattir yattāścayanaṃ nāma

For this apprehension of their own object by determinate [cognitions] is what is called their definiteness.

prasādodvegavaraṇānyekasmin puṃsi yogināṃ

For yogins, satisfaction, agitation and delusion arise in one [and the same] spirit.

jāyante na ca tadrūpaḥ pumān abhimataḥ paraiḥ

[These feelings] arise, but others do not accept that the spirit has the nature of these [feelings].

tathā hi kāpilayogināṃ puruṣaṃ prakṛtivibhaktaṃ bhāvayatāṃ puruṣamālambyasvabhyastayogānāṃ prasādo bhavati prītiś ca

For indeed, those followers of Yoga who accept Kapila's [teachings], when meditating upon puruṣa as distinct from prakṛti, experience clarity and joy after having practiced yoga properly based on puruṣa

ajitayogānāṃ kṣiprataramapaśyatāṃ udvegaḥ ye ca prakṛtyā jaḍamatayasteṣāṃ varaṇamupajāyate

Those who have not mastered yoga and do not quickly perceive [puruṣa] experience agitation, while those who are naturally dull-minded experience confusion

na cāsau puruṣas tadrūpastriguṇātmako 'bhīṣṭaḥ paraiḥ

And this puruṣa is not accepted by others as having that nature, [namely] as consisting of the three guṇas

tasmāt prasādatāpadainyādikāryopalabdher ityanaikāntikametat

Therefore, this [inference] based on "the observation of effects like clarity, distress and dejection" is inconclusive

saṅkalpāt tāni prītyādīni bhavanti na puruṣāditi cet

[If you say] "Those [effects] like joy etc. arise from volition, not from puruṣa"

etacchabdādiṣvapi samānaṃ

This [argument] applies equally to sound and other [objects]

tataś ca saṅkalpamātrabhāvitve bāhyāḥ sukhadayo na sidhyanti

And consequently, if [they] were mere products of volition, external pleasures etc. would not be established

saṅkalpasya saṃvidrūpatvāt

Because volition is of the nature of consciousness

ata eva ca bāhyasukhādyupadhānavaśāt saṃvedanasya sātādirūpatvamityetad api vyabhicāri

For this very reason, the [claim] that "consciousness has the nature of pleasure etc. due to the influence of external pleasure etc." is also inconsistent

antareṇāpi bāhyaviṣayopadhānaṃ puruṣālambanena prītyādīnām utpattidarśanāt

Because even without external objects being imposed, joy etc. are observed to arise with puruṣa as their basis

yacceṣṭāniṣṭhavikalpād anapekṣitabāhyaviṣayasannidhānaṃ sukhādisaṃvedanaṃ prasiddhaṃ tat kathaṃ paropadhānāt syāt

And how could that well-known experience of pleasure etc. which arises from contemplation of the desirable and undesirable without requiring the presence of external objects come from the imposition of something else?

mano 'pi siddham ityādinā saṃvidrūpatvasya pratipāditatvāt

Because it has been established through [the statement] beginning with "the mind too is established" that [mind] is of the nature of consciousness

tasmāt samanvayādityasiddho hetuḥ

Therefore, the reason [given by the Sāṃkhya] "because of homogeneity" is unproven.

siddhe 'pi triguṇe vyakte na pradhānaṃ prasidhyati / ekaṃ tat kāraṇaṃ nityaṃ naikajātyanvitaṃ hi tat

Even if the manifest (vyakta) is accepted as consisting of three guṇas, pradhāna is not established as its one eternal cause, for that [manifest] is not united with a single generic character.

yadi nāma vyaktam triguṇātmakaṃ siddhaṃ tathāpi tasya yattadabhīṣṭaṃ kāraṇaṃ pradhānākhyaṃ tan na sidhyati

Even if it be granted that the manifest is comprised of three guṇas, still that which is desired [by the Sāṃkhyas] as its cause, called pradhāna, is not established.

tathābhūtena kāraṇena kvacid api hetor anvayāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ

[This is] because nowhere has the reason been proven to have concomitance with such a cause.

tathā hi triguṇātmakamevaṃ nityaṃ vyāpi ca tasya kāraṇaṃ sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ

For they desire to prove that its cause is one that consists of three guṇas, is eternal, and all-pervading.

na caivambhūtena kāraṇena kvaciddhetoḥ pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ / nāpi yadātmakaṃ kāryam upalabhyate kāraṇenāvaśyaṃ tadātmanā bhavitavyaṃ

