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tanmayatvena sarvasya jagataḥ tat svarūpavadekatvaprasaṅgādityuktaṃ / | It has been pointed out that since the entire world would be made of that [Pradhāna], it would lead to the absurd conclusion that everything has the same single form as that [Pradhāna]. |
tataś ca vaiśvarūpyamādita eva nāstīti kutastasyāvibhāgaḥ syād iti // | And therefore, since diversity would not exist from the very beginning, how could there be any dissolution of it? |
iti prakṛtiparīkṣā // | Thus ends the examination of Prakṛti. |
sarvotpattimatāmīśamanye hetuṃ pracakṣate | Others declare [the Supreme] Lord to be the cause of all produced things |
nācetanaṃ svakāryāṇi kila prārabhate svayaṃ | An insentient thing cannot, indeed, begin its effects by itself |
anutpattimatāmaṇvākāśādīnāṃ nityatvān na kiñcitkāraṇam astītyata utpattimatām ityuktaṃ | Since unproduced things like atoms, ākāśa and so forth are eternal [and thus] have no cause, therefore [the text] specifies "of produced things" |
īśam iti śīśvaram | The term "īśa" means "God" |
anya iti naiyāyikādayaḥ | "Others" means the Naiyāyikas and others |
tatra viśiṣṭaguṇamātmāntarameva sarvasya jagataḥ kartṛ sarvajñam īśvaram iti kecit | Among these, some hold that "God is a distinct Spirit with special qualities, omniscient, [and] the creator of the entire world" |
ātmavyatiriktaṃ nityaikasarvārthaviṣayabuddhyupetatayā bhinnaguṅatvād dravyāntaram evetyapare | Others hold that "[God] is a distinct substance from the Spirit, because [He] has different qualities, being eternal, one, and endowed with knowledge of all objects" |
nanu dharmādharmaparamāṇvādi jagataḥ kāraṇam asty eva tat kim artham īśvaram aparaṃ kāraṇatvena kalpayanti | [Question:] "Since merit, demerit, atoms etc. already exist as causes of the world, why do they postulate God as another cause?" |
yadyapi dharmādi kāraṇaṃ tathāpi tadacetanatvādadhiṣṭhāyakamantareṇa na svayam svakāryamārabdhumutsahata | Although merit etc. may be causes, nevertheless, being insentient, they cannot begin their effects by themselves without a supervisor |
ityatastadadhiṣṭhāyakena kenacit kartrā bhavitavyam na hi kiñcid cetanam svatantramadhiṣṭhāyakam dṛṣṭam | Therefore there must be some supervisor [who is] a creator, for nothing insentient is ever seen [to be] an independent supervisor |
prayogaḥ yadacetanaṃ tadadhiṣṭhātāram antareṇa na svakāryamārabhate yatha amṛtpiṇḍasalilasūtrādayaḥ kumbhakārarahitāḥ kumbham | [The logical argument is:] Whatever is insentient cannot begin its effects without a supervisor - just as clay-lumps, water, thread etc. [cannot produce] a pot without a potter |
acetanam ca dharmādīniti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ | And merit etc. are insentient - thus [this would constitute] a cognition contradicting the pervader |
tasmādyosāvadhiṣṭhātā{sa} īśvara iti siddham / | Thus it is established that He who is the Operator [of the universe] is Īśvara. |
na caivam sati dharmādharmādīnām vaiyarthyam nimittakāraṇatvādīśvarasyeti / | And in this case, merit and demerit are not rendered purposeless, since Īśvara is [only] the efficient cause. |
syādetadyadātmasamavetau dharmādharmau sa evātmādhiṣṭhātā bhaviṣyati / | [One might object:] "If merit and demerit are inherent in the ātman, then that ātman itself could be the operator." |
tat kim īśvareṇa parikalpiteneti / | "Why then [would we need] to postulate Īśvara?" |
tadasamyak / | This [objection] is incorrect. |
tasyātmanastadānīm ajñatvāt yāvaddhi tasya śarīrendriyādiḥ kāryakāraṇasaṃghāto notpadyate tāvadayamajña upalabhyānapi rūpādīnviṣayānnopalabhate kuto 'nupalabhyau dharmādharmāvupalapsyata iti / | Because that ātman would be unconscious at that time; for as long as its aggregate of causes and effects consisting of body, sense organs, etc. is not produced, this unconscious [entity] does not perceive even perceptible objects like forms, etc. - how then could it perceive merit and demerit, which are imperceptible? |