Neither has any invariable connection of the reason with such a cause been established, nor must a cause necessarily be of the same nature as its effect is observed to be.

kāryakāraṇayor bhedāt

Because there is a difference between cause and effect.

tathā hi hetumattvānityatvāvyapitādibhir dharmaiḥ samanvite vyaktākhyaṃ kāryamiṣyate bhavadbhiḥ naca tatkāraṇasya tādrūpyamiṣṭaṃ tasmād anaikāntiko hetuḥ

For you [Sāṃkhyas] accept that the effect called manifest possesses such properties as "having a cause," "being non-eternal," "being non-pervasive," etc., yet you do not accept these same properties for its cause; therefore the reason is inconclusive.

dharmaviśeṣaviparītabhāvanād viruddho 'pīti darśayannāha ekaṃ tat kāraṇamityādi

[The author] shows that [the reason] is also contradictory because it entails a conception contrary to [the cause's] specific properties, stating "that one cause" etc.

eko nityastriguṇātmakaḥ kāraṇabhūto dharmaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ sa ca tathābhūto na sidhyati kiṃ tarhi viparīta iti bhāvaḥ

[The meaning is that] what is desired to be proven is an entity that is one, eternal, consisting of three guṇas, and serving as a cause, but such an entity is not established; rather, [what is established is] the opposite.

kasmādityāha naikajātyanvitaṃ hi taditi

[He asks] "how?" [and answers] "because that is not endowed with a single generic character"

hi śabdo hetau

The word 'hi' [is used] in the sense of 'because'

tasmāt tadvyaktākhyaṃ kāryaṃ naikayā triguṇātmakayā svātmabhūtayā jātyā samanvitaṃ siddhaṃ

Therefore, the effect known as 'manifest' is not established as being endowed with a single generic character consisting of the three guṇas [and] forming its own essence

kiṃ tarhi anekatvānityatvādidharmānvitamevopalabhyate

What then? [It] is perceived as being endowed with qualities such as multiplicity, non-eternality, and so forth

yadi hi vyaktam ekayā yathoktyā jātyā samanvitaṃ bhavet tadā tat kāraṇam api yathoktadharmaviśiṣṭaṃ sidhyet

If the 'manifest' were endowed with a single generic character as stated [by the opponent], then its cause too would be established as possessing the aforementioned qualities

yāvatā kāryasyānityatvānekatvadharmānvayadarśanāt tatkāraṇam api tathaivānumīyate

Since the effect is observed to possess qualities of non-eternality and multiplicity, its cause too must be inferred to be likewise

nityasya kramākramābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt

Because for something eternal, [its] operation would be contradictory both in sequence and simultaneity

kāraṇabhedakṛtatvāc ca kāryavaicitryasya

And because diversity in the effect must be caused by diversity in the cause

anyathā nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt

Otherwise, [there would be] the undesirable consequence of [the effect being] without cause

tasmān na nityaikarūpapradhānasiddhiḥ

Therefore, [there can be] no establishment of a single eternal pradhāna

yadi punar anityānekarūpa eva kāraṇaṃ pradhānam iti saṃjñā kriyeta tadā nāsti vivāda iti bhāvaḥ

If, however, the term 'pradhāna' were applied to a cause that is indeed non-eternal and manifold, then [this is] the meaning: there would be no dispute

ayaḥśalākākalpā hi kramasaṅgatamūrtayaḥ / dṛśyante vyaktayaḥ sarvāḥ kalpanāmiśritātmikāḥ //

All manifested entities are perceived to be like iron rods, [in that they are] having forms connected in sequence and their essence mixed with conceptual constructs.

yathā hyayomayyaḥ śalākāḥ parasparamasaṅgatās tadvadimāḥ śabdādivyaktayaḥsvasvabhāvavyavasthitatayā deśakālaśaktipratibhāsādibhedān na parasparamanvāviśanti /

Just as iron rods remain separate from one another, so too these manifested entities of sound etc., being established in their own nature, do not interpenetrate one another due to their differences in place, time, potency, appearance, and so forth.

etenānekatvaṃ pratipāditaṃ /

By this [statement] multiplicity [of manifested entities] is established.

anityatvapratipādanāyāha kramasaṅgatamūrtaya iti /

To establish their non-permanence, [the text] states "having forms connected in sequence."

utpādakrameṇa saṅgatā samāliṅgitā mūrtiryāsām iti vigrahaḥ /

The compound is to be analyzed as "those whose forms are connected with [and] embraced by a sequence of origination."