yathoktam | As it has been said: |
ajño jantur anīśoyam ātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ / | "This ignorant creature, not master of its own pleasure and pain, |
īśvaraprerito gacchet svargaṃ vā śvabhram eva vā // | [When] impelled by Īśvara, goes either to heaven or to the nethermost hell." |
iti // | Thus [ends the quotation]. |
tatrāviruddhakarṇopanyastam īśvarasādhane pramāṇadvayam āha yatsvārambhaketyādi / | In this context, [the text] states two means of proof for establishing Īśvara, presented by Aviruddhakarṇa, beginning with "that which has its own origination..." |
yat svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśeṣavat buddhimaddhetugamyaṃ tat tadyathā kalaśādikam | That which possesses a specific arrangement of its own component parts is cognizable [as having] an intelligent cause, as for instance a jar and similar [objects]. |
dvīndriyagrāhyamagrāhyaṃ vivādapadamīdṛśam buddhimatpūrvakam tena vaidharmyeṇāṇavo matāḥ | Such an object of dispute, which is both perceptible by two sense organs and imperceptible, must be [produced] by an intelligent [cause], with atoms serving as a corroborative instance through dissimilarity. |
taduktam dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyam vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt ghaṭādivat vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti | Thus it has been stated: "That which is perceptible by two sense organs or imperceptible, being the subject of dispute, must be preceded by an intelligent cause, because it possesses a specific arrangement of its component parts, like a jar, and unlike atoms [through dissimilarity]." |
tatra dvābhyāṃ darśanasparśanendriyābhyāṃ grāhyaṃ mahadanekadravyavattvarūpādyupalabdhikāraṇopetaṃ pṛthivyudakajvalanasaṃjñitaṃ trividhaṃ dravyaṃ dvīndriyagrāhyam | Here, "perceptible by two sense organs" refers to the three kinds of substances named earth, water and fire, which are perceptible by the two sense organs of sight and touch, because they possess the causes of perceptibility such as being large, containing multiple substances, and having color. |
agrāhyaṃ vāyvādi yasmān mahatvam anekadravyavatvaṃ rūpasamavāyādiścopalabdhikāraṇamiṣyate tac ca vāyvādau nāsti | "Imperceptible" refers to air and other [substances], because largeness, possession of multiple substances, inherence of color and other [qualities] are considered to be causes of perceptibility, and these do not exist in air and other [substances]. |
yathoktam mahattvādanekadravyatvād rūpāccopalabdhiḥ | As has been stated: "Perception occurs due to largeness, possession of multiple substances, and color." |
adravyavattvātparamāṇavāva{dha---}nupalabdhiḥ | "An atom is imperceptible because it does not contain [other] substances." |
rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyoranupalabdhiḥ | "Air is imperceptible due to the absence of color-configuration." |
rūpasaṃskāro rūpasamavāyaḥ | "Color-configuration" means the inherence of color. |
dvyaṇukādīnāṃ tvanulabdhiramahattvāditi | "But dyads and other [compounds] are imperceptible due to lack of largeness." |
atra sāmānyena dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyasya buddhimatkāraṇapūrvatvasādhane siddhasādhyatā doṣo ghaṭādiṣu ubhayasiddheḥ | In this [argument], if one were to prove generally that things perceptible by two sense organs and imperceptible [things] are preceded by intelligent causes, [there would be] the fallacy of proving what is already established with respect to jars and similar [objects], since both [parties] accept this. |