kathaṃ tarhi kṣityādinaikena rūpeṇa tathā sa evāyam iti ca sthireṇa svabhāvenānugatā vyavasīyante bhāvā ity āha kalpanāmiśritātmikā iti /

[If one asks:] "How then are entities conceived as unitary in form, like earth etc., and as enduring, as in [the notion] 'this is that same thing'?" [The text] responds: "[because they are] having their essence mixed with conceptual constructs."

mithyāvikalpo 'yamartheṣvekātmatāgraha ity arthaḥ /

The meaning is that this grasping of unity in objects is a false conceptual construction.

etac ca paścāt pratipādayiṣyate kṣaṇabhaṅgādau //

And this will be established later in [the sections on] momentariness and so forth.

evaṃ tāvat samanvayādityasya hetor asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditaṃ adhunā kuṭādibhedavad iti dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyasādhanadharmānvayatvaṃ pratipādayannāha mṛdvikārādaya ityādi / mṛdvikārādayo bhedā naikajātyanvitāstathā /

Thus far it has been established that the reason "because of homogeneity" suffers from being unestablished, contradictory and inconclusive; now, showing that the example "like the differences of jars etc." does not possess the properties of what is to be proven and the means of proof, [the text] states "the differences of clay products etc."

ādiśabdena kanakādivikārāṇāṃ ca grahaṇaṃ /

By the word "ādi" [in the compound mṛdvikārādi], the modifications of gold and such are also included.

tatheti dūṣaṇāntarasamuccaye sādṛśye vā /

The term "tathā" [so also] may be taken either as cumulative [marking] another refutation, or as indicating similarity.

naikajātyanvitā ityanena sādhanadharmavaikalyaṃ darśitaṃ /

By means of [the phrase] "not imbued with any single generic character", the absence of the property serving as [valid] proof is shown.

naikanimittāśceti / siddha iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ /

[The phrase] "nor [arising] from a single cause" is to be construed with [the word] "established."

anena sādhyadharmānanvayo darśitaḥ /

By this [phrase], the non-presence of the property to be proven is shown.

nanu caikaṃ mṛtpiṇḍakanakādi kāraṇaṃ teṣāṃ siddham eva tathā mṛtsuvarṇatvādijātiścaiṣām eṣānugāminī dṛṣṭā tat katham ubhayavaikalyam ity āha mṛtpiṇḍāder vibhedata iti /

[One might object:] "But indeed, a single cause like a lump of clay or gold for these [effects] is certainly established, and likewise their generic character of clayness, goldness, etc. is seen to inhere in them, so how [can you claim] the absence of both?" [To this he] says: "because of the diversity of lumps of clay and such things."

nahyeko 'vayavī mṛtpiṇḍādirasti ekadeśāvṛttau sarvāvaraṇaprasaṅgāt /

For there is not a single composite whole like a lump of clay, since if [it existed] in one place, [it would lead to] the undesired consequence of [its] covering everything.

nāpyekā jātiḥ prativyaktiḥ pratibhāsabhedāt //

Nor is there a single generic character in each individual [thing], due to the difference in [their] appearances.

punar api samanvayādityasya hetoḥ svato 'naikāntikatvam iti pratipādayannāha caitanyetyādi / caitanyādyanvitatve 'pi naikapūrvatvamiṣyate /

Showing again that the reason "because of inherence" is itself inconclusive, he states [the verse beginning with] "caitanya": "Even though [they are] endowed with consciousness and other [qualities], [they are] not accepted as having a single antecedent."

puruṣāṇām amukhyaṃ cet tadihāpi samaṃ na kiṃ //

If [you say] it is secondary for the puruṣas, why is it not equally [secondary] in this case too?

tathā hi cetanatvabhoktṛtvādibhir aparimitair dharmair anvitāḥ pumāṃso 'bhīṣṭāḥ na ca te tathāvidhaikakāraṇapūrvakā bhavadbhir iṣyante /

For indeed, the puruṣas are accepted [by you] as endowed with unlimited properties such as consciousness and being-an-experiencer, yet you do not accept them as having a single cause possessing such properties.

gauṇaṃ yato 'caitanyādivyāvṛttāḥ sarva eva pumāṃsastenārthāntaravyāvṛttirūpā caitanyaṃ jātistadanugāminī kalpyate natvekā tātvikī sāstīti /

Since all puruṣas are excluded from insentience and similar [qualities], therefore a genus called "consciousness" is assumed to follow them [merely] as excluding other things, though no such real genus exists.

yadyevaṃ tadamukhyaṃ sukhādyanvitatvamasatyapi tathābhūtaikakāraṇapūrvatve puruṣavadihāpi vyakte kimiti samam tulyaṃ na kalpyate / tasmād anaikāntiko hetuḥ /

If that is so, then why is the association with pleasure etc. not similarly assumed for the manifest [world] just as for the puruṣas, even without being preceded by a single cause possessing these qualities? Therefore the reason is inconclusive.

puruṣāṇām ityupalakṣaṇaṃ /

The mention of "puruṣas" is [meant as] an illustration.

tathā sukhādayo mūlaprakṛtyavasthābhāvino guṇatvācetanatvābhoktṛtvādibhir anvitāḥ pradhānapuruṣāś ca nityatvādibhir yuktāḥ na ca te tathābhūtaikakāraṇapūrvakā ityanenaikāntika eva //

Similarly, pleasure and other [states], being modifications of primordial matter, are endowed with [qualities] like being attributes, being insentient, being non-enjoyers etc., and pradhāna and puruṣas are endowed with [qualities] like eternality etc., yet they are not preceded by a single cause of that nature.

evaṃ tāvat samanvayādityayaṃ hetuḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ /

Thus the reason "because of homogeneity" has been refuted.

sāmprataṃ nigamanavyājena pariśiṣṭahetudūṣaṇārthaṃ diṅmātram āha pradhānahetvabhāve 'pītyādi /

Now, under the pretext of a conclusion, [the author] states just an indication for refuting the remaining reasons [by saying] "Even in the absence of pradhāna as cause" etc.

pradhānahetvabhāve 'pi tataḥ sarvaṃ prakalpate / śakter bhedena vaicitryaṃ kāryakāraṇatādikaṃ // tatra yattāvaduktaṃ parimāṇācchaktitaḥ pravṛtteḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvāccāsti pradhānam iti / ete trayo 'pi hetavo 'naikāntikāḥ sādhyaviparyaye /

[Regarding the claim that] "Pradhāna exists because of [things having] finite measure, because activity [proceeds] from power, and because of the relation between cause and effect" - these three reasons are all inconclusive with respect to the opposite of what is to be proved.

pradhānākhyasya hetor abhāve 'pyeṣāṃ parimāṇādīnām avirodhāt / tathā hi yadi tāvat kāraṇamātrasyāstitvaṃ sādhayte tadā siddhasādhyatā na hyasmākaṃ kāraṇamantareṇa kāryasyotpādo 'bhīṣṭaḥ kāraṇamātrasya ca pradhānam iti saṃjñākaraṇe na kiñcid bādhyate /

Because even in the absence of a cause called pradhāna there is no contradiction of these [facts] like finite measure etc. For if merely the existence of a cause is being proved, then [this constitutes] proving what is [already] proved, since we also do not accept the production of an effect without a cause, and if pradhāna is [merely] made into a name for cause in general, nothing is contradicted.

athaivaṃ sādhyate asti prekṣāvat kāraṇaṃ yadetanniyataparimāṇaṃ vyaktimutpādayati śaktitaś ca pravartata iti / tadānaikāntikatā vināpi hi prekṣāvatā kartrā svahetusāmarthyapratiniyamāt pratiniyataparimāṇādiyuktasyotpattyavirodhāt /

If on the other hand it is proved thus: "There exists an intelligent cause which produces this manifestation of fixed measure and proceeds according to [its] power" - then [there is] inconclusiveness, because even without an intelligent agent there is no contradiction in the production of something endowed with fixed measure etc. due to the determination by the capacity of its own cause.

na cāpi pradhānaṃ prekṣāvadyuktaṃ tasyācetanatvāt / prekṣāyāś ca caitanyaparyāyatvāt /

And pradhāna cannot properly be intelligent, because it is insentient and because intelligence is synonymous with consciousness.

kiṃ ca śaktitaḥ pravṛtter ityanena yadyavyatiriktaśaktiyogi kāraṇamātraṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā /

Moreover, if by means of the reason "because activity [proceeds] from potency," what is sought to be proved is merely a cause possessing non-distinct potencies, then there is proving of what is [already] proved.

atha vyatiriktavicitraśaktiyuktam ekaṃ nityaṃ kāraṇam tadānaikāntikatā hetoḥ /

If, on the other hand, [what is meant to be proved is] a single eternal cause endowed with distinct and diverse potencies, then the reason becomes inconclusive.