vivādābhāvāt / [p.42] abhyupetabādhā ca aṇvākāśādīnāṃ tathānabhyupagamāt / | Due to the absence of dispute [there would be this fallacy]; and [there would be] the fallacy of contradicting what is accepted, because [the Naiyāyika] does not accept [the production by an intelligent cause] of atoms, ākāśa and similar [entities]. |
teṣāṃ ca nityatvāpratyakṣādibādhā / | And [there would be] contradiction with direct perception and other [means of valid cognition] regarding their eternality. |
atas tadarthaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannagrahaṇam / | Therefore, for this purpose, the qualification "being the locus of disagreement" is included. |
vividhā matir vimatir vipratipattir iti yāvat asyā adhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ vivādāspadībhūtam ity arthaḥ / | "Vimati" means diverse opinions or "vipratipatti," and that which has become the locus of these [diverse opinions] is what has become the subject of dispute—this is the meaning. |
evaṃvidhe sati śarīrendriyabhuvanādaya eva pakṣīkṛtā iti nāṇvādiṣu prasaṅgaḥ / | When [the subject] is qualified in this way, only the body, sense organs, worlds and similar [entities] are made the subject [of inference], thus [there is] no undesired extension to atoms and other [eternal entities]. |
kāraṇamātrapūrvatve 'pi sādhye siddhasādhyatā mābhūd iti buddhimatkāraṇagrahaṇaṃ / | [The qualifier] "intelligent cause" is taken [in the inference] so that even when proving mere precedence of a cause, there should not be the fallacy of proving what is [already] established. |
sāṃkhyaṃ prati buddhisattvānupapatter na siddhasādhyatā avyatiriktā hi buddhiḥ pradhānāt sāṃkhyair iṣyate / | Against the Sāṃkhya there is no fallacy of proving what is [already] established, because of the impossibility of [separate] existence of intelligence, for intelligence is accepted by the Sāṃkhyas as non-different from pradhāna. |
na ca tenaiva tadeva tadvadbhavati / | And certainly the same [thing] cannot become endowed with itself through itself. |
svārambhakāṇām avayavānāṃ saṃniveśaḥ pracayātmakaḥ saṃyogaḥ / | "Arrangement of component parts" [means] the conjunction in the form of aggregation of the parts that constitute [these things]. |
tena viśiṣṭaṃ vyavacchinnaṃ tadbhāvas tasmāt / | [These things are] characterized and differentiated by this [arrangement]; therefore [they must be] of that nature [i.e., produced by an intelligent cause]. |
avayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvaṃ gotvādibhir vyabhicārītyataḥ svārambhakagrahaṇam / | [The reason] 'being characterized by an arrangement of components' would deviate due to [universals like] 'cowness' etc., hence the specification 'its own constituting [parts]'. |
gotvādīni tu dravyārambhakāvayavasanniveśena viśeṣyante natu svārambhakāvayavasanniveśeneti / | The universals like 'cowness' etc. are differentiated by the arrangement of parts constituting the substance, not by the arrangement of parts constituting themselves. |
tena ye 'sau buddhimān sa īśvara iti / | Therefore, that which is intelligent is [what we call] "Īśvara" [God]. |
tadetat pramāṇaṃ yadityādiślokadvayena nirdiṣṭaṃ / | This proof has been indicated by the two verses beginning with "yad". |
svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśa eva viśeṣo viśeṣaṇaṃ so 'syāstīti tat tathoktam / tena viśiṣṭam ity arthaḥ / etena hetor vyāptir darśitā / | That which has the arrangement of its own constituting parts as its differentiating characteristic is called thus. The meaning is "qualified by that". Through this, the pervasion of the reason [with the probandum] is shown. |
dvīndriyetyādi / vivādapadam iti / vivādādhikaraṇāpannam ity arthaḥ //47- | [Beginning with the words] "perceivable by two senses" etc. The term "vivādapadam" means "that which has become the subject of dispute". |
dvitīyaṃ ca taduktaṃ pramāṇaṃ bodhayann āha tattvādīnām ityādi / | Explaining the second proof mentioned by him, [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "tattvādīnām". |
tattvādīnām upādānaṃ cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitaṃ / rūpādimattvāt tantvādi yathā dṛṣṭaṃ svakāryakṛt // | The material cause of the elements etc. must be controlled by something conscious, because [they] possess color etc., just as yarn etc. are seen [to be controlled] when producing their effects. |
rūpādimattvād iti hetuḥ / | "Because [they] possess color etc." is the reason. |
tantvādīti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / | "Yarn etc." is the example. |
yathoktam tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāramārabhanta iti pratijānīmahe / rūpādimattvāt tantvādivad iti // | As has been declared: "The material causes of the body, worlds and organs produce their effects [only] when controlled by something possessing consciousness - this we assert, because they possess form etc., like yarn and similar [things]." |
udyotakāras tu pramāṇayati bhuvanahetavaḥ pradhānaparamāṇvadṛṣṭāḥ svakāryopattāvatiśayabuddhimantamadhiṣṭhātāram apekṣante sthitvā pravṛttes tantuturyādivad iti / | Uddyotakara however presents the proof thus: "The causes of the world - [namely] pradhāna, atoms and the unseen [force] - require a controller possessing superior intelligence for producing their effects, because their activity is intermittent, like yarn, shuttle and similar [things]." |
etadeva darśayati dharmādharmāṇava ityādi / | This very [argument] is shown by [the words] beginning with "dharma, adharma, and atoms." |
dharmādharmāṇavassarve cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitāḥ / | "All [things including] dharma, adharma and atoms are controlled by something possessing consciousness, |
svakāryārambhakāḥ sthitvā pravṛttesturitantuvat // | [And] they produce their effects [only] after remaining [inactive], due to [their] intermittent activity, like yarn." |
subodhaṃ // | [This is] easily understood. |
praśastamatistvāha sargādau puruṣāṇāṃ vyavahāro 'nyopadeśapūrvakaḥ uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānāṃ pratyarthaniyatatvāt / aprasiddhavāgvyavahārāṇāṃ kumārāṇāṃ gavādiṣu pratyarthaniyato vāgvyavahāro yathā mātrādyopadeśapūrvaka iti / | Praśastamati however says: "At the beginning of creation, human practices must have been preceded by instruction from another, because later the practices of enlightened beings are found to be restricted to specific objects - just as in the case of children who have not yet learned verbal usage, their verbal usage regarding cows and other [things] is restricted to specific objects [and is] preceded by instruction from their mother and others." |
prabuddhānāṃ pratyarthaniyatatvād iti / prabuddhānāṃ satāṃ pratyarthaniyatatvād ity arthaḥ / | The phrase "because the [practices] of the enlightened are restricted to specific objects" means that the [practices] of those who have become enlightened are restricted to specific objects. |
yadupadeśapūrvakaḥ sargādau vyavahāraḥ sa īśvaraḥ pralayakālepyaluptajñānātiśaya iti siddhaṃ darśayati sargādāvityādi / | He shows as established that "The one by whose instruction practices [existed] at the beginning of creation is God, whose superior knowledge remains undiminished even at the time of dissolution" through [the words] beginning with "at the beginning of creation." |
śeṣaṃ tu tubodhaṃ // | The remaining [arguments] however [are] easy to understand. |
tathā aparaṇūdyotakāroktāni pramāṇāni buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitaṃ mahābhutādikaṃ vyaktaṃ sukhaduḥkhanimittaṃ bhavati / acetanatvāt kāryatvād vināśitvād rūpādimattvāt vāśyādivad iti / | Thus the proofs stated by Uddyotakara [are]: "The manifested [world], consisting of the great elements and the rest, becomes the cause of pleasure and pain [only] when controlled by an intelligent cause - because it is insentient, because it is a product, because it is perishable, and because it possesses form and other [qualities], like an axe and other [things]." |
etāni darśayati mahābhūtādikam ityādi / | These [arguments] are shown [in what follows], beginning with "mahābhūtādikam." |
mahābhūtādikaṃ vyaktaṃ buddhimaddhetvadhiṣṭhitaṃ / yāti sarvasya lokasya sukhaduḥkhanimittatāṃ // acetanatvakāryatvavināśitādihetutaḥ / | "The manifested [world], consisting of the great elements and the rest, when controlled by an intelligent cause, becomes the source of pleasure and pain for all people - because of [its] being insentient, being a product, being perishable and other such reasons, |
vāsyādivadataspaṣṭaṃ tasya sarvaṃ pratīyate // | like an axe and other [things] - thus everything is clearly understood to be His." |
buddhimaddhetvadhiṣṭhitam --- cetanāvatādhiṣṭitam / | "Controlled by an intelligent cause" means controlled by [a cause] that possesses consciousness. |
ata iti / yathoktāddhetukadambakāt / | "Thus" means from the aforementioned collection of reasons. |
īśvarasya sarvajagaddhetoḥ // | "His" means of [Īśvara], the cause of the entire world. |
atha sarvajñatvaṃ kathaṃ tasya siddhaṃ yenāsau niḥśreyasābhyudayakāmānāṃ bhaktiviṣayatāṃ yāyādityāha sarvakartṛtvasiddhau cetyādi / | Now [the question is asked]: "How is His omniscience established, by which He should become an object of devotion for those desiring the highest good and prosperity?" To this [the text] says "When [His] being the creator of all is established" etc. |
sarvakartṛtvasiddhau ca sarvajñatvamayatnataḥ / | "When [His] being the creator of all is established, [His] omniscience is proven without effort, |
siddham asya yataḥ kartā kāryarūpādivedakaḥ // | because the creator must be one who knows the form and other aspects of [his] products." |
tathācāhuḥ praśastamatiprabhṛtayaḥ sakalabhuvanahetutvād evāsya sarvajñatvaṃ siddhaṃ / | Thus Praśastamati and others have declared: "[God's] omniscience is established from [His] being the cause of the entire universe." |
kartuḥ kāryopādānopakaraṇaprayojanasampradānaparijñānāt / | Because the creator [must have] complete knowledge of the effect, material cause, instruments, purpose, and recipient. |
iha hi yo yasya kartā bhavati sa tasyopādānād iti jānīte / | For in this world, whoever is the maker of something knows its material cause and so forth. |
yathā kulālaḥ kumbhādīnāṃ kartā tadupādānaṃ mṛtpiṇḍamupakaraṇāni ca cakrādīni prayojanamudakāharaṇādi kuṭumbinaṃ ca sampradānaṃ jānīta ityetat prasiddham tatheśvaraḥ sakalabhuvanānāṃ kartā sa tadupādānāni paramāṇvādilakṣaṇāni tadupakaraṇāni dharmādharmadikkālādīni vyavahāropakaraṇāni sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyalakṣaṇāni prayojanamupabhogaṃ sampradānasaṃjñākāṃś ca puruṣān jānīta iti / | Just as it is well-known that a potter, being the maker of jars and such things, knows their material cause (the clay lump), their instruments (the wheel and so forth), their purpose (carrying water and so forth), and their recipient (the householder), similarly God, being the creator of all worlds, knows their material causes (characterized as atoms and so forth), their instruments (dharma, adharma, space, time, and so forth), the auxiliaries to their operation (characterized as universal, particular, and inherence), their purpose (experience), and the recipients designated as the souls. |
ataḥ siddhamasya sarvajñatvam iti / | Hence His omniscience is established. |
kāryarūpādivedaka iti / kāryasya ye rūpādayaḥ svabhāvādayaḥ ādiśabdenopādānādīnāṃ grahaṇam teṣāṃ vedaka iti samāsaḥ / | "One who knows the form and other [aspects] of the effect" - here the compound means: the forms and other aspects of the effect [refer to] its nature and so forth, by the word "ādi" the material cause and others are included, and "vedaka" means one who knows these. |
yājakāderākṛtigaṇatvāt karmaṇyaṇaṃ vā vidhāya svārthikaṃ ko vidheyaḥ / | The word "vedaka" is [derived] either because it belongs to the group [of words] beginning with "yājaka", or by applying the suffix "aṇa" in the passive sense along with the reflexive [suffix] "ka". |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily understood. |
tathā aparaṃ pramāṇakadambakaṃ tairuktaṃ / | Thus another series of proofs has been stated by them. |
vicitrodayapraspandāspadānāspadaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ dvitīyādipramāṇapañcakavyatiriktapramāṇāntarāvacchedyaṃ / vastutvādibhyo rūpādivat / | That which is the substrate of the variegated and mobile, and that which is not their substrate - which is the subject of dispute - is cognizable through a means of cognition different from the five [means] beginning with the second, just as color and so forth [are cognized as distinct] from entity-hood and so forth. |
vaidharmyeṇa kūrmaromādaya iti / | [The example of] turtle's hair and such [is given] by way of dissimilarity. |
tatra vicitrodayo guṇapadārtha ucyate vicitra uadayo 'syeti kṛtvā prasyandaḥ karmapadārthaḥ | There, the category of Quality is said to have diverse manifestations, and the category of Motion [is called] prasyanda because it has diverse origins. |
tayorāspadaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ dravyam anāspadaṃ guṇādayaḥ pañca samavāyaparyantāḥ | The substratum [āspada] of these two is substance, [which is their] inherent cause, while the non-substratum consists of the five [categories] from Quality up to Inherence. |
dvitīyādipramāṇapañcakamanumānamārabhyābhāvaparyantaṃ tadvyatiriktaṃ pramāṇāntaraṃ pratyakṣaṃ śeṣaṃ subodham | [It is cognized through] a means of knowledge different from the five beginning with the second, i.e., from inference up to non-apprehension, [namely] through perception. The rest is easily understood. |
ayam aparo hetus tairuktaḥ / | This is another argument stated by them. |
sadādyaviśeṣāskanditānāskanditaṃ vimatyādhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ kasyacit pratyakṣaṃ sattvād rūpādivad iti / | That which is pervaded and not pervaded by the particulars of [universals like] existence etc., [and which is] the subject of dispute, is perceptible to someone because it exists, like color etc. |
tatra sadādayaḥ ṣaḍaviśeṣāḥ sadanityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti | There, the six non-particulars beginning with existence are: existence, non-eternality, substantiality, effect, cause, and having universal-particular. |
dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ viśeṣāḥ tairāskanditamākrāntaṃ yathāsambhavaṃ dravyaguṇakarmātmakaṃ padārthatrayamanāskanditaṃ sāmānyād iti | [These are] the particulars of substance, quality and action; what is pervaded by these is, according to possibility, the three categories consisting of substance, quality and action, [and what is] not pervaded [consists of] universal etc. |
śeṣaṃ sugamam / | The rest is easily understood. |
vimaterāspadaṃ vastu pratyakṣaṃ kasyacit sphuṭam / | The object which is the locus of dispute is clearly perceptible to someone. |
tadatrāsiddhatetyādinottarapakṣamārabhate / | With [the words] beginning "inadmissibility here" [the author] begins the counter-position. |
tadatrāsiddhatā hetoḥ prathame sādhane yataḥ / | Because in the first proof there is inadmissibility of the reason, |
sanniveśo na yogākhyaḥ siddho nāvayavī tathā // | since neither the arrangement called conjunction nor the composite whole is established. |