tathābhūtena kvacid anvayāsiddher asiddhaś ca hetuḥ na hi vyatiriktaśaktivaśāt kasyacit kāraṇasya kvacit kārye pravṛttiḥ siddhā śaktīnāṃ svātmabhūtatvāt /

And [the reason is] unestablished because no concomitance with such [a cause] is established anywhere, for nowhere is the activity of any cause towards an effect established as being due to distinct potencies, since potencies are [always] intrinsic to their own nature.

yaccoktaṃ avibhāgād vaiśvarūpasyeti tadasiddhaṃ /

And what was stated as "because of the non-separation of the universal form" - that is unestablished.

niranvayavināśadharmatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ kvacidapi layāsiddheḥ /

Because all entities have the nature of traceless destruction, dissolution is not established anywhere.

tathā hi layo bhavan pūrvasvabhāvapracyutau vā satyāṃ bhaved apracyutau vā yadi tāvat pracyutau tadā niranvayavināśaprasaṅgaḥ /

For dissolution, if occurring, would occur either with the loss of the previous nature or without [such] loss; if [it occurs] with loss, then traceless destruction would follow.

athāpracyutay tadā layānupapattiḥ na hyavikalamātmatatvamanubhavataḥ kasyacillayo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /

But if [it occurs] without loss, then dissolution is impossible, for dissolution is not possible for anything experiencing its own unimpaired essence, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence.

tasmāt parasparaviruddhamidam avibhāgo vaiśvarūpaṃ ceti /

Therefore this [statement] "non-separation and universal form" involves mutual contradiction.

tadevaṃ pradhānahetvabhāve 'pi kāraṇasya śaktibhedena hetunā kāryasya parimāṇādirūpeṇa vaicitryaṃ kāryakāraṇavibhāgādiścotpadyata ityanaikāntikatā hetūnāṃ /

Thus, even in the absence of a cause [in the form of] pradhāna, the diversity of the effect in the form of quantity etc. and the differentiation of cause and effect etc. arise through the reason of difference in potencies - [hence] the reasons are inconclusive.

ādiśabdena śaktitaḥ pravṛtter ityetasya grahaṇaṃ /

By the word "etc." is meant the inclusion of [the argument] "because activity [proceeds] from potency."

athavā pradhānahetvabhāve 'pītyapiśabdo 'vadhāraṇe /

Or the word "api" in [the phrase] "even in the absence of a cause [in the form of] pradhāna" is used in the sense of restriction.

tenāyam artho bhavati /

Hence the meaning comes to be this:

pradhānahetvabhāva eva kāraṇaśaktibhedena hetunā kāryasya parimāṇādirūpeṇa vaicitryaṃ kāryakāraṇatādeścopāpdyamānatvād viruddhatā hetūnām iti /

It is only in the absence of a [primary] cause like Pradhāna that diversity in the effect can exist due to different potencies of [secondary] causes, and [it is] only thus that the relation of cause and effect becomes possible; hence the reasons [put forward by the Sāṃkhyas] are contradictory.

tathā hi yadi pradhānaṃ vyaktasya kāraṇaṃ syāt tadā tadātmatvena sarvam eva viśvaṃ tat svarūpavadekam eva dravyaṃ syāt /

For if Pradhāna were the cause of the manifest [world], then the entire universe, being of the same nature as that [Pradhāna], would be a single substance having the same form as that [Pradhāna].

tataścaikā buddhirahaṅkārapañcatanmātrāṇītyādiparimāṇavibhāgo na syāt /

And consequently, there could not be any differentiation of magnitude such as [between] buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and the five tanmātras.

tathā ca sati niṣparimāṇam eva jagat syāt /

And in that case, the world would be without [any] differentiation.

tathā kulālādīnāṃ ghaṭādikaraṇe śaktitaḥ pravṛttiḥ pradhānahetvabhāva upapadyate na tu tadbhāve /

Similarly, the activity of potters and others in making pots and such things is possible only in the absence of Pradhāna as a cause, not in its presence.

yathoktaṃ prāk na ca śaktir na ca kriyeti /

As was stated before: "[There would be] neither potency nor action."

kāryakāraṇavibhāgo 'pi pradhānahetvabhāva eva sati yuktaḥ /

Even the distinction between cause and effect is logical only in the absence of Pradhāna as a cause.

pūrvamevāditaṃ vaiśvarūpyaṃ ca pradhāne sati nopapadyata eva /

It has already been stated that diversity cannot exist if Pradhāna exists